Church Committee plausible denial
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Section of the Church Committee dealing with plausibe denial.
II. Section B Covert Action as a Vehicle for Foreign Policy Implementation Page 11
[edit] The Concept Of “Plausible Denial” (Page 11)
II. Section B Covert Action as a Vehicle for Foreign Policy Implementation Page 11
Non-attribution to the United States for covert operations was the original and principal purpose of the so-called doctrine of “plausible denial.”
Evidence before the Committee clearly demonstrates that this concept, designed to protect the United States and its operatives from the consequences of disclosures, has been expanded to mask decisions of the President and his senior staff members. A further consequence of the expansion of this doctrine is that subordinates, in an effort to permit their superiors to “plausibly deny” operations, fail to fully inform them about those operations.
“Plausible denial” has shaped the recesses for approving and evaluating covert actions. For example, the 40 Committee and its predecessor, the Special Group, have served as “circuit breakers” for Presidents, thus avoiding consideration of covert action by the Oval office.
“Plausible denial” can also lead to the use of euphemism and circumlocution, which are designed to allow the President and other senior officials to deny knowledge of an operation should it be disclosed. The converse may also occur; a President could communicate his desire for a sensitive operation in an indirect, circumlocutious manner. An additional possibility is that the President may, in fact, not be fully and accurately informed about a sensitive operation because he failed to receive the “circumlocutious” message .
[edit] IV. Findings and Conclusions (Page 261)
Section C Subsection 1 Page 261
As emphasized throughout this report, we are unable to draw firm conclusions concerning who authorized the assassination plots. Even after our long investigation it is unclear whether the conflicting and inconclusive state of the evidence is due to the system of plausible denial or whether there were, in fact, serious shortcomings in the system of amortization which made it possible for assassination efforts to have been undertaken by agencies of the United States Government without express authority from officials above those agencies.
Based on the record of our investigation, the Committee finds that the system of Executive command and control was so inherently ambiguous that it is difficult to be certain at what level assassination activity was known and authorized. This creates the disturbing prospect that assassination activity might have been undertaken by officials of the United States Government without its having been incontrovertibly clear that there was explicit authorization from the President of the United States. At the same time, this ambiguity and imprecision leaves open the possibility that there was a successful “plausible denial” and that a Presidential authorization was issued but is now obscured.
Whether or not assassination was authorized by a President of the United States, the President as the chief executive officer of the United States Government must take ultimate responsibility for major activities during his Administration. Just as these Presidents must be held accountable, however, their subordinates throughout the Government had a concomitant duty to fully disclose their ‘plans and activities.
As part of their responsibility, these Presidents had a duty to determine the nature of major activities and to prevent undesired activities from taking place. This duty was particularly compelling when the Presidents had reason to believe that major undesired activities had previously occurred or were being advocated and might occur again. Whether or not the Presidents in fact knew about the assassination plots, and even if their subordinates failed in their duty of full disclosure, it still follows that the Presidents should have known about the plots. This sets a demanding standard, but one the Committee supports. The future of democracy rests upon such accountability.
[edit] IV. Findings and Conclusions (page 277-279)
Section C Subsection 5 Page 277-279
5. Practices current at the time in which the assassination plots occurred were revealed by the record to create the risk of confusion, rashness and irresponsibility in the very areas where clarity and sober judgment were most necessary
Various witnesses described elements of the system within which the assassination plots were conceived. The Committee is disturbed by the custom that permitted the most sensitive matters to be presented to the highest levels of Government with the least clarity. We view the following points as particularly dangerous :
(1) The expansion of the doctrine of “plausible denial” beyond its intended purpose of hiding the involvement of the United States from other countries into an effort to shield higher officials from knowledge, and hence responsibility, for certain operations.
(2) The use of circumlocution or euphemism to describe serious matters-such as assassination-when precise meanings ought to be made clear.
(3) The theory that general approval of broad covert action pro- grams is sufficient to justify specific actions such as assassination or the passage of weapons.
(4) The theory that authority granted, or assumed to be granted, by one DC1 or one Administration could be presumed to continue without the necessity for reaffirming the authority with successor officials.
(5) The creation of covert capabilities without careful review and authorization by policymakers, and the further risk that such capabilities, once created, might be used without specific authorization.
[edit] (a) The danger inherent in overextending the doctrine “plausible denial”
The original concept of “plausible denial” envisioned implementing covert actions in a manner calculated to conceal American involvement if the actions were exposed. The doctrine was at times a delusion and at times a snare. It was naive for policymakers to assume that sponsorship of actions as big as the Bay of Pigs invasion could be concealed. The Committee’s investigation of assassination and the public disclosures which preceded the inquiry demonstrate that when the United States resorted to cloak-and-dagger tactics, its hand was ultimately exposed. We were particularly disturbed ‘to find little evidence that the risks and consequences of disclosure were considered.
We find that the likelihood of reckless action is substantially increased when policymakers believe that their decisions will never be revealed. Whatever can be said in defense of the original purpose of plausible denial--a purpose which intends to conceal United States involvement from the outside world-the extension of the doctrine to the internal decision-making process of the Government is absurd. Any theory which, as a matter of doctrine, places elected officials on the periphery of the decision-making process is an invitation to error, an abdication of responsibility, and a perversion of democratic government. The doctrine is the antithesis of accountability.
[edit] (b) The danger of using “Circumlocution and Euphemism”
According to Richard Bissell, the extension of “plausible denial” to internal decision-making required the use of circumlocution and euphemism in speaking with Presidents and other senior officials.
Explaining this concept only heightens its absurdity. On the one hand, it assumes that senior officials should be shielded from the truth to enable them to deny knowledge if the truth comes out. On the other hand, the concept assumes that senior officials must be told enough, by way of double talk, to grasp the subject. As a consequence, the theory a fails to accomplish its objective and only increases the risk of misunderstanding. Subordinate officials should describe their proposals in clear, precise, and brutally frank language; superiors are entitled to, and should demand, no less .
Euphemism may actually have been preferred-not because of “plausible denial”-but because the persons involved could not bring themselves to state in plain language what they intended to do; In some instances, moreover, subordinates may have assumed, rightly or wrongly, that the listening superiors did not want the issue squarely placed before them. “Assassinate,” “murder” and “kill” are words many people do not want to speak or hear. They describe acts which should not even be proposed, let alone plotted. Failing to call dirty business by its rightful name may have increased the risk of dirty business being done.
[edit] (c) The danger of generalized instructions
Permitting specific acts to be taken on the basis of general approvals of broad strategies (e.g., keep Allende from assuming office, get rid of the Castro regime) blurs responsibility and accountability. Worse still, it increases the danger that subordinates may take steps which would have been disapproved if the policymakers had been informed. A further danger is that policymakers might intentionally use loose general instructions to evade responsibility for embarrassing activities.
In either event, we find that the gap between the general policy objectives and the specific actions undertaken to achieve them was far too wide. It is important that policymakers review the manner in which their directives are implemented, particularly when the activities are sensitive, secret, and immune from public scrutiny.
[edit] (d) The danger of “Floating Authorization”
One justification advanced by Richard Helms and William Harvey for not informing John McCone about the use of underworld figures to attempt to assassinate Fidel Castro was their assertion that the project had already been approved by McCone’s predecessor, Allen Dulles, and that further authorization was unnecessary, at least until the operation had reached a more advanced stage.
We find that the idea that authority might continue or “float” from one administration or director to the nest, and that there is no duty to reaffirm authority inhibits responsible decision-making. Circumstances may change or Judgments differ. New officials should be given the opportunity to review significant programs.
[edit] (e) The problems connected with creating new covert capabilities
The development of a new capability raises numerous problems. Having a capability to engage in certain covert activity increases the probability that the activity mill occur, since the capability represents a tool available for use. There is the further danger that authorization for the mere creation of a capability may be misunderstood as permitting its use without requiring further authorization.
Finally, an assassination capability should never have been created.
