Roth v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States
ROTH v. UNITED STATES
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
No. 85-140 Argued: April 22, 1957 --- Decided: June 24, 1957
1. In the Roth case, the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 1461 which makes punishable the mailing of material that is "obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy . . . or other publication of an indecent character," and Roth's conviction thereunder for mailing an obscene book and obscene circulars and advertising, are sustained. Pp. 479-494.
2. In the Albert case, the constitutionality of § 311 of West's California Penal Code Ann., 1955, which, inter alia, makes it a misdemeanor to keep for sale, or to advertise, material that is "obscene or indecent," and Alberts' conviction thereunder for lewdly keeping for sale obscene and indecent books and for writing, composing, and publishing an obscene advertisement of them, are sustained. Pp. 479-494.
3. Obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected freedom of speech or press either (1) under the First Amendment, as to the Federal Government, or (2) under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as to the States. Pp. 481-485.
(a) In the light of history, it is apparent that the unconditional phrasing of the First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance. Pp. 482-483.
(b) The protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people. P. 484.
(c) All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance — unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion — have the full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more important interests; but implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance. Pp. 484-485. [p477]
4. Since obscenity is not protected, constitutional guaranties were not violated in these cases merely because, under the trial judges' instructions to the juries, convictions could be had without proof either that the obscene material would perceptibly create a clear and present danger of antisocial conduct, or probably would induce its recipients to such conduct. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250. Pp. 485-490.
(a) Sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest — i.e., material having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts. P. 487.
(b) It is vital that the standards for judging obscenity safeguard the protection of freedom of speech and press for material which does not treat sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest. Pp. 487-488.
(c) The standard for judging obscenity, adequate to withstand the charge of constitutional infirmity, is whether, to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interest. Pp. 488-489.
(d) In these cases, both trial courts sufficiently followed the proper standard and used the proper definition of obscenity. Pp. 489-490.
5. When applied according to the proper standard for judging obscenity, 18 U.S.C. § 1461 which makes punishable the mailing of material that is "obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy . . . or other publication of an indecent character," does not (1) violate the freedom of speech or press guaranteed by the First Amendment, or (2) violate the constitutional requirements of due process by failing to provide reasonably ascertainable standards of guilt. Pp. 491-492.
6. When applied according to the proper standard for judging obscenity, § 311 of West's California Penal Code Ann., 1955, which, inter alia, makes it a misdemeanor to keep for sale or to advertise material that is "obscene or indecent," does not (1) violate the freedom of speech or press guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment against encroachment by the States, or (2) violate the constitutional requirements of due process by failing to provide reasonably ascertainable standards of guilt. Pp. 491-492.
7. The federal obscenity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1461 punishing the use of the mails for obscene material, is a proper exercise of the postal power delegated to Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 7, and it [p478] does not unconstitutionally encroach upon the powers reserved to the States by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. Pp. 492-493.
8. The California obscenity statute here involved is not repugnant to Art. I, § 8, cl. 7, since it does not impose a burden upon, or interfere with, the federal postal functions — even when applied to a mail-order business. Pp. 493-494.