An Antidote Against Atheism/Appendix/Chapter III
Chap. III.
1. That considering the lapse of Mans Soul into Matter, it is no wonder she is so much puzzled in speculating things Immaterial. 2. That all Extension does not imply Physical Divisibility or Separability of Parts. 3. That the Emanation of the Secondary substance from the Centrall in a Spirit is not properly Creation. 4. How it comes to pass that the Soul cannot Withdraw her self from pain by her Self-contracting faculty. 5. That the Soul's extension dues not imply as many Wills and Understandings as imaginable Parts, by reason of the special Unity and Indivisibility of her substance. 6. Several Instances of the puzzledness of Phansy in the firm conclusions of Sense, and of Reafon. 7. The unconceivableness of the manner of that strong union some parts of the Matter have one with another. 8. What is meant by Hylopathy, and how a Spirit though not impenetrable, may be the Impellent of Matter. 9. That the unexplicableness of a Spirit's moving Matter is no greater argument against the truth thereof, then the inconceivableness of that line that is produced by the Motion of a Globe on a Plane is an argument against the Mobility thereof. 10. That the strength of this last Answer consists in the Assurance that there are such Phænomena in the world as utterly exceed the Powers of mere Matter; of which several Examples are hinted out of the foregoing Treatise.
1. That the Souls of Men, the lowest dregs of all the intellectual Orders, Should be plung'd and puzzled in the more close and accurate Speculation of things Spiritual and Intellectual, is but reasonable; especially considering that even Matter it self, in which they tumble and wallow, which they feel with their hands and usurp with all their Senses, if they once offer to contemplate it in an Intellectual and Rational manner, their Phansies are so clouded in this dark state of incarceration in these earthly Bodies, that the Notion thereof seems unimaginable and contradictious, ** Antidote, Book 1. ch. 4. sect. 2. as I have largely enough already insisted upon.
But that the Notion of a Spirit, which seems so to obscure the clearness of the Idea of God, is no such inconsistent and unconceiveable Notion as some would have it, I hope I shall sufficiently evince by answering the shrewdest Objections that I think can be made against it.
2. Whereas therefore we have defined a Spirit (I mean chiefly a created one) as well from those more absolute powers of Self-contraction and dilatation, as also from those relative faculties of Penetrating, moving and altering of the Matter; we will now set down the Objections made against them both.
And against the first it is objected, That it is impossible for the Mind of Man to imagine any Substance having a power of Self-dilatation and Contraction to be unextended, and that Extension cannot be imagined without diversity of parts, nor diversity of parts without a possibility of division or separation of them; because diversity of parts in any Substance supposes diversity of substances, and diversity of substances supposes independency of one another: from whence it will follow that Indivisibility is incompetible to a Spirit, which notwithstanding we have added in the Definition thereof.
I confess the Objection is very ingenious and set on home; but withall conceive that the difficulty is easily taken off, if we acknowledge some such thing to be in the nature of a Spirit as has been by thousands acknowledged in the nature of Intentional species. We will therefore represent the property of a Spirit in this Symbole or Hieroglyphick.
Suppose a Point of light from which rays out a luminous Orb according to the known principles of of Optics: This Orb of light does very much resemble the nature of a Spirit, which is diffus'd and extended, and yet indivisible. For wee'l suppose in this Spirit the Center of life to be indivisible, and yet to diffuse it self by a kind of circumscrib'd Omnipresency, as the Point of light is discernible in every point of the Luminous Sphere. And yet supposing that Central lucid Point indivisible, there is nothing divisible in all that Sphere of light. For it is ridiculous to think by any Engine or Art whatsoever to separate the luminous rays from the shining Center, and keep them apart by themselves; as any man will acknowledge that does but carefully consider the nature of the thing we speak of.
Now there is no difficulty to imagine such an Orb as this a Substance as well as a Quality. And indeed this Sphere of light it self, it not inhering in any Subject in the space it occupies, looks far more like a Substance then any Accident. And what we fancie unadvisedly to befal Light and Colours, that any point of them will thus ray orbicularly, is more rationally to be admitted in Spiritual substances, whose central essence spreads out into a Secondary substance, as the luminous rays are conceiv'd to shoot out from a lucid Point. From whence we are enabled to return an Answer to the greatest difficulty in the foregoing Objection, viz. That the conceived parts in a Spirit have an inseparable dependence upon the central Essence thereof, from which they flow, and in which they are radically contained; and therefore though there be an Extension of this whole substantial power, yet one part is not separable or discerpible from another, but the intire Substance, as well Secondary as Primary or Central, is indivisible.
3. But let us again cast our eye upon this lucid Point and radiant Orb we have made use of; It is manifest that those rays that are hindred from shooting out so far as they would, need not loose their virtue or Being, but onely be reflected back toward the shining Center; and the obstacle being removed, they may shoot out to their full length again: so that there is no generation of a new ray, but an emission of what was actually before. Whereby we are well furnish'd with an Answer to a further Objection, that would insinuate that this Emanation or Efflux of the Secondary Substance from the Central is Creation properly so called, which is deemed incompetible to any creature.
But we answer, that both the Central and Secondary Substance of a Spirit were created at once by God, and that these free active Spirits have onely a power in them of contracting their vital rays and dilating of them, not of annihilating or creating of them: For we also added in the Definition of a Spirit, Self-penetration, or the running of one part into another, if we may call them parts. And this Answer I hold so satisfactory, that I think it needless to alledge the opinion of Durandus, who contends that Creation is not incompetible unto a creature, provided that it be acknowledged to be done by virtue of donation from the first Creator, and in an inevitable observance to his Laws. We might also further scruple whether any Emanation may be properly call'd Creation, but enough has been already said to satisfie this Objection.
4. But we are further yet urged concerning this Self-contraction and dilatation; for it is demanded why the Soul of Man, which we acknowledge a Spirit, does not contract it self or withdraw it self from those parts which are pained, or why she does not dilate her self beyond the bounds of the Body. To which is answered. That the Plantal faculty of the Soul, whereby she is unitable to this terrestrial Body, is not arbitrarious, but fatal or natural; which union cannot be dissolved unless the bond of Life be loosened, and that vital congruity (which is in the Body, and does necessarily hold the Soul there) be either for a time hindred or utterly destroy'd.
See my Immortality of the Soul, Book 2. chap. 11. sect. 10. also Book 3. chap. 2. sect. 3, 4.
See also this Append. chap. 10. sect. 9, 10.5. The last Objection against the Self-extension of a Spirit is, That there will be as many Wills and Understandings as Parts. But I have, in that Symbolical representation I have made use of, so represented the Extension of a Spirit, that it is also acknowledged Indivisible; whereby the Objection is no sooner propounded then answered, that engine lying in readiness to receive all such assaults.
6. Now for the Objections made against the Relative faculties of a Spirit, to wit, The power of penetrating, moving and altering the Matter; there is mainly this one. That Matter cannot be altered but by Motion, nor Motion be communicated but by Impulse, nor Impulse without Impenetrability in the Impulsor, and that therefore how a Spirit should move Matter which does penetrate it, is not to be imagined.
But I answer, first, what our Imagination is baffled in, either our outward Senses or inward reason often prove to be true. As for example, our Reason attending to the nature of an exact Globe and Plane, will undoubtedly pronounce that they will touch in a point, and that they may be moved one upon another: But our Imagination cannot but make this exception, That the Globe thus drawn upon the Plane, describes a line which must necessarily consist of points, point perpetually following point in the whole dcscription; Book 1. chap. 4. sect. 2which how monstrous it is to be admitted, I have already intimated in the foregoing Discourse.
So likewise the Angle of Contact included betwixt the Periphery and a Perpendicular falling on the end of the Diameter of a Circle, Geometricians demonstrate by reason to be less then any acute Angle whatsoever, insomuch that a line cannot fill betwixt the Periphery and the Perpendicular: whence the Phansy cannot but imagine this Angle to be indivisible; which is a perfect contradiction, and against the definition of an Angle, which is not the coincidence but the inclination of two lines. Besides, a lesser Circle inscrib'd in a greater, so that it touches in one point, through which let there be drawn the common Diameter of them both, and then let fall a Perpendicular on that end of the Diameter where the Circles touch; it will be evident that one Angle of Contact is bigger then the other, when yet they are both indivisible, as was acknowledged by our Imagination before: So that one and the same Angle will be both divisible and indivisible, which is again a plain contradiction.
And as Imagination is puzzled in things we are sure of by reason, so is it also in things we are certain of by Sense; for who can imagine how it comes about that we see our image behinde the Looking-glass? for it is more easie to fancy that we should deprehend our faces either in the very surface of the glass, or else in the place where they are: For if the reflected rayes might serve the turn, then we should finde the distance of our image no greater then that of the glass; but if we be affected also by the direct rayes, methinks we should be led by them to the first place whence they came, and finde our faces in that reall situation they are.
7. But to instance in things that will come more near to our purpose. We see in some kindes of Matter almost an invincible union of parts, as in Steel, Adamant, and the like; what is it that holds them so fast together? If you'l say, some inward Substantial form; we have what we look'd for, a Substance distinct from the Matter. If you say it is the quality of Hardness in the Matter that makes it thus hard; that is no more then to say, it is so because it is so. If you say it is a more perfect rest of parts one by another then there is in other Matter; if that be true, it is yet a thing utterly unimaginable: as for example, That upon Matter exactly plain, more plain and solid then a Table of Marble, if a man laid a little Cube upon it of like plainness and solidity, that this Cube by mere immediate touching of the Table should have as firm union therewith as the parts of the Cube have one with another, is a thing that the Phansy of man cannot tell how to admit. For suppose at first you drew along this Cube on the Table, as it would easily goe, both surfaces being so exactly smooth, and that then you left drawing of it; that these two smooth bodies should presently stick so fast together that a Hammer and a Chiesill would scarce sever them, is a thing utterly unimaginable.
Wherefore the union betwixt the Parts of the Matter being so strong, and yet so unimaginable how it comes to pass to be so, why should we not admit as strong or stronger union betwixt a Spirit and a Body, though our Phansy suggest it will pass through, as well as it does that smooth bodies will ever lie loose, unless there be some cement to hold them together, And this union once admitted, Motion, Activity and Agitation being so easie and prone a conception of the property of a Spirit, it will as easily and naturally follow that it does move or agitate the Matter it is thus united to.
8. But again to answer more closely, I say, this present Objection is nothing else but a Sophism of the Phansy, conceiving a Spirit as a Body going through some pervious hole or passage too wide and patent for it, in which therefore it cannot stick or be firmly settled in it. To which Imagination we will oppose, that though Spirits do penetrate Bodies, yet they are not such thin and lank things that they must of necessity run through them, or be unable to take hold of them, or be united with them, but that they may fill up the capacity of a Body penetrable by Spirits: which penetrability of a Body or Matter when it is satiated or fill'd, that Spirit that thus fills it is more strongly riveted in, or united with the Body or Matter, then one part of the Matter can be with another.
And therefore we will acknowledge one speciall faculty of a Spirit, which after penetration it doth either naturally or arbitrarioully exert, which is this, to fill the Receptivity or Capacity of a Body or Matter so far forth as it is capable or receptive of a Soul or Spirit.
And this affection of a Spirit we will make bold to call, for more compendiousness, by one Greek term ὑλοπάθεια which, that there may be no suspicion of any fraud or affected foolery in words, we will as plainly as we can define thus, A power in a Spirit of offering so near to a corporeal emanation from the Center of life, that it will so perfectly fill the receptivity of Matter into which it has penetrated, that it is very difficult or impossible for any other Spirit to possess the same, and therefore of becoming hereby so firmly and closely united to a Body, as both to actuate and to be acted upon, to affect and be affected thereby.
And now let us appeal to Imagination her self, if Matter does not fit as close, nay closer, to a Spirit then any one part of Matter can do to another: For here union pervades through all, but there conjunction is onely in a common Superficies, as is usually fancied and acknowledged. And this Hylopathia which we thus suppose in a finite Spirit or Soul, I further adde, may well answer in Analogy to that power of creating Matter which is necessarily included in the Idea of God.
9. But lastly, if the manner how a Spirit acts upon a Body, or is affected by a Body, seems so intricate that it must be given up for inexplicable; yet as the mobility of an exact Globe upon a Plane is admitted as an evident and undeniable property thereof by our Understanding, though we cannot imagine how it always touching in a point should by its motion describe a continued line, (and the like may be urged from the other following instances of Intricacy and perplexedness:) so supposing such manifest operations in Nature,that Reason can demonstrate not to be from the Matter it self, we must acknowledge there is some other Substance besides the Matter that acts in it and upon it, which is Spiritual, though we know not how Motion can be communicated to Matter from a Spirit.
10. And the strength of this our third and last Answer consists in this, that there are indeed several such operations apparently transcending the power of Matter, of which we will onely here briefly repeat the heads, having more fully discoursed of them in the foregoing Treatise.
And first, I instance in what is more general, and acknowledged by Des-Cartes himself, who yet has entituled the Laws of Matter to the highest Effects that ever any Man could rationally do: and 'tis this; That that Matter out of which all things are, is of it self uniform and of one kinde. From whence I infer, that of it self therefore it all either rests or moves, If all rest, there is something besides Matter that moves it, which necessarily is a Spirit: If it all move, there could not be possibly the coalition of any thing, but every imaginable particle would be actually loose from another. Wherefore there is required a Substance besides Matter that must binde what we finde fix'd and bound.
The second Instance is in that admirable Wisdom discoverable in all the works of Nature, which I have largely insisted on in my Second Book, which do manifestly evince that all things are contriv'd by a wise Principle: But who but a fool will say that the Matter is wise, and yet notwithstanding out of the putrefied parts even of the Earth it self, as also out of the drops of dew, rotten pieces of wood, and such like geer, the bodies of Animals do arise so artificially and exquisitely well framed, that the reason of Man cannot contemplate them but with the greatest pleasure and admiration?
Thirdly, those many and undeniable Stories of Apparitions do clearly evince, that an Understanding lodges in sundry Aiery bodies, when it is utterly impossible that Aire should be so arbitrariously changed into shapes, and yet held together as an actuated vehicle of life, if there were not something besides the Aire it self that did thus possess it and moderate it, and could dilate, contract, and guide it as it pleased; otherwise it would be no better figured nor more steddily kept together then the fume of Tobacco or the reek of Chimneys.
Fourthly and lastly, It is manifest that that which in us understands, remembers and perceives, is that which moves our bodies, and that those Cognoscitive Faculties can be no operation of the bare Matter. From whence it is evident that there is in our Bodies an Intellectual spirit that moves them as it pleases; as I have largely enough prov'd in the last Chapter of the First Book of my Antidote, and still yet further confirm when we come to the Objections made against it.