Downum v. United States/Dissent Clark

by Tom C. Clark

United States Supreme Court

372 U.S. 734

Downum  v.  United States

 Argued: March 20, 1963. --- Decided: April 22, 1963

Mr. Justice CLARK, with whom Mr. Justice HARLAN, Mr. Justice STEWART and Mr. Justice WHITE join, dissenting.

The Court in applying the rule of Cornero v. United States, 48 F.2d 69, 74 A.L.R. 797 (C.A.9th Cir., 1931), says that 'the valued right of a defendant to have his trial completed by the particular tribunal summoned to sit in judgment on him may be subordinated to the public interest-when there is an imperious necessity to do so.' (Emphasis supplied.) The Court of Appeals was urged to adopt the Cornero rule, but it refused. Applying that rule here, the Court orders the conviction reversed and petitioner set free.

In Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 69 S.Ct. 834, 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949), this Court refused to follow the Cornero rule, which was characterized as holding that the absence of witnesses was not such an 'imperious' or 'urgent necessity' as to come within the recognized exception to the double jeopardy provision. Id., at 691, 69 S.Ct. at 838, 93 L.Ed. 974. The Court said:

'We are asked to adopt the Cornero rule under which petitioner contends the absence of witnesses can never justify discontinuance of a trial. Such a rigid formula is inconsistent with the guiding principles of the Perez decision (United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824)) to which we adhere. Those principles command courts in considering whether a trial should be terminated without judgment to take 'all circumstances into account' and thereby forbid the mechanical application of an abstract formula. The value of the Perez principles thus lies in their capacity for informed application under widely different circumstances, without injury to the defendants or to the public interest.' Ibid.

I adhere to Wade v. Hunter, which in short holds that 'a trial can be discontinued when particular circumstances manifest a necessity for so doing, and when failure to discontinue would defeat the ends of justice.' Id., at 690, 69 S.Ct. at 838, 93 L.Ed. 974.

In order to apply the principles of Wade v. Hunter, it is necessary that the facts be recalled. On Wednesday or Thursday of the week preceding trial, some 12 cases, including petitioner's were set by the court for the following Monday. This was, in the words of the trial judge, 'very short notice.' Transcript of Record, p. 18. Subpoenas were issued by the District Attorney's office for approximately 100 witnesses and placed in the hands of the marshal. The petitioner's case was No. 10 on the list, and the prosecutor stated that he did not foresee that it would be reached on Tuesday, the second day of the week's hearings. The prosecutor's office was shorthanded, one of the assistants being in the military service. The prosecutor who had been assigned to petitioner's case had learned from the marshal the previous day that the wife of a Mr. Rutledge, who was the key witness in petitioner's case, would inform them of her husband's whereabouts, if she should learn of it. Since the prosecutor was trying another case on the Tuesday morning that petitioner's case was called, he was unable immediately to contact the marshal and determine whether Mr. Rutledge was present, and he announced ready for trial without ascertaining this. The jury for petitioner's case was selected and then excused until 2 p.m., and the prosecutor proceeded to complete the hearing of his other case before noon. Then, upon checking with the marshal's office during the noon recess, the prosecutor discovered that Rutledge was not present. He immediately informed the judge in his chambers, and upon the opening of the afternoon session defense counsel was advised in open court that the key witness of the Government was not available and the case would have to go over a couple of days. A defense motion to dismiss two of the six counts in the indictment-those on which Rutledge was the key witness-on the ground of lack of prosecution and proceed to trial on the remaining counts was denied by the court, and the jury was discharged-all over objections from the defense. Two days later the case was called and the petitioner interposed his plea of double jeopardy. Thereafter, a second jury was impaneled, and petitioner was tried and found guilty on all counts.

The first jury had never begun to act in this case. Petitioner was never formally arraigned in the presence of the first jury, nor was any evidence presented or heard for or against him at that time, nor was he required to put on any defense. In addition, the second jury having been impaneled two days later, there was no continued or prolonged anxiety, nor was the petitioner caused any additional expense or embarrassment, deprived of any right or prejudiced in any way. Neither has petitioner contended that one jury was more or less favorable than the other.

The conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals indicate that they viewed the circumstances in which the prosecutor found himself as having resulted from excusable oversight. There is no indication that the prosecutor's explanation was a mere cover for negligent preparation or that his action was in any way deliberate. There is nothing in the record that even suggests that the circumstances were used by the prosecutor for the purpose of securing a more favorable jury or in any way to take advantage of or to harass the petitioner. Indeed, it appears to be just one of those circumstances which often creep into a prosecutor's life as a result of inadvertence when many cases must be handled during a short trial period.

We can of course visualize other ways of handling the situation. The judge might have held the first jury together, rather than discharging them, until Mr. Rutledge's attendance could have been obtained. But this, viewed prospectively from the moment the court acted, would have tied up 12 men on the panel for an indefinite period and disrupted the calendar for the entire week, if not longer. It is entirely understandable that the trial judge was concerned with his calendar. Moreover, even if a two-day continuance in the above manner-holding the first jury-were later held improper on appeal from the trial court's judgment, the petitioner could then be retried after suffering not only the time and expense of one full trial but also the disclosure of his defense. Nor is the claim of petitioner that the Government should have proceeded on the other counts of the indictment, which he claims did not require the testimony of Rutledge, any more tenable. This not only would have required two trials but also might raise the legal proposition that the prosecution on the remaining two counts was barred. While ordinarily the other four counts might have been sufficient to support a maximum sentence, the prosecutor might well have had good reason, in addition to the obvious preference for one rather than two trials, for wanting all counts considered in one proceeding. The indictment charged the petitioner with forging and passing government checks and conspiring with two codefendants, who pleaded guilty, to commit those acts. Rutledge was the payee of some of the checks and might well have been an important, though not the key, witness with reference to the conspiracy. In fact, the prosecutor expressed to the trial court his opinion that, under the entire indictment, he could not safely go to trial without the attendance of Rutledge. Transcript of Record, pp. 19 20.

As I see the problem, the issue is whether the action of the prosecutor in failing to check on the presence of his witness before allowing a jury to be sworn was of such moment that it constituted a deprival of the petitioner's rights and entitled him to a verdict of acquittal without any trial on the merits. Obviously under the facts here he suffered no such deprivation. Ever since Perez this Court has recognized that the 'ends of public justice' must be considered in determining such a question. 9 Wheat., at 580, 6 L.Ed. 165. In this light I cannot see how this Court finds that the trial judge abused his discretion in affording the Government a two-day period in which to bring forward its key witness who, to its surprise, was found to be temporarily absent. I believe that the 'ends of public justice,' to which Mr. Justice Story referred in Perez, require that the Government have a fair opportunity to present the people's case and obtain adjudication on the merits, rather than that the criminal be turned free because of the harmless oversight of the prosecutor.

Notes