Hammer v. Dagenhart

From Wikisource
Jump to: navigation, search
Hammer v. Dagenhart
Syllabus
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), was a United States Supreme Court decision involving the power of Congress to enact child labor laws. — Excerpted from Hammer v. Dagenhart on Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
Court Documents
Opinion of the Court
Dissenting Opinion
Holmes
Linked case(s):
312 U.S. 100
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

247 U.S. 251

Hammer v. Dagenhart

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 704 Argued: April 15, 16, 1918 --- Decided: June 3, 1918

The Act of September 1, 1916, c. 432, 39 Stat. 675, prohibits transportation in interstate commerce of goods made at a factory in which, within thirty days prior to their removal therefrom, children under the age of 14 years have been employed or permitted to work, or children between the ages of 14 and 16 years have been employed or permitted to work more than eight hours in any day, or more than six days in any week, or after the hour of 7 P.M. or before the hour of 6 A.M. Held, unconstitutional as exceeding the commerce power of Congress and invading the powers reserved to the States.

The power to regulate interstate commerce is the power to prescribe the rule by which the commerce is to be governed; in other words, to control the means by which it is carried on.

The court has never sustained a right to exclude save in cases where the character of the particular things excluded was such as to bring them peculiarly within the governmental authority of the State or Nation and render their exclusion, in effect, but a regulation of interstate transportation, necessary to prevent the accomplishment through that means of the evils inherent in them.

The manufacture of goods is not commerce, nor do the facts that they are intended for, and are afterwards shipped in, interstate commerce make their production a part of that commerce subject to the control of Congress.

The power to regulate interstate commerce was not intended as a means of enabling Congress to equalize the economic conditions in the States for the prevention of unfair competition among them by forbidding the interstate transportation of goods made under conditions which Congress deems productive of unfairness.

It was not intended as an authority to Congress to control the States in the exercise of their police power over local trade and manufacture, always existing and expressly reserved to them by the Tenth Amendment. [p252]

The case is stated in the opinion. [p268]

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).