A Tour Through the Batavian Republic/Letter XVI
LETTER XVI.
HITHERTO the revolution of Holland had been happily conducted, and the world saw with astonishment a nation, under the eyes of its conquerors, tranquilly proceeding to reform the abuses of its government. This spectacle was the more grand and delightful, as it occurred at a period when Europe was shaken to its centre, by civil contentions, and almost universal hostilities. Hostilities not grounded on the ordinary causes of war, but growing out of opposite principles, which imbittered the animosities of nations beyond the example of all former times. It occurred at a period when the term revolution seemed designated to express scenes of atrocity and horror, outrageous persecutions against virtue, integrity, and talents; violations of morality, and all the social duties of life; a disregard for the claims of humanity; factions succeeding to factions, each more terrible in their measures than their predecessors; the elevation of the bloodthirsty and flagitious, and the depression of the virtuous and humane! It has already been stated that not one drop of human blood was judicially spilt on account of the revolution of Holland!
The emigrations which took place prior to the arrival of the French were considerable, but no severe laws were enacted against the persons who so fled, and the tranquillity and good order maintained by the new government induced multitudes to return to their country. A nobleman who asked permission of the president of the provisional representatives, for his brother, who had accompanied the stadtholder to England, to return to Holland, received for answer, that there were laws against emigrations, but none against returns.
The conduct of the French, towards the Dutch nation was regarded by the latter with sentiments of gratitude and esteem, until, in the month of May, 1795, the articles of the treaty of peace between the two republics were made known. The conditions granted by France to Holland excited throughout the United Provinces the liveliest discontent. They were such as even the most zealous partisans of the new system, and the firmest adherents of the French, could not vindicate. But how were they to be rejected? Holland, completely in the power and at the mercy of France, had no alternative but to accept the conditions offered her, or see her cities given up to spoliation and rapine.
Beside the heavy contributions which had already been levied on the Dutch, a further sum, to the immense amount of one hundred millions of livres, was required by one of the articles of the treaty to be paid, either in specie or in bills upon foreign powers, as should afterwards be agreed upon, as ah indemnification to the French republic for the expences of the war.Antwerp being incorporated with France, the navigation of the Scheldt was declared to be free for the vessels of both republics; and dock-yards and store-houses were assigned in the port of Flushing, where the waters of the Scheldt meet the ocean, for the use of the French.
Though at peace with Austria and the powers of Germany, the Dutch were compelled to assist the French with half their disposable military force: the enemies of the French republic were acknowledged and declared to be the enemies of Holland; and twelve ships of the line, and eighteen frigates (the article probably of the treaty to which the Dutch assented with most cordiality) were agreed to be furnished for the North Sea[1].
The deep discontent occasioned by this treaty, was afterwards further increased by the adoption of a government for the United Provinces, copied after that of the French republic. The moderate party were desirous of the old constitution of the United States, with some modifications and changes favourable to the popular cause, as the perpetual abolition of the stadtholderate and hereditary nobility, and an extension of the right of suffrage. But the influence of France, too weighty to be resisted, and the love of innovation, too ardent for sober reflection, prevailed over these sentiments. The venerable state edifice of the Seven Confederated Provinces of Belgium was overthrown, and a Gallic structure, airy, light, and unsubstantial, was erected in its place. The weakness and crimes of the French directory, facilitating the enlightened views of the great man who, happily for Europe, at present guides the destinies of France, proved its overthrow; and the Batavian government, its offspring, is verging fast, through imbecility, to dissolution. May it quietly expire!
On the establishment of a directorial government in Holland, many virtuous and enlightened patriots, disgusted at the new system of things, and not being able, under the circumstance of an irresistible foreign influence, to render their country further services, withdrew themselves from public affairs, to the infinite loss of the nation. Their places were occupied by another description of patriots, men who owed their consequence to the revolution; and supposed it more from personal interest and feeling, than from any settled conviction of its expediency or value: — men of weak understandings, but ardent dispositions, who mistook a desire for innovation[2] for an inclination to do good.
The losses of the Dutch abroad, the capture of their important colony the Cape of Good Hope, and the disgraceful surrender of the fleet sent to its relief', conspired to augment the unpopularity of the new government and strong suspicions were entertained, that in the bosom of the directory and of the councils there was a party in the pay of England, which, like the stadtholder's, betrayed the interests of the republic, and served the cause of its most dangerous rival. In particular it was thought that the fleet sent to the Cape of Good Hope was destined to fall an easy prey to the English; and rumours of this treason were afloat before the armament sailed from the ports of Holland. To ascertain the foundation on which such a report rested would probably be no easy task, but the mention that it was widely circulated and believed, serves to shew the opinion that was entertained of the government; and that men, in places of authority and trust, were thought to be base enough, for mercenary considerations, to betray their country.
The naval combat of the 11th of October, 1797, though it ended in the total defeat of their fleet, raised for a period the spirits of the Dutch nation, and was of some advantage to the government. The contest was honourably and courageously maintained by the Dutch, and no one was suspected of having neglected his duty, or served the cause of the enemy. As I remembered to have heard in England some reports to the disadvantage of Admiral Story, who commanded a division of the Batavian fleet on that day, I made particular enquiries concerning him; and by Captain ———, who commanded a frigate on the 11th of October, and saw the whole of the engagements I was assured, that Admiral Storey's conduct was that of a brave and honourable seaman. Towards the end of the action he lost a leg; and it was not until he was so disabled, that his ship quitted the line of battle. He has since been impeached for his behaviour on another occasion; but certainly his conduct on the 11th of October, far from deserving any censure, was highly meritorious and praise-worthy.
Admiral De Winter was a general of brigade in the French army at the period of the conquest of Holland, and bears the reputation of a good soldier, as well as of a brave and skilful admiral. He is a person of the finest character, and universally beloved. Though unfortunate to an extent, where a sense of national shame and calamity blunts the feeling of pity, and gives velocity and sharpness to the darts of calumny, his reputation is unsullied by the slightest breath of unfavourable report. His disposition is mild, and his manners singularly modest and unassuming. Yet with these qualities, which seem but ill adapted to win the hearts of the turbulent and boisterous men of the profession to which he belongs; he is viewed with the most partial affection by the officers and seamen of the Dutch marine. His conduct has invariably been marked by moderation and humanity; and though he obtained the high situation which he holds in the navy of Holland by the influence of the French, he has never senctioned with his approbation the conduct of that republic towards his country. In all instances he has acted the part of a genuine and honest patriot; — of a patriot worthy of the most virtuous times of the republic.
The popularity at home resulting to the government of Holland from the hard contested, though unsuccessful, combat of the 11th of October, was short lived. Early in the ensuing year, discontent and opposition to the measures of the Batavian administration had made such progress, not only among the people, but in the councils, that the directory, in order to maintain their authority, were obliged to have recourse to the desperate expedient of purging the legislative assemblies of their obnoxious members with an armed force. An oath of hatred to the stadtholder. was then taken by the remaining members, and a decree passed, commanding the anniversary of the; execution of Lewis XVI, to be observed as a festival throughout the republic. This revolution was effected without the intervention of the French; but from the measures that immediately resulted from it, the conclusion may safely be drawn, that it had their countenance and approbation. A similar act of outrage had, a short period before, been committed against the legislatures of France, by a part of the executive power of that republic.
Though by the treaty of peace a stipulated sum was required from the Dutch nation, as an indemnification to the French republic for the expences of the war, this price of redemption, exorbitant and immoderate as it was, served rather to excite than to allay the rapacity of the French; and new demands were made on the Batavian republic, under the various forms of loans, requisitions of clothing and provisions, voluntary contributions, subsidies, and the forced circulation of assignats.
The treatment of the Batavian troops, in the service of France, was complained of as peculiarly severe and unjust. In battle they were almost constantly placed in situations of the greatest danger; and in the exchange of prisoners their interest was invariably neglected. Thus treated by the confederate army, desertion was frequent among the Batavian soldiers; but the government was obliged to supply with new recruits the diminution of their forces, which arose from this cause. The Dutch soldiers were reproached early in the war, by the British and Austrian troops, then their brethren in arms, with shameful cowardice or treachery, and the same accusations pursued them when they were united to the legions of France.
In 1799 the Batavian republic seems to have reached its lowest ebb of depression. The people, worn out with the repeated exactions of the French, the destruction of their commerce, the loss of their colonies, and the arbitrary acts of the government, became impatient of a change in the system of affairs, and the discontents that reigned throughout the republic assumed a haughty and menacing tone. The condition of Holland under the administration of the stadtholder was invidiously compared with its degraded and abject situation under the directorial government, and exposed to the rapacity of France.The stadtholderian party, probably blinded by their passions, mistook these discontents and murmurs for a general inclination in the people to re-establish the old form of government, provided such foreign assistance could be furnished them, as would enable them to expel the French from the territories of the republic and thus over-rating their strength and abilities, strong representations were made to England of the expediency of sending into Holland a sufficient force to assist the friends of the stadtholder, and exonerate the republic from the bondage of France. The disaffection to the new government, which notoriously prevailed in the marine and military forces of the republic, was placed in the strongest light; and assurances were held out, if not of their cordial support, of a languid resistance. It was further stated, that the number of French troops in Holland was more reduced than it had been at any period since the conquest of the country; and that the vast armies which the French had to maintain in Italy and Germany, where the fate of the war was dubious, would probably prevent them from sending any considerable reinforcements to their troops in Holland.
These representations, coinciding with the inclinations of the British government, produced in the autumn of the year an expedition against Holland. The stadtholderian party complained, that the army destined for their deliverance was not embarked until the favourable season for the campaign was past, and a continuance of unfavourable weather for some days after the appearance of the armament off the Texel increased the evils of this delay. A part of the hostile fleet having anchored off the Helder, the point where a landing was meant to take place was disclosed, and the forces destined to oppose the invaders consequently marched towards that point.
It appeared on the landing of the troops, that an erroneous opinion had been formed of the disposition of the Dutch soldiers. They were commanded by General Daendals, an officer of great experience and abilities, whose fidelity to the new government was guaranteed by a large share of animosity against the British nation, and opposed the disembarkation of the hostile forces with the greatest courage and resolution. At length, pressed by superior numbers, they retreated, but not before they had made a most gallant resistance, and given the English a severe foretaste of the determined opposition which they had to expect from the Batavian army.
If the stadtholderian party had been too sanguine in their expectations from the Dutch army, it appears that they had formed a true judgment of the disposition of the navy. On the defeat of the forces which opposed the landing of the English, strong symptoms of mutiny and insubordination broke out in the Dutch fleet. This tendency to revolt, it is firmly believed in Holland, might have been checked, had the commander-in-chief and some of the principal officers of the fleet been faithful to their duty, but they are supposed to have been gained over to the stadtholderian party; and the disgraceful surrender of the fleet was the consequence of their treachery. The justification of himself, which Admiral Story addressed to the Batavian directory, if what was advanced in it was to be relied on as fact, clearly exculpated him; but the contrary opinion is entertained in Holland, and it is not probable that he will ever again be employed.
On their first successes, and the surrender of the fleet, it was expected that the English army would have advanced rapidly into the country. There was no force sufficient to oppose them, and multitudes of disaffected individuals were preparing to join them.
Though the majority of the inhabitants of Amsterdam were inclined to support the new government, it contained a powerful party, daily receiving accessions of strength from the provinces, in favour of the stadtholder, which only waited for the nearer approach of the British army to declare themselves. So confidently were the English expected in Amsterdam, and a counter-revolution to take place throughout Holland, that the members of the directory were prepared to quit the Hague. But with a supineness which is most loudly condemned by their friends in Holland, the leaders of the British army, instead of profiting by the consternation which their first success and the treason of the fleet occasioned, remained, in a state of cautious, if not timid, inactivity till the season for rapid operations, was elapsed.
The number of stadtholderians who had joined the British army, exclusive of those from the fleet, was inconsiderable, but this was accounted for by the circumstances that the part of Holland which was occupied by the English was the district most averse, within the limits of the republic to the authority of the house of Orange. In the southern parts of Hollands towards the mouth of the Maese, where the stadtholderian party wished the invasion to have been made, the friends of the old government were much more numerous. It cannot, however, be doubted, but that many would have joined the army had it advanced far enough to have enabled them to do so with security and confidences, and in the persons so disposed its inactivity excited mingled emotions of indignation and sorrow. Speaking of this period of the campaign in Holland, a French General said to me, "C'étoit par la sottise des généraux Anglais que l'Amsterdam n'étoit pas pris." This, however, he qualified by adding, that had Amsterdam been taken, the French inevitably must soon have become masters of it again. The delay of the British army afforded time to the French to collect their forces, and about the period that the Duke of York arrived with a reinforcement of English and Russian troops, General Brune, with a large body of French auxiliaries, took the command of the Gallo-Batavian army.
The hereditary Prince of Orange arrived in the army about the same time with the Duke of York, and, probably elated with the success that had been obtained; addressed a proclamation to the Dutch people, couched in terms scarcely less peremptory than might have been used had the Orange colours been flying on the stadthouse of Amsterdam. It formed a striking contrast with the proclamations published by the representatives of the French people four years before. But where power is unlimited, moderation is more frequently to be found, than where weakness predominates, unless power is lodged in the hands of Alvas or Philips.
After a series of bloody and well-contested actions, the British and Russian forces obtained possession of Alkmaer, and the hopes of the friends of the house of Orange, which the tardy movements of the army had dampt, began to revive. The citizens of Amsterdam, attached to the new order of things, again trembled for the security of the capital, and, throughout the republic, the partisans of the stadtholder were filled with the most extravagant joy.
But these sentiments of depression on the one hand, and of exultation on the other, were of no long duration. After a desperate engagement, in which the British forces were victorious, but with great loss, it was judged necessary by the commander-in-chief for the army to retreat.So unexpected was such a measure by General Brune, and, in consequence of his defeat, believing that further offensive operations would immediately be pursued by the English, that, designing himself to retreat, he had sent his baggage, with part of his artillery, across the Y.
Favoured by the obscurity of a tempestuous night, and the enemy's ignorance of their design, the retreat of the British army was effected with little loss. By day-light in the morning they were at a distance of thirty miles from the French forces, and in a position of considerable strength, where they had formerly been established. It was now determined that the British and Russian troops should evacuate Holland; and to accomplish this without further effusion of blood, a negociation was entered into by the Duke of York with General Brune.
The conditions at first proposed by the French general, on which the Duke of York's army should be permitted to re-imbark without molestation, were so exorbitant, as to be instantly rejected. Brune required that the Dutch fleet should be restored, and fifteen thousand French and Batavian prisoners released; without conditions, from the prisons of England. The demand of the restitution of the fleet was soon abandoned, though the Batavian directory; in their instructions to General Brune, insisted that the restitution of the fleet should form the leading article in any convention that might be concluded by him with the Duke of York; and the number o£ prisoners required to be released without exchange, was reduced to eight thousand. The other articles of the convention stipulated that the British and Russian forces should quit the territories of the Batavian republic before the 30th of November, and that no injury should be done to the dikes, canals, or navigation of the Texel.
The easy terms on which the British and Russian troops were permitted to evacuate Holland were loudly complained of by the Batavian directory, and strong insinuations against the integrity of General Brune were circulated throughout the republic by the party inimical to the English. These suspicions were countenanced by the known character of the general for rapacity, and the belief that he had obtained the command of the French army in Holland by corruption, consequently would not scruple to reimburse himself by the most nefarious means. But most probably the strength of the British army, the means of defence which it possessed, and perhaps a humane desire to prevent a further waste of human life, were the real motives that induced General Brune to grant the terms alluded to.
The French who served against the English during this campaign speak in the highest terms of the bravery of the British soldiers; but their report of the generals is less favourable. There is one exception, however, to this, The conduct of Prince William of Gloucester excited particular admiration in the French; and he is mentioned with much respect and praise, as a general who will one day be an honour to the British nation, if the early proofs which he has given of his courage and military talents are to be relied on as prognostics of the future.
The treatment of the British and Russian troops who were taken prisoners, was singularly humane and generous. A party of women and children, belonging to the English army, having fallen into the hands of the enemy, they were sent to Amsterdam; a collection was made in that city for their relief and after having been hospitably entertained for some days, they were restored to their husbands and fathers, all of them comfortably furnished by the benevolence of the enemy with new clothing.
The conduct and discipline of the British army, while they remained in Holland, gave great satisfaction to the peaceful, inoffensive inhabitants of the parts where hostilities had been carried on. Every article taken for the use of the troops was paid for with the utmost regularity and punctuality; and where unavoidable damage was done to the property of individuals, for purposes of defence or attack, compensation was liberally made.But a less honourable warfare was waged by the navy. A flotilla of gun-boats and small vessels, inadequate to any splendid of useful conquests, coasted the shores of the Zuider Zee, destroying fishing smacks, and firing on the miserable villages that did not display the Orange flag. Where, through fear, they were received as friends, their business was to dismiss the petty municipalities, cut down the trees of liberty, and distribute Orange cockades to all who chose to accept of them. On their departure, the former order of things were invariably re-established, and thus frequently in the course of a few hours a village was revolutionised, and counter-revolutionised, with the most perfect indifference on the part of its inhabitants.
Had the expedition against Holland been attempted at an earlier period of the year, or had the army advanced after its first successes, before the French and Dutch had time to concentrate their forces, it is highly probable that possession might have been gained of Amsterdam, and a great part of the republic reduced to obedience to the stadtholder. But perhaps it was fortunate for humanity that the campaign terminated otherwise. Had Amsterdam been taken, and the stadtholder restored to his offices, the patriots and the French would still have, remained in possession of the frontier places of the republic, from whence no force that the house of Orange could have raised, or the English supplied, would have expelled them; and France, rather than permit so important a conquest as Holland to be wrested from her hands, would, from these commanding points, have poured innumerable and irresistible bodies of troops into the country. The British army might again, at an inclement season of the year, have been obliged to make a disastrous retreat, through a dreary and inhospitable country, with an active and vigilant enemy in their rear, and the Prince of Orange might again have been compelled to seek his personal safety in a precipitate flight from his government.
The complete failure of the expedition, undertaken at their suggestion, and for their relief, extinguished the last hopes of the stadtholderian party, and firmly established the power of the new government. The repulse of a powerful army of invaders, exalted the spirit of the nation, and the murmurs of discontent against the directory and the legislatures were lost in the shouts of triumph that resounded throughout the republic.
- ↑ This treaty is given in the Appendix, paper E
- ↑ I wish the English language had a synonyme to the Greek verb νεωτεριζειν which so happily expresses the turbulence of the Grecian commonwealth; and I wonder that the refreshments of the modern language, and the troubles of modern times, have not produced some term by which a love of changes in government could be at once briefly and forcibly expressed.