De Methodis/Book I
| De Methodis by Book I |
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Glossary and translation notes
Contents |
Chapter one
Page 89, Page 90===Chapter two=== Page 90, Page 91, Page 92. . . .. . . .===Chapter three=== Page 93
[edit] Chapter four
Page 93, Page 94===Chapter five=== Page 94, Page 95===Chapter six=== Page 95, Page 96, Page 97. . . .===Chapter seven=== Page 97, Page 98. . . .===Chapter eight, in which the argument of adversaries is undone, and in which it is shown in what way the order of instruction is from what is more known to us.=== Page 99, Page 100, Page 101
The opinion having been refuted of those who say that the way of ordering ought to be taken not from our cognition, but from the nature of things to be treated, it is easy to undo their argument, which was taken from the first book of the Physics. For we say it is false to accept them when they say Aristotle wanted to begin from treatment of principles not in so far as they are known, but in so far as they are principles and therefore to be preferred according to nature; for we now say Aristotle demonstrated what is to be ordered is from principles not for the reason that these are by nature prior to the effects, but because we cannot reach knowledge of other things except from cognition of principles. He therefore took the way of that order not from the nature of the things but from the nature of our cognition.
Truly, adversaries assumed in this argument that first principles of natural things are not more known to us than composites and effects, but rather more unknown. From this it follows that, at least this appears to be true, what with Averroës we said, that there is no one way of instruction, but order is from what is known to us. Therefore so that we may thoroughly remove every difficulty, we must declare in what way the order of instruction is said to be from what is more known to us.
To start, this common distinction is to be made: our cognition is of two types, one imperfect which they call confused, the other perfect, which they call distinct, which itself is of two types. For one is perfect simply; the other [is perfect] not simply but is called perfect only in a genus, that is, conditionally, and by the nature of its discipline, as for example, the natural philosopher ought to have full and simply perfect cognition of all metals, for in these nothing remains to be known to him; if less, he is said to have imperfect knowledge of them. But a maker of copper is not held to have the same cognition of copper that the natural philosopher has. It is enough if he has as much as suffices for the purpose of exercising his work and his art. Therefore this will not be said to be simply perfect cognition of copper, but nevertheless it will be perfect in that genus, that is, by the condition of that art.
Moreover indeed, just as the term ‘more known’ is comparative and is referred to something else which is said to be less known, so it should be understood that something can be more known than another in two ways; for either it is more known than the other as it brings what is to be obtained to the cognition of that other, or it brings nothing to the thing to be understood, as the triangle is more known to us than the eternal prime mover, yet cognition of the triangle brings nothing to cognition of the prime mover. This member is surely to be set aside by us, since, as everyone concedes, this meaning of ‘more known’ has a place neither in order nor in method.
Now this ‘more known,’ which contributes to cognition of the other, ‘less known,’ can be divided into three members. First, something is more known than something else to the extent it is the cause of cognition of the other, because cognition of the one makes us attain either distinct or confused cognition of the other. That is, it becomes the middle, through which the other can be deduced by means of a syllogism and can become known; as generation is more known to us than prime matter and, as a middle more known to us, is the cause of the knowledge of the matter itself. Second, something is more known to us than another not as the cause producing the cognition of it, but as something necessary to the cognition which is to be attained of it. For this reason it can be called the cause sine qua non. For example, animal is more known than horse, because cognition of animal is necessary at least for distinct cognition of horse. Therefore, cognition of animal contributes to knowing horse, because horse cannot be perfectly known if animal is not known—the species cannot [be known] if the genus is not. Nevertheless, the genus cannot produce cognition of the species, for the species cannot be inferred from the genus.
Finally, something is not said to contribute to knowledge of something else because the cognition of one is the cause of cognition of the other or [because] the cause is the sine qua non, that is,not that to know one is necessary to having cognition of the other, but only because it is useful, for one being known, we more easily obtain cognition of the other. For this reason, animals are said to be more known to us than plants. Although we can infer from animals nothing about plants, nor is it necessary to know animals in order to obtain knowledge of plants, for we can know plants even with distinct cognition, while not knowing animals, because plants and animals are two distinct species of the same genus, of which to know neither one is necessary for cognition of the other. But nevertheless, we know plants easier if we first know animals, on account of the reason that we mentioned earlier. Similarly, it is possible to know the sense of touch without cognition of sight, yet with great difficulty. And if sight and the other senses are known, cognition of touch is obtained easily.
From these, the whole nature of order may be manifest, and also the difference between order and method, properly understood, that is, what is customarily called the way of instruction. For method is, according to the first meaning of more known, a proceeding from more known, that is, from which the unknowns that are sought are inferred. Order, on the other hand, is the proceeding from more known according to the second and third meaning, not according to the first, unless by accident, as we will declare below. For in order we always turn our minds toward something, so that we may begin to know with that which is either necessary or at least useful, so that others which remain to be known may be known more and more easily. Therefore, in order, we make no inference, no argument, but only a disposition of things to be treated, that we may treat this one first and that one later. From this another difference between order and method arises. For each is a proceeding from this to that, but because method is an inferential proceeding, therefore a treatment is named complete after that which is sought, not after that from which it is inferred. For the latter is taken up not for its own sake, but for the sake of the former. For example, in the first book of the Physics, Aristotle found prime matter by the resolutive method. For from generation, which is a posterior effect, he concluded that it is necessary that there is prime matter itself. That treatise is not said to be On Generation and Matter but just On Matter, for ‘on generation’ is not there on account of itself, but on account of matter. Therefore, we believe Averroës to have erred. He, in commentary 57 in the first book of the Physics, numbers his book among books treating ‘on generation,’ saying in this Aristotle takes ‘on generation’ to be in the broadest sense, that is, of one from one; however, in the book on coming to be and passing away, he consider generation to be what is of one from many. But nevertheless, generation is not said to be treated except where what is to be known is set forth per se from its own causes, and there defined; wherefore, the first book, in which Aristotle begins to speak of generation taken in the broadest sense, is the book on coming to be and passing away, as we can know from the introduction of the book. And in the definition of generation which is treated by Aristotle there, it is manifest that Aristotle speaks of that which is of one from one, and about this says much, before speaking on mixture. Moreover, the first book of the Physics is not called a book on generation, but only on principles. For generation is there taken as known slightly and confusedly, as from these we are led to cognition of principles.
Moreover, in order, when progression occurs from this to that without inference, the naming [of the treatise] is by both. Since if it first handles the elements and then the mixtures, the whole treatise is not said to be about mixtures, but in fact this [part] about elements and in fact that [part] about mixtures. For they say both are treated separately and both on account of themselves. For the elements are to be known per se, and not only on account of the mixtures. But the treatment of the elements is placed first, because it is necessary for subsequent cognition of the mixtures.
It sometimes happens, however, that those which are ordered are of the kind that inference is made of one from the other, on account of which they can be interchanged. This, however, is by an accident with regard to the disposition itself. For the disposition, as such, makes no inference. For example, Aristotle wanted to deal first with nature and then motion, and motion can be inferred from nature. In the ordering, no inference is considered, but only that first nature and then motion may be dealt with. For it frequently happens, that what is treated first may be the genus and what is treated afterwards may be the species, where an inference is neither considered nor can occur.
It seems, however, that in the resolutive order, the inference of those things that lead to the end arise from the notion of the end. Nevertheless, the resolutive does not have it in so far as it is order, for every order must be of this type, but more as it is of that kind of order, for the condition of the particular order is resolutive. But on this matter, we will speak below. For now it is sufficient to declare the difference between order and method. The essential condition of method is that it makes an inference of one thing from another. We say that order, to the extent it is such, is not an argument and, on account of the proper nature of order itself, makes no inference of one thing from another thing.
[edit] Chapter nine, in which the utility of both order and method is declared, and it is clearly exposited in what way both are from what is more known, toward the full solution of contrary arguments.
Now from these things which have been said, we can conclude the utility and end as much of order as of method. For the nature of either instrument consists in the end and utility. For the utility and end of method is making [something] known, that is, to produce cognition of that which is unknown. Therefore, method makes it that we learn, since it uncovers what which was hidden. Order, on the other hand, does not have this power. For if we dispose in the right order things to be treated, but do not use some method or argumentation, we learn nothing and obtain no cognition. But the utility of order is that through it we may be taught better and easier. For it is method, not order, that lets us know prime matter, elements, and mixtures. We have [them] from order, with the result that we learn all these things better and easier. For we will know them better if we treat first prime matter, then elements, and then mixtures, because unless we maintain this order, it will not be possible for us to have perfect and distinct knowledge of them. Similarly, that we can know the sense of sight and sense of touch, we accept by method, not order. It is order that lets us acquire the cognition of these things more easily. Aristotle showed this at the beginning of the fifth book of the Metaphysics, because, speaking of order, he said, the beginning (principium) of instruction is not always the principle (principium) of the thing, but from which someone learns more easily. For this is the proprium of order, because by learning with order, we learn easier.
Therefore order and method contribute to cognition in opposite ways. They both should be a progression from what is better known, one in one way, one in another, as we declared.
It is now to the following that with extreme care we should turn our attention. Both [order and method] look toward our cognition as an end, not both in the same way. For method is directed toward our confused rather than our distinct knowledge, as will be clear once we have spoken of method. For method is from what is more known to us sometimes by distinct cognition and yet sometimes by confused cognition. Order, on the other hand, always looks toward our distinct cognition, never our confused. I understand ‘distinct’ either simply, or at least within the genus and according to the strength of the capability [to be so] of that which is to be disposed. For indeed the parts of any discipline are to be disposed, such that optimal cognition of these things is had, to the extent it can be had in that discipline.
Therefore order is always maintained from what is more known to us according to our distinct and in-the-genus perfect cognition. For those things, which it is necessary to know for distinct cognition of others, must be treated first, because if they are unknown, it is not possible for the others to be known, except perhaps imperfectly and confusedly. For this reason, it is necessary, to first treat the genus, then the species, because distinct and perfect cognition of the species is then had, to the extent the definition of it is known,in which [case] it is necessary to accept the distinctly known genus. For this reason, treatment of the genus necessarily precedes that of the species.
Now it can happen that two [things] have such a relationship with each other, that it is necessary to know neither to have cognition of the other, when it is possible for either one to be known distinctly while the other is unknown. This happens with species which are equally contained under the same genus. Nevertheless, one, if it is known first, makes cognition of the other one easier, as cognition of parts of man makes easier the cognition of parts of other animals, and cognition of the perfect senses makes easier cognition of the other, imperfect ones, which are known with the greatest difficulty. Therefore, we ought also to place first that which leads to cognition of the other usefully, if not necessarily.
Therefore, with these two locutions, ‘more’ and ‘easier,’ we describe the total utility of order, for the way of ordering is taken from our cognition to be acquired either more or easier: indeed more, when it is not possible for optimal cognition in the genus to be had by disposing otherwise, and indeed easier, when it is possible for optimal cognition to be acquired without the application of this order, but only with great labor and difficulty.
Therefore, the way of ordering all disciplines is twofold, taken from our cognition as if from a final cause. Because the parts of any discipline which are ordered rightly were disposed either on account of the necessity of perfect and distinct science or on account of the greater ease of instruction. The first way is more excellent, and where it has a place, the other is not considered. But if it is unfitting and the second is fitting, the latter should be used. If in some case, neither has a place, then by whichever he will want to begin is left to the discretion of the author. However, the author normally stays with the order of nobility, or something of that type. Nevertheless, none of these is considered, if the way of ordering can be obtained from our cognition by the other of the two ways, which we declared.
Moreover, Aristotle made mention of these two ways, for in the proem of the first book of the Physics he touched upon the first way, when he said it is not possible for perfect understanding of natural things to be had if first principles are not known. On the cognition of these, perfect cognition of the others depends. Therefore one should start from first principles. For who would not here see Aristotle to take the way of ordering from the necessity of our perfect cognition?
Aristotle mentioned the other way in the beginning of the fifth [book] of the Metaphysics where he said that in disciplines, the beginning (principium) of instruction is not always the principle (principium) of the thing, but whenever it is, there anyone would learn more easily.
Averroës touched on each way in the first chapter of the first book of the Commentaries on Meteorology, as we can see in that place.
From these it is clear they erred who believed every science and every art could be treated and disposed with different orders according to the discretion of the writer or teacher. In truth, there is one, not many, order of better and easier instruction in each discipline to be treated. If this is perverted, it is certainly not possible for these things that could be to be called well ordered, because perfect cognition cannot be acquired or is acquired with difficulty. Therefore resolutive order cannot be suitable to that, to which compositive order is well adapted, and vice versa. But this matter will be discussed at more length, when we make a speech about individual orders.
Therefore to the argument of adversaries a response that removes all difficulty is clear. For they said that Aristotle begins with principles which are mostly unknown; composites and effects are much more known than them; therefore, it is not the condition of order that it be from what is more known to us.
In this argument is a deceitful move from relative (secundum quid) to absolute (simpliciter). For principles to be less known to us than effects is in fact in accordance with our confused cognition. But absolutely (simpliciter), they are not less known, because according to the order of distinct cognition they are more known and wholly to be known prior to effects, because they are more knowable. For they can be known distinctly, apart from distinct cognition of the effects. But the effects cannot be known distinctly unless distinct cognition of the principles is had first. For cognition of effect depends on cognition of cause, but cognition of cause does not dependon cognition of effect.
And so if the way of ordering is taken from our confused cognition, then by all means the way of the others has something of force. But since it [the way of ordering] is taken from the distinct [cognition] alone, it [the argument] is simply empty and false, as we said.
[edit] Chapter ten
[edit] Chapter eleven
Page 103, Page 104===Chapter twelve=== Page 104, Page 105===Chapter thirteen=== Page 105===Chapter fourteen=== Page 106, Page 107, Page 108, Page 109, Page 110, Page 111. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .
