Black v. Jackson/Opinion of the Court

by John Marshall Harlan

United States Supreme Court

177 U.S. 349

Black  v.  Jackson

 Argued: February 1, 1900. --- Decided: March 26, 1900

1. The final judgment of the supreme court of the territory can be re-examined here if the value of the matter in dispute be sufficient to give this court jurisdiction. The defendant claimed to have acquired by his entry and settlement a vested interest in the entire land covered by his entry, and insisted that even if the plaintiff obtained a patent therefor the title would be held in trust for him. He proceeds in his defense upon the ground that after residing upon the land for the period designated in the statute he will be entitled under the law to a patent. It ought not to be assumed that he will put himself in such position that he cannot demand a patent. Although the naked legal title remains in the United States in trust for the person who may earn it, we think that in determining the value of the matter in dispute we should look at the value of the land, not simply at the value of the right of present possession. According to the weight of proof, the value of the land embraced by the homestead entry of Black is more than the sum required for our jurisdiction. 23 Stat. at L. 443, chap. 355; 26 Stat. at L. 81, 86, chap. 182, § 9. Besides, the demurrer admitted the averment in the answer to the effect that the land with the defendant's improvements thereon could be transferred in the manner stated in the answer for the sum of $6,000. The motion to dismiss the appeal must therefore be overruled.

2. This case having been determined on demurrer to the answer, it must be taken as true that Black resided upon the land in dispute on and after September 16, 1893, claiming the right to do so in virtue of the laws of the United States and of a homestead entry made before the one made by Jackson. It appears that the Land Office recognized the prior right to be in Jackson. This action of the Land Office, Black contends, was erroneous in matter of law, and he has announced his purpose, in the event a patent is issued to Jackson, to institute appropriate judicial proceedings, the object of which will be to have it declared that the legal title is held in trust for him. He insists that although, in the absence of fraud, the courts will not go behind the facts found by the Land Department in any contest before it relating to the administration of the public lands, he is not concluded by the decision of that Department upon questions of law.

If parties are injuriously affected by any action of the Land Department based upon an erroneous view of the law, the courts have power in some form to protect their rights against such illegal action. In Cornelius v. Kessel, 128 U.S. 456, 461, 32 L. ed. 482, 483, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 122, 124, this court said: 'The power of supervision possessed by the Commissioner of the General Land Office over the acts of the register and receiver of the local land offices in the disposition of the public lands undoubtedly authorizes him to correct and annul entries of land allowed by them, where the lands are not subject to entry, or the parties do not possess the qualifications required, or have previously entered all that the law permits. The exercise of this power is necessary to the due administration of the Land Department. If an investigation of the validity of such entries were required in the courts of law before they could be canceled, the necessary delays attending the examination would greatly impair, if not destroy, the efficiency of the Department. But the power of supervision and correction is not an unlimited or an arbitrary power. It can be exerted only when the entry was made upon false testimony, or without authority of law. It cannot be exercised so as to deprive any person of land lawfully entered and paid for. By such entry and payment the purchaser secures a vested interest in the property and a right to a patent therefor, and can no more be deprived of it by order of the Commissioner than he can be deprived by such order of any other lawfully acquired property. Any attempted deprivation in that way of such interest will be corrected whenever the matter is presented so that the judiciary can act upon it.' So, in Sanford v. Sanford, 139 U.S. 642, 647, 35 L. ed. 290, 291, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 666, 667, it was said that where the matters determined by the Land Office 'are not properly before the Department, or its conclusions have been reached from a misconstruction by its officers of the law applicable to the cases before it, and it has thus denied to parties rights which, upon a correct construction, would have been conceded to them, or where misrepresentations and fraud have been practised, necessarily affecting its judgment, then the courts can, in a proper proceeding, interfere and control its determination so as to secure the just rights of parties injuriously affected'-citing Quinby v. Conlan, 104 U.S. 420, 426, 26 L. ed. 800, 802; Baldwin v. Stark, 107 U.S. 463, 465, 27 L. ed. 526, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 473.

As to Jackson's right to possession, it is clear that although successful in his contest with Black before the Land Office, no patent could issue to him under the original homestead law until after the expiration of five years from the date of his entry, and not then except upon proof that he, or if he be dead his widow, or if she be dead her heirs or devisees, prove 'by two credible witnesses that he, she, or they have resided upon or cultivated the same for the term of five years immediately succeeding the time of filing the affidavit [required by § 2290 of the Revised Statutes], and makes affidavit that no part of such land has been alienated, except as provided in § 2288, and that he, she, or they will bear true allegiance to the government of the United States; then, in such case, he, she, or they, if at that time citizens of the United States, shall be entitled to a patent, as in other cases provided by law.' U.S. Rev. Stat. § 2291. But by the 3d section of the act of May 14, 1880, entitled 'An Act for the Relief of Settlers on Public Lands,' 21 Stat. at L. 140, chap. 89, it was provided 'that any settler who has settled, or who shall hereafter settle, on any of the public lands of the United States, whether surveyed or unsurveyed, with the intention of claiming the same under the homestead laws, shall be allowed the same time to file his homestead application and perfect his original entry in the United States Land Office as is now allowed to settlers under the pre-emption laws to put their claims on record, and his right shall relate back to the date of settlement, the same as if he settled under the pre-emption laws.'

It thus appears that Jackson holds only an inchoate title to the land in dispute and that he may so conduct himself before making final proof and securing final certificate as to forfeit his right to obtain a patent based upon the decision of the Land Office.

By the decree below the defendant is enjoined from entering upon the premises in question or exercising any further control or possession over them, except to remove his improvements within thirty days after the decree. In his original answer the defendant claimed that he was entitled to a trial by jury, and in his amended answer he insisted that his rights could not be disposed of in equity before the court only.

What circumstances under the laws of Oklahoma will justify the use of a mandatory injunction for the purpose of ousting a person of the possession of land and putting his adversary in possession-neither party having the legal title-is left in some doubt by the decisions of the supreme court of that territory. Sproat v. Durland, 2 Okla. 24, 35 Pac. 682, 886; Peckham v. Faught, 2 Okla. 173, 37 Pac. 1085; Reaves v. Oliver, 3 Okla. 62, 41 Pac. 353; Woodruff v. Wallace, 3 Okla. 355, 41 Pac. 357; Procter v. Stuart, 4 Okla. 679, 46 Pac. 501; Barnes v. Newton, 5 Okla. 428, 48 Pac. 190, 49 Pac. 1074; Laughlin v. Fariss, 7 Okla. 1, 50 Pac. 254; Glover v. Swartz (Okla.) 58 Pac. 943; Brown v. Donnelly (Okla.) 59 Pac. 975. Some of the decisions seem to restrict the right to such an injunction to cases in which the defendant was a mere trespasser upon the particular land in dispute without color or pretense of claim or title, while others recognize the appropriateness of that remedy where a plaintiff seeks possession after succeeding in a contest before the Land Office with one who at the initiation of such contest was in peaceable possession and in good faith contending for his right to such possession.

We think that the decision in Laughlin v. Fariss, 7 Okla. 1, 5-7, 9, 11, 50 Pac. 254, should be accepted as a correct exposition of the law of the territory. What was that case? One F. M. Fariss made a homestead entry on land, and received a certificate of cash entry. The interest so acquired was conveyed by deed to W. D. Fariss. Before F. M. Fariss made his final proof, Laughlin filed against him a contest on the ground of prior settlement. That contest finally came before the Secretary of the Interior for review, and was decided adversely to Laughlin. Subsequently, and before F. M. Fariss made his final proof, Laughlin filed another contest alleging that Fariss was disqualified to make a homestead entry by reason of having entered the Oklahoma country in violation of law. Fariss's assignee sued Laughlin, alleging that he was entitled to the sole and exclusive occupancy of the land, and asking that an injunction be awarded restraining Laughlin from cultivating or interfering with the land and removing him from the premises.

The questions presented to the supreme court of Oklahoma for decision in that case were: 1. Did the petition show that plaintiff had an equitable title to the tract of land in controversy? 2. If so, was that title a sufficient basis for an action at law for the recovery of the possession of the land? 3. Should questions 1 and 2 be answered in the affirmative, then the inquiry was whether the petition contained a sufficient statement of facts to justify the relief sought and obtained?

The court answered the first question upon the authority of Flanagan v. Forsythe, 6 Okla. 225, 50 Pac. 152, in which it was held that 'when a homestead entryman has complied with all the requirements of the Federal statutes applicable to the disposal of the tract of land occupied by him, and has made his final proof, paid the amount of money required, and received final certificate therefor, he has a complete equitable title to said land, with the naked legal title only remaining in the government.'

In answering the second question in the affirmative, the court referred to § 614 of the Territorial Code of Civil Procedure which provides: 'In an action for the recovery of real property, it shall be sufficient if the plaintiff state in his petition that he has a legal or equitable estate therein, and is entitled to the possession thereof, describing the same, as required by § 127, and that the defendant unlawfully keeps him out of possession. It shall not be necessary to state how the plaintiff's estate or ownership is derived.' Okla. Stat. 1893, 864, title Procedure Civil. Section 127, here referred to, provides that, 'in any action for the recovery of real property, it shall be described with such convenient certainty as will enable an officer holding an execution to identify it.' The supreme court of the territory said: 'It would seem that the language of this section is too plain to need the support of authority to show that an equitable title or estate in land is a sufficient basis for an action in the nature of ejectment, but if such were necessary it can be found in abundance by consulting the decisions of the supreme court of the state from which the statute was taken'-citing Simpson v. Boring, 16 Kan. 248; Kansas P. R. Co. v. McBratney, 12 Kan. 9; Duffey v. Rafferty, 15 Kan. 9; State v. Stringfellow, 2 Kan. 263; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Pracht (Kan.) 1 Pac. 319. The court added: 'It is also apparent that the allegations contained in plaintiff's petition, regarding his title and right of possession, are amply sufficient to entitle him to maintain an action of forcible detainer for the possession of said tract of land. Price v. Olds, 9 Kan. 66; Conaway v. Gore, 27 Kan. 122.'

The third question was answered in the negative, the court reaffirming the principle announced in Richardson v. Penny, 6 Okla. 328, 50 Pac. 231, in which it was said: 'We still hold to the well, if not universally, established doctrine that, when a party has a plain and adequate remedy at law he cannot invoke the powers of a court of equity to issue its writ of injunction.'

In the course of its opinion the court, having stated that it was conceded that the action of forcible entry and detainer would lie in a case like the one then before it, said: 'This remedy by injunction, both mandatory and prohibitive in character, may and does sometimes become a very far-reaching and oppressive, as well as a speedy and effective, one, and should only be granted by courts of equity in cases where the applicants therefor bring themselves clearly within the well-defined and established rules authorizing the issuance of same; hence, such courts rarely deem it necessary or advisable to interfere in this manner, to aid a person endeavoring to recover the possession of real property' citing High on Injunctions, 2d ed. §§ 354, 355, 360, and Lacassagne v. Chapuis, 144 U.S. 119, 124, 36 L. ed. 368, 370, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 659, 661. The rule, the court observed, was clearly and concisely stated by this court in Lacassagne v. Chapuis, in which it was said: 'The plaintiff was out of possession when he instituted this suit, and by the prayer of this bill he attempts to regain possession by means of the injunction asked for. In other words, the effort is to restore the plaintiff by injunction to rights of which he had been deprived. The function of an injunction is to afford preventive relief, not to redress alleged wrongs which had been committed already. An injunction will not be used to take property out of the possession of one party and put it into that of another. . . . The plaintiff has a full, adequate, and complete remedy at law, and the case is not one for the jurisdiction of a court of equity.'

The supreme court of the territory thus concluded its opinion in Laughlin v. Fariss. 'We hold that the action of injunction will not lie to adjust possessory rights to a tract of land after the equitable title thereto has passed from the government of the United States and become vested in an individual, unless in a case which presents some recognized special ground therefor, which must be one other than that one party claims that he is the owner and entitled to the immediate possession thereof, and that the other party unlawfully and without any right whatever holds and detains such possession. We therefore conclude that the facts, stated by the plaintiff below in his amended petition, are not sufficient to entitle him to the interference of a court of equity.'

In the decision in Laughlin v. Fariss all the justices of the supreme court of the territory concurred, including those who constituted the majority when the present case was decided. And we cannot find that that court has in any case withdrawn or qualified the ruling that an entryman, out of possession and having a decision by the Land Office in his favor, may proceed against his adversary in possession by an action of forcible detainer, and thus obtain possession without resorting to the extraordinary remedies used by courts of equity. According to the decisions of that court, Black, as between himself and his successful adversary, was in possession without color of title. Now, by the statutes of the territory, in the article relating to forcible entry and detainer, if it be found that lands and tenements after a lawful entry 'are held unlawfully,' then the justice 'shall cause the party complaining to have restitution thereof;' and it is provided that proceedings under that article may be had in all cases 'where the defendant is a settler or occupier of lands and tenements, without color of title, and to which the complainant has the right of possession.' Okla. Stat. 1893, 919, 920, §§ 4805, 4806.

In the opinion in the present case the supreme court of the territory said nothing about defendant's contention that he was entitled to a trial by jury. Speaking by the same justice who in the court below delivered the opinion in the present case, the supreme court of the territory, in Barnes v. Newton, 5 Okla. 428, 432, 48 Pac. 190, 49 Pac. 1074, conceded that in a case between contesting entrymen the one who obtained the decision of the Land Office might avail himself of the statutory provisions relating to forcible entry and detainer, but that such a remedy was not sufficiently efficacious, for the reason that 'by delays and appeals a party in possession of a homestead could keep his adversary out of possession of the land for years.' But the same reason could be urged to justify the extraordinary remedy of a mandatory injunction in order to put a defendant out of possession, even where the plaintiff was entitled to maintain ejectment or an action in the nature of ejectment. The suggestion referred to leaves out of view the distinction made by the Constitution of the United States between cases in law and cases in equity. Robinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat. 212, 223, 4 L. ed. 372, 376; Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425, 19 L. ed. 260; Van Norden v. Morton, 99 U.S. 378, 25 L. ed. 453; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 467, 516, 42 L. ed. 819, 838, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418. And it also fails to recognize the provisions of the Seventh Amendment securing the right of trial by jury in 'suits at common law' where the value in controversy exceeds $20. That Amendment, so far as it secures the right of trial by jury, applies to judicial proceedings in the territories of the United States. Webster v. Reid, 11 How. 437, 460, 13 L. ed. 761, 770; American Pub. Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464, 466, 41 L. ed. 1079, 1080, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 618; Springville v. Thomas, 166 U.S. 707, 41 L. ed. 1172, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 717. So that a court of a territory authorized, as Oklahoma was, to pass laws not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States (26 Stat. at L. 81, 84, chap. 182, § 6), could not proceed in a 'common-law' action as if it were a suit in equity, and determine by mandatory injunction rights for the protection or enforcement of which there was a plain and adequate remedy at law according to the established distinctions between law and equity. And this evidently is in accordance with the statutes of Oklahoma providing that while the court must try issues of law, unless referred in the mode prescribed, 'issues of fact arising in actions for the recovery of money or of specific real or personal property shall be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived or a reference be ordered.' Okla. Stat. 1893, 809, § 4156.

In the case before us no special grounds are disclosed that would authorize the court to issue a mandatory injunction and determine without a jury the issue as to the right of possession. If it be said that the plaintiff's residence upon the land for a given time is necessary in order that he may earn a patent, the answer is that the defendant is not alleged to be in the actual possession of the entire land embraced by the plaintiff's entry. Nor does it appear that the plaintiff may not, without interference by the defendant, maintain a residence upon that part of the land which is not in the actual possession of the defendant, and do all that may be requisite in order to earn a patent. We may also observe that it is not alleged that the defendant is doing any actual injury to the part of the land remaining in his possession. It does not appear that he has done anything except to continue in possession of that part. If Black prevents Jackson from taking possession of the 80 acres in question, he is entitled to bring his action of forcible detainer and to recover possession unless it appears that the Land Office erred, as matter of law, in deciding for him. It is not meant by this that an action of forcible detainer is the only remedy that can be adopted by the plaintiff.

As in Oklahoma the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity is abolished,-each action being called a civil action, whatever the nature of the relief asked (Okla. Stat. 1893, 764, § 3882),-we perceive no reason why the case may not proceed in the trial court under the pleadings as they have been framed, with the right of the defendant to a trial by jury in respect of all issues which, according to the recognized distinctions between actions at common law and suits in equity, are determinable in that mode.

3. One of the defenses made by Black is that the plaintiff entered upon the land in violation of the act of March 1, 1889, 25 Stat. at L. 759, chap. 317, and of the act of March 2, 1889, 25 Stat. at L. 980, 1005, chap. 412, as well as of the proclamation of the President of March 23, 1889, 26 Stat. at L. 1544, 1546. The acts and proclamation referred to related to the lands obtained by the United States under the agreement with the Muscogee or Creek Nation of Indians in the Indian territory. The contention of the defendant is that the plaintiff by his conduct disqualified himself from acquiring any interest in the tract of land here in dispute which was part of the lands obtained from the Muscogee or Creek Indians, and consequently the Land Office erred, as matter of law, in its decision for the plaintiff. Smith v. Townsend, 148 U.S. 490, 37 L. ed. 533, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 634; Payne v. Robertson, 169 U.S. 323, 42 L. ed. 764, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 337; Calhoun v. Violet, 173 U.S. 60, 62, 43 L. ed. 614, 615, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 324. No opinion was expressed on this question by the supreme court of the territory, and we need not now express an opinion. If the plaintiff should proceed against the defendant in some other mode than by injunction, the facts connected with his alleged unlawful entering upon the lands opened for settlement under the above acts and proclamation can all be proved, and any question arising out of them as to his disqualification to acquire any interest whatever in the land in dispute can then be determined.

We are of opinion that the case made out by the plaintiff was not such as to entitle him to a mandatory injunction, and that the court of original jurisdiction erred in determining the cause without a jury. The decree of the Supreme Court of the Territory is therefore reversed, and the cause is remanded with directions to set aside that decree and for such further proceedings as will be consistent with law and this opinion.

Reversed.

Notes