De Methodis/Book II
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Glossary and translation notes
Page 112Page 113Page 114Page 115Page 116Page 117Page 118Page 119Page 120Page 121Page 122Page 123Page 124Page 125===Chapter 8; that the resolutive order does not contribute to the invention of speculative science.===
There were some who believed natural science could not be passed on by any order other than compositive, but that it was invented by resolutive order, and accordingly that the resolutive was useful not [only] to the passing on of it but to the invention of it as well. For Aristotle wrote of this science using compositive order, but used resolutive for invention of the causes to be uncovered and proceeded from the posterior effects to the prior causes. For in the first book of the Physics, in taking an argument from generation, he led us to cognition of prime matter and in the eighth book from eternal motion he demonstrated that there is an eternal prime mover. But they, as others rightly noticed, have often fallen into manifest ambiguity, because they interpreted method as order. For although it is true that for invention of principles of nature, resolution had to be used, nevertheless it is the resolutive method and demonstration from effects about which he will later speak. It is not resolutive order. I astonished at how they do not see those things which are regularly said by nearly everyone regarding the interpretation of the proem of the first book of the Physics. For the saying of everything in this place is well-worn and common: the order of instruction is one thing, the way of instruction, which is properly called method, is another thing.
There were still others, who in another sense said resolutive order is useful for the invention of natural science. For they who first fashioned this science, seemed to invent it by this order in the first place. For indeed they first met the ultimate species of natural bodies and were led by the desire of knowing the very natures, causes and affections of them. Afterwards, they began to consider the proximate causes of each and to rise from these to those more remote, until finally, they reached the first and most remote, by which the tradition of natural science took its start by compositive order. Therefore the invention of natural science went first by resolutive order. The tradition of it then proceeded through the compositive.
But by no means is it true, what these men devise, for first it is not possible to doubt, without reason, whether in the first consideration of these things, which they themselves call the invention of science, this order which they cite is used. For because the natures of all higher level genera are contained in the ultimate species, accordingly those species to be known to us are set forth under diverse and more or less general concepts, as we said. It seems to be in accordance with reason, that they are first offered to us, and the desire for knowing in us rises, under a more general concept, since indeed that which is most universal is known first and more easily by us than what is less universal, and what is according to the order of distinct rather than confused cognition. For we knew horse earlier as body than as animal, andearlier as animal than as horse distinct from ox or ass. For we examine and know more easily those things which are common to many than those distinctive (propria) to each. Therefore, it is to be accepted that it is by the order, through which things became known to us, that those things excite our desire for distinct knowledge. Nevertheless, if natural bodies first move us as bodies, it follows that we are first excited toward discovering the nature of bodies, and then of animals, and then of men. To investigate the nature of a body as it is a body, is to seek the principle of the body. And the principles of natural bodies, by which one is a natural body, are the first principles of all natural things. These things are handled in the books on the harkening of nature. And so invention of this science seems to proceed by compositive, not resolutive, order.
If we were to allow them to maintain this order, which they imagine, it should be most certain to us that this cannot be called invention of natural science. For what, I pray, is natural science if not perfect and distinct cognition of natural things through their causes? For surely confused and imperfect cognition cannot be called science. Therefore let us see whether natural science was invented through this order. They say that first, the ultimate species to be known are offered according to their proximate causes, then the more remote ones, the primary and most remote. If they understand by this process that we come into cognition of proximate causes by means of cognition of species and ultimate effects and from these are led into cognition of more remote causes, they fall into ambiguity. For this is method, not order. For it has an inference from unknown to known. Therefore if we should say order, not method, it is necessary to that we understand the following. Cognition of these very species is sought first and so there is treatment of them first. Then next there is dealing with the proximate causes of these, and cognition of them is sought. Then with the remote, and finally with the most remote principles. But by no agreement can this be called science or invention of natural science, because that whole cognition is confused. For while we are ignorant of the first and most remote principles, we can know perfectly nothing of the others. Therefore what kind of treatment will there be of man or of horse when all more remote causes are unknown? Certainly confused and rude.
Moreover, in that first consideration of things, which they call the invention of science, do we know something in things themselves, or not? If not, then we know nothing through it, and therefore there is invention of no science. If [we do know] something, what then is it? As when in the first place we consider man and other species, what do we know in man? Truly, the substance of man consists of form and matter, of soul and body. But nevertheless it cannot be known to us that cognition of the nature of man consists in cognition of matter and form, which, because to consist of matter and form is not the proprium of man, does not apply to it to the extent it is man, but to natural body to the extent it is a natural body. Therefore while we do not know this condition to be essential of all natural bodies, we cannot know that cognition of matter and form is required for perfectly knowing human nature. But neither can body and soul be known while we do not know the nature of form in general, nor prime matter from which all secondary matter is constituted.
Many more absurdities, which everyone may consider, follow from this opinion [of our adversaries]. And so accordingly it should be certain and accepted that whatever this order is which is maintained in this thinking, it is wholly inappropriate not only to the tradition of natural science but also to its invention. Now it is in accordance with the greatest reason for natural science to be passed on in accordance with the same order it was first invented by them, for if natural science were passed on by philosophers only by compositive order, since perfect cognition of natural things cannot be brought together with another order, it follows also that the first inventors of this science cannot by any other order invent or attain perfect science of natural things. This should be asserted of method as well. For by this method Aristotle passed on to us perfectnatural science. It is necessary that he himself was also led by the same [method] to perfect cognition of natural things. And by the same [method] natural science was invented. Of course, Aristotle, or whoever else was the first inventor of natural science, may have deceived us, if dismissing the order and the method, using which he invented natural science and was led to optimal cognition of natural things, in passing it on to us, maintained a different order and different method, by which we could obtain cognition either not quite perfect or difficult to obtain.
Moreover, what we said regarding natural science is to be judged true of all over resolutive sciences, for the same way is valid in all.
Therefore it is manifest that the compositive order alone is suited to both passing on and inventing contemplative science. For the same nature of things to be known offers by itself both to those who want to invent by contemplation and effort the science of those things and to those who resolve to pass it on to others.
Moreover, that which some call invention, is certainly neither the invention of science nor tradition, but some preceding consideration or premeditation, while we are moved by a desire and love of knowing things, we must begin first to search for that cognition.Page 129Page 130Page 131Page 132Page 133Page 134Page 135Page 136Page 137Page 128Page 139Page 140Page 141Page 142Page 143Page 144Page 145Page 146Page 147Page 148Page 149
