In re African-American Slave Descendants Litigation

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United States District Court,
N.D. Illinois,
Eastern Division.
In re AFRICAN-AMERICAN SLAVE
DESCENDANTS LITIGATION.
MDL No. 1491.
No. 02 C 7764.

July 6, 2005.

Benjamin Obi Nwoye, Mendoza & Nwoye, P.C., Chicago, IL, Bryan R. Williams, New York, NY, Diana E. Sammons' Nagel, Rice, Dreifuss & Mazie, Livingston, NJ, Dumisa Buhle Ntsebeza, Cape Town, South Africa, Gary L. Bledsoe, Law Offices of Gary L. Bledsoe, Austin, TX, Harry E. Cantrell, Jr., Cantrell Law Firm, New Orleans, LA, Lionel Jean- Baptiste, Jean-Baptiste and Raoul, Evanston, IL, Morse Geller, Forest Hills, NY, Pius Akamdi Obioha, Law Offices of Pius A. Obioha, New Orleans, LA, Roger S. Wareham, Thomas Wareham & Richards, Brooklyn, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Andrew R. McGaan, Douglas Geoffrey Smith, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Thomas F. Gardner, Susan Lynn Winders, Jones Day, David Michael Kroeger, Jenner & Block, LLC, Christina M. Tchen, &van James Rohlfsen, Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom, LLP, Michael J. Barron, Canadian National Railway Company, James A. Fletcher, Fletcher & Sippel, LLC, James A. Morsch, Butler Rubin Saltarelli & Boyd LLP, Edward M. Shin, Greenberg Traurig, LLP., Lawrence E. Kennon, Power & Dixon, Roland W. Burris , Burris, Wright, Slaughter and Tom, LLP, Chicago, IL, Heidi K. Hubbard, Andrew W. Rudge, Williams & Connolly, Gary DiBianco, Andrew L. Sandler, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, John Niblock, John H. Beisner, Pammela Ouinn, O'Melveny & Myers, Washington, DC, Marco E. Schnabl, Vaughn C. Williams, William J. Hine, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Debra Torres, John W. Brewer, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, Ann Cara Turetsky, O'Melveny & Myers Times Square Tower, Vincent R. FitzPatrick, Jr., White & Case, New York, NY, Jack E. McClard, Maya M. Eckstein, Robert R. Merhige, Jr., Hunton & Williams, Richmond, VA, Frank E. Emory, Jr., Hunton & Williams Bank of America Plaza, Charlotte, NC, Edward D. Fagan, Fagan & Associates, Livingston, NJ, Joseph M. Wright, Chief Deputy Court Administrator State of Michigan, Detroit, MI, Robert Notzon, Law Office of Robert Notzon, Austin, TX, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

CHARLES R. NORGLE, District Judge.

*1 Before the court is Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Consolidated and Amended Complaint. For the following reasons, the motion is granted with prejudice.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case arises out of the institution of human chattel slavery as it existed in the North American colonies and the later formed United States of America. The allegations in Plaintiffs' Second Consolidated and Amended Complaint ("SCAC" or "Complaint") retell the generally acknowledged horrors of the institution of slavery, and the malignant actions of the sovereigns, entities, and individuals, foreign and domestic, that supported that institution. Plaintiffs' Complaint asks the courts to reexamine a tragic period in our Nation's history and to hold various corporate defendants liable for the commercial activities of their alleged predecessors before, during, and after the Civil War in America. Defendants acknowledge that slavery marked a deplorable period in our Nation's history. However, they assert that Plaintiffs' claims, which arise from that period, cannot be heard in 2005 in a court of law.

II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF SLAVERY IN AMERICA

In essence, Plaintiffs' Complaint is a claim for reparations rooted in the historic injustices and the immorality of the institution of human chattel slavery in the United States. To elucidate the nature of this institution, the court undertakes an analysis, necessarily brief, of the historical events surrounding slavery, including the monumental event that ended the institution of slavery in the United States, the Civil War. The court also undertakes a brief analysis of the present day slave reparations movement, in order to illuminate the larger political context into which this case falls.

A. A Definition of Slavery

In January of 1865, General William Tecumseh Sherman of the Union forces, along with Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, met with former slaves. Ira Berlin, Generations of Captivity: A History of African-American Slaves 2 (2003). The conversation focused on two questions: from the point of view of the freed slave, what was the nature of slavery, and what was the nature of freedom? Id. Garrison Frazier, a sixty-seven year old former slave, explained that "[s]lavery ... is receiving by the irresistible power the work of another man, and not by his consent." Id. Freedom, Frazier indicated, "is taking us from the yoke of bondage, and placing us where we could reap the fruits of our own labor, take care of ourselves and assist the Government in maintaining our freedom." Id. Frazier's definition reminds us of the essential unfairness of slavery: the slaveowner takes, by sheer violence and force, the slave's freedom and labor in order to place himself at the top of a society's economic hierarchy. Id. at 3.

B. A Brief History of Slavery in the New World

While slavery seems to have been a part of human history since the "dawn of civilization," African slave trafficking in the New World began in the year 1502. Robert William Fogel, Without Consent or Contract: The Rise and Fall of American Slavery 17-18 (1991). Europeans were historically drawn to Africa for two reasons: gold and slaves. Edward Reynolds, Stand the Storm, A History of the Atlantic Slave Trade 28 (1985). Those who journeyed to Africa seeking slaves for the New World sometimes simply kidnapped individuals who appeared before them by happenstance. Herbert S. Klein, The Atlantic Slave Trade 103 (1999). However, historical evidence indicates that a great deal (perhaps even the majority) of the slave trade was made possible by African leaders who sold African slaves to European slave traders. Id.; see also Reynolds, supra at 33-46 (providing a detailed explanation of the African slave market, and the economic mechanisms used to facilitate the sale of slaves from local African chiefs to slave traders). Local African leaders acquired these slaves in several different ways: captives were taken in local wars or raids, those imprisoned for crimes or indebtedness were often forced into slavery, and large states would exact slaves as "tribute" from smaller tribes under their control. See Klein, supra at 117.

*2 Upon their sale to slave traders, slaves were shipped to the New World in what became known as the "Middle Passage." Slaves' heads were shaved, their bodies were branded and stripped naked, and their ankles were shackled. See Reynolds, supra at 47. They were then led into the holds of slave ships, where they were laid down alongside each other for the journey to the New World. Id. at 48. The prevalence of disease, lack of sufficient food and water, and constant confinement took its toll, with up to one-quarter of the slaves on any given ship dying during the "Middle Passage." Id. at 48-53.

African slaves in the New World were initially sold into small sugar production operations in Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Cuba, Haiti, Jamaica, the British West Indies, and Dutch Guyana. Id. at 20-21. Other African slaves were set to work producing such crops as cocoa, coffee, hemp, tobacco, and rice. Id. at 21. By the 1680s, the small farm with its traditional methods of operation had given way to more efficient means of production, and the concept of the large "plantation" was born. Id. at 23. Inefficient methods of farming had been "replaced by large gangs of slaves, working in lock step, and moving methodically across vast fields." Id. With this change came an increase in the size of slave operations. By the early part of the 1800s, many plantations in Jamaica and the West Indies contained up to two hundred and fifty slaves. Id.

Slavery in North America began more slowly than slavery in South America and the Caribbean. In 1680, there were 7,000 slaves in the British North American colonies. Id. at 29. Slavery as an economic institution in North America, however, rapidly gained momentum over the next fifty years. By the 1730s, roughly 120,000 slaves had been brought to the colonies and forced to work in such industries as farming, tobacco production, and domestic service. Id. By the middle of the 1700s, the institution of slavery in the United States began to concentrate in the Southern colonies. It was in these colonies that plantations emerged, ready to take advantage of the inexpensive labor slaves provided in the production of such crops as tobacco, rice, sugar, and cotton. Id. at 31.

During the years 1780 to 1810, the rapid expansion of these industries was accompanied by a significant increase in the number of slaves imported from Africa. Id. at 32. The increase in the importation of slaves, along with the natural increase in the slave population, soon gave the United States a dubious distinction. By 1825, the population of slaves in the United States was roughly 1,750,000, making the United States the "leading user of slave labor in the new world." Id. at 33. Slavery had become the Dominant economic force in the Southern United States. Historians cite numerous factors for this development, but it seems that two factors are the most significant. First, slave labor was inexpensive compared to other sources of labor. Id. at 34. Second, slave masters in the Southern states were willing to expend an "enormous, almost unconstrained degree of force ... to transform ancient modes of labor into a new industrial discipline." Id. This "new industrial discipline" was based on a division of labor scheme, enforced by brutality, and legally sanctioned.

C. Slavery and American Law

*3 This violent and oppressive system was supported by the United States legal system for a long period of time. Thus slavery was historically more than simply a social and economic institution. It was also an established legal institution. fFN11 For instance, Article 1, Section 9 of the United States Constitution has been traditionally understood to limit Congress' power to regulate slavery. [FN21 It is thought that this Article meant that Congress was denied the power to regulate the "internal slave trade, leaving only importation from Africa to be prohibited after 1808." Walter Berns, The Constitution and the Migration of Slaves, 78 YALE L .J. 198 (1968). Also, in 1850, Congress passed a statute supporting the rights of slaveowners to capture escaped slaves. The Fugitive Slave Act provided that:

FN 1. Some Northern state statutes, however, stood firmly in opposition to slavery. See infra Part ME (discussing the Personal Liberty Laws enacted in Northern States).

FN2. "The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person." U.S. Const. art 1, § 9, cl. 1 .

[W]hen a person held to service or labor in any State or Territory of the United States, has heretofore or shall hereafter escape into another State or Territory of the United States, the person or persons to whom such service or labor may be due ... may pursue and reclaim such fugitive person ... [and may] take and remove such fugitive person back to the State or Territory whence he or she may have escaped as aforesaid. The Fugitive Slave Act, ch. 60, § 6, 9 Stat. 462 (1850). This Act also provided for fines and/or imprisonment for those who aided escaped slaves, and stipulated that both law enforcement personnel and ordinary citizens were bound by law to aid in the capture of escaped slaves. Id. Finally, in the infamous case of Dred Scott v. Sandford, Scott, a slave, brought suit to gain his freedom. 60 U.S. 393 (1856). The Supreme Court of the United States held that since Scott was a "negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country, and sold as slaves," he could not be a citizen of the United States, and hence had no standing to bring suit in a United States court. Id. at 403-04.

D. Slavery and Morality

The immorality of the institution of slavery is obvious. However, scholars have attempted to explain exactly what it is about this institution that offends moral sensibilities. Two moral indictments of the institution are significant. First, "slavery permitted one group of people to exercise unrestrained personal domination over another group of people." Fogel, supra at 394. The slave was subject to abject cruelty, both physical and psychological, by his or her masters in order for the master to maintain domination. Id. In one sense, "[t]he extreme degree of domination required by this system ... is the essential crime." Id. Second, the slave was denied the fruits of his or her labor. Id. at 395. Slaves were forced to work at physically grueling tasks for very long hours without pay, thus it was impossible for the slave to improve his or her economic position within society. Id The slave simply had no resources or "opportunity ... to rise on the economic ladder by acquiring land, labor skills, and other forms of capital." Id.

E, Slavery as a Cause of the Civil War

*4 Historians have long debated whether slavery was the single driving force behind the regional tensions in the United States that eventually led to the Civil War. "Although some scholars have held that slavery was the cause [of the Civil War], others have developed complex analyses that draw distinctions between immediate and ultimate causes and that explore a variety of ways other than war that could have settled or at least contained the issue of slavery." Id. at 411. This much, however, is clear: by 1861, tensions between the North and the South had escalated to the extent that maintaining peace would have required that the Northern states allow the permanent "existence of an independent confederacy dedicated to the promotion of slavery." Id. at 413. In other words, by 1861, tensions between the North and the South had increased to such a pitch that the only way slavery would be abolished throughout the entire nation was through armed conflict.

A great deal of the tension between the North and the South had to do with the Northern states' promulgation of Personal Liberty Laws. "In his annual message to Congress of December 3, 1860, [President] James Buchanan warned that the South 'would be justified in revolutionary resistance to the Government of the Union' if northern states did not repeal their Personal Liberty Laws." Thomas D. Morris, Free Men All: The Personal Liberty Laws of the North 1780-1861 202 (1974). These laws were devised and implemented by many Northern states to make it very difficult for slave owners to capture escaped slaves who had taken up residence in those states.

The court does not claim objective knowledge of the ultimate cause of the Civil War. Certainly, however, tensions marked by the North's moral outrage at the institution of chattel slavery, and the South's indignation at the North's promulgation of Personal Liberty Laws, contributed significantly to the advent of war.

F. The Civil War

Fort Sumter, located in the Charleston harbor, South Carolina, was one of just four Federal fortifications left in Confederate territory in 1861. Shelby Foote, The Civil War, A Narrative: Fort Sumter to Perryville 44 (Vintage Books 1986) (1958). The government of South Carolina had made protests to Washington regarding the presence of a Federal fortification within its borders, but those protests were ignored. Id. Instead, Washington decided to reinforce Fort Sumter with men and supplies. Id. However, when local gunmen opened fire on a Union steamer attempting to bring these reinforcements to Fort Sumter, the steamer was forced to turn away. Id. By March of 1861, Fort Sumter was surrounded by Confederate forces, and was cut off from fresh supplies. Id. By April of that year, the Federal forces inside Fort Sumter were in danger of starving to death. Id. at 48. The time had come for Washington to make a decision--abandon Fort Sumter, or again attempt to resupply it. Washington was aware that another attempt to bring supplies to Fort Sumter might well provoke an attack on the fort itself. Id. at 47. This time, however, the attack would not come from local gunmen, but from Confederate forces. Id. Washington decided not to cave in to Confederate pressures, and attempted to bring fresh provisions and reinforcements to the fort. Id. at 47. On the morning of April 12, 1861, with Union supply ships within sight of Fort Sumter, the Confederacy fired the first shot of the Civil War. Id. at 49. *5 The four-year Civil War was fought by means of a series of pitched battles, each one seemingly more horrific than the last. The first true battle of the war, the battle of Bull Run, resulted in the deaths of roughly 2,700 Union soldiers and 2,000 Confederate soldiers. The Price in Blood, Casualties in the Civil War, at http://www.civilwarhome.com/casualties.htm. Other battles, at places like Gettysburg, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Wilson's Creek, Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor, and Franklin took the lives of tens of thousands of Union and Confederate soldiers. Id. The final campaign of the war, fought in the vicinity of Appomattox, Virginia, resulted in a combined 17,500 battle deaths. Id.

Following the Appomattox campaign, on April 9, 1865, Union General Ulysses S. Grant received Confederate General Robert E. Lee at Appomattox Courthouse, where the two generals agreed upon the terms of Lee's surrender. Shelby Foote, The Civil War, A Narrative: Red River to Appomattox 945-51 (Vintage Books 1986) (1974). Shortly thereafter, Grant rode out towards his headquarters, where Union batteries were firing in celebration. Id. at 950- 51. Grant insisted the batteries stop firing, worried that the noise might spark a skirmish between his troops and the nearby, and still armed, Confederate soldiers. Id. at 951. There was, however, another more important reason Grant considered it "unfitting" for his troops to be firing their weapons at that point: "'The war is over,' he told his staff. 'The rebels are our countrymen again.'" Id.

All in all, approximately 620,000 Americans died in the Civil War; Union forces fighting to end slavery suffered 360,000 of these deaths. James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era 854 (Oxford University Press 1988). There were 178,975 African-American Union troops that fought in the Civil War, and 36,000 of those troops died during the war. The Price in Blood, Casualties in the Civil War, at http://www.civilwarhome.com/casualties.htm. An analysis as brief as this cannot do justice to the tremendous sacrifices made by both Union and Confederate soldiers in this war. Since the Civil War, America has been involved in a number of armed conflicts, but, by some estimates, the fatalities America suffered in the Civil War exceeds the total number of fatalities America has suffered in all its other wars. Id. The Civil War, the war that ended the institution of chattel slavery in the United States, was truly America's bloodiest war.

G. The Abolishment of Slavery

On January 1, 1863, in the midst of the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation. That document reads in part: "I do order and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated States ... are, and henceforward shall be free...." Abraham Lincoln, The Emancipation Proclamation, Exec. Proclamation No. 17 (Jan. 1, 1863), reprinted in 12 Stat. 1268 (1863).

*6 Following the war, Congress acted to formally abolish slavery by proposing the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. That Amendment was ratified on December 6, 1865. Section 1 of that Amendment reads: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1.

Also, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was ratified on July 9, 1868. Section 1 of that Amendment reads: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. In effect, the Fourteenth Amendment overruled the Dred Scott decision, making freed slaves citizens of the United States.

Following the Civil War, the South was bankrupt, and an estimated four million African-Americans assumed the responsibilities of freedom as nationalism emerged. These lingering effects led to the Reconstruction era, a significant period in our Nations history, which addressed the numerous issues raised by the abolition of slavery and the war fought to achieve that end.

H. The Modern Slave Reparations Movement

Plaintiffs' Second Consolidated and Amended Complaint falls within the broader context of a present and ongoing social and political movement for slave reparations in America. In order to properly place this suit within the context of that movement, the court offers a brief analysis of recent efforts undertaken by various groups to gain reparations for the historic injustices of slavery.

1. A Definition of "Reparations"

A complete definition of the term "reparations" will answer, at least, the following questions. What political, moral, or legal justification is there for the assertion that descendants of slaves are owed some sort of reparations? What are the arguments against reparations? Assuming reparations are justified, what form should these reparations take? Which specific individuals or groups will pay these reparations? To which specific individuals or groups will these reparations be paid?

In general, reparations advocates argue that reparations are justified because America itself owes a debt to the descendants of slaves. America owes this debt, advocates assert, simply because the slaves themselves were never paid for their labor. "[B]lack people worked long, hard, killing days, years, centuries--and they were never paid .... There is a debt here." Randall Robinson, The Debt: What America Owes to Blacks 207 (2000). In other words, the basic moral principle of fairness, and the fundamental legal principle that parties must repay their debts, justifies reparations. "[B]elief in the fairness of reparations requires at the intellectual level acceptance of the principle that the victims of unjust enrichment should be compensated. Under reparations, Blacks more readily may position themselves as creditors seeking payment of an overdue debt, rather than as racial supplicants seeking an undeserved preference." Robert Westley, Many Billions Gone: Is It Time to Reconsider the Case for Black Reparations?, 40 B.C. L.REV. 429, 436 (1998) .

*7 Other advocates argue that reparations are justified as a way to "repair a country by creating a sense of mutual, interracial trust, respect, and shared destiny." Note, Bridging the Color Line: The Power of African-American Reparations to Redirect America's Future 115 HARV. L.REV. 1689, 1689- 90 (2002) (hereinafter, "Note"). Still others argue that reparations for descendants of slaves are justified because other groups that have suffered historical harms have been able to obtain reparations. See Alfred L. Brophy, Some Conceptual and Legal Problems in Reparations for Slavery. 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 499 (2003) (hereinafter "Conceptual and Legal Problems ") (noting that "Native Americans, Holocaust victims, [and] Japanese Americans interned during World War 11" have obtained reparations).

However, opponents of slave reparations identify a number of reasons, they assert, that reparations are unjust or unwise. Alfred L. Brophy, The Cultural War over Reparations for Slavery, 53 DEPAUL LREV. 1181, 1201-02 (2004) (hereinafter "Cultural War "); see also David Horowitz, Uncivil Wars: The Controversy over Reparations for Slavery 12-16 (2002) (identifying ten separate arguments against reparations). The court will briefly summarize what seem to be the most cogent of these arguments. Some assert that there is no genuine moral or legal liability on the part of those who are currently asked to pay the reparations. Cultural War, supra, at 1202-06. This argument focuses on the fundamental notion that "one should be liable only for the harms one causes...." Id. at 1202. Since today's Americans do not hold slaves, the argument goes, today's Americans are not morally or legally liable for the evils of slavery. Id. Others argue that the reparations asked for have, in fact, already been paid.

Since the passage of the Civil Rights Act and the advent of the Great Society in 1965, trillions of dollars in transfer payments have been made to African-Americans in the form of welfare benefits and racial preferences (in contracts, job placements and educational admissions).... It is said that reparations are necessary to achieve a healing between African-Americans and other Americans. If trillion-dollar restitutions and a wholesale rewriting of American law (in order to accommodate racial preferences) is not enough to achieve a "healing," what is?

Horowitz, supra, at 14; see also CHICAGO, ILL., ORDINANCE 2-92-420 et seq. (providing that "Minority-owned business[es]," including those businesses owned by African-Americans, are to receive at least twenty-five percent of the dollar value of any contract, purchase order, or agreement awarded by the City of Chicago). Some also argue that the Civil War itself was payment, in blood and human lives, for slavery. Cultural War, supra, at 1208; see also Horowitz, supra, at 15 ("If not for the sacrifices of white soldiers and a white American president who gave his life to sign the Emancipation Proclamation, blacks in America would still be slaves"). Finally, a common argument made against reparations is that reparations talk is divisive, and continues to enmesh African-Americans in a culture of victimhood. Cultural War, supra, at 1209-10 ("[talk of reparations] makes blacks think that whites as a group are their oppressors; it makes whites who have no responsibility for the sins of the past feel like oppressors and plays on feelings of guilt").

*8 Advocates of reparations differ in their assessments of exactly what form reparations ought to take. Some reparations advocates assert that reparations should start with a formal apology from America, as well as the establishment of "truth commissions" to investigate the complicity of various groups or organizations in slavery. Cultural War, supra, at 1185-1189; see also CHICAGO, ILL., ORDINANCE 2-92-585 (requiring parties entering into contracts with the city to search company records, and provide "full and accurate disclosure to the public about any slavery policies sold by any companies, or profits from slavery by other industries (or their predecessors) who are doing business with the city"); S. Res. 39, 109th Cong. (2005) (formally apologizing for the Senate's failure to enact antilynching legislation, and expressing sympathy to the descendants of victims of lynching). Apologies, "truth commissions," and local ordinances requiring companies to disclose ties to slavery, are thought by some to be a first step along the road to full reparations. "By preparing people to understand the nature of the harm and why reparations are needed, they are a way of making the claim before the public." Cultural War, supra, at 1188.

Most commonly, however, the term "reparations" simply means some sort of financial compensation for descendants of slaves. Some reparations advocates have proposed that reparations take the form of a "trust ... established for the benefit of all Black Americans." Westley, supra, at 470; see also Robinson, supra, at 244-45. This trust "should be financed by funds drawn annually from the general revenue of the United States," and the funds would "be expendable on any project or pursuit aimed at the educational and economic empowerment" of African- Americans. Westley, supra, at 470. Specifically, advocates of reparations assert that trust funds should be used to finance the creation of special schools for black children found to be "at risk in unhealthy family and neighborhood environments." Robinson, supra, at 244-45. These funds could also be used to finance the work of black political and advocacy groups. Id. at 245-46. Other reparations advocates propose that reparations take "the form of subsidies to black-owned businesses, investment in education programs and scholarships for black youths, training programs for black workers, affirmative action programs, resources for community-based organizations in predominantly black communities, and development and implementation of programs designed to educate the country about the legacy of slavery." Note, supra, at 1690.

The reparations movement has thus moved towards the notion that reparations should be directed towards certain groups of people, rather than specific individuals. "Pro-reparation positions more readily see harm to entire groups and want to repair that economic and psychological harm." Conceptual and Legal Problems, supra, at 509; see also Robinson, supra, at 244-46 (advocating group reparations). The group entitled to receive reparations would obviously consist of descendants of slaves, and determining exactly who is and is not a member of this group could be done in a number of different ways. See Kevin Hopkins, Forgive U.S. Our Debts? Righting the Wrongs of Slavery, 89 GEO. L.J. 2531, 2542 2(001) (proposing that genealogical research, blood testing, or genetic mapping could be used to determine whether one is a legitimate descendant of slaves).

*9 However, there may well be no perfect method of determining exactly who is a descendant of a slave, and thus a member of the group entitled to receive reparations. See Id. at 2542-2547. Genealogical research "often fails to provide significant information about a person's ancestry." Id. at 2543. The blood, or "one-drop," test (whereby anyone with any trace of African ancestry is deemed part of the group entitled to receive reparations) "fails to differentiate between descendants of U.S. slaves and those of other nationalities with African heritage...." Id. at 2544. Genetic mapping, or DNA testing, is more promising than the above two methods, but "alone is insufficient to provide a decisive link to a homeland...." Id. at 2547.

The question of who ought to pay the reparations is also complex. The value of slaves' unpaid labor, reparations advocates argue, was scattered amongst numerous entities: "plantation owners, northern entrepreneurs, state treasuries, the United States government." Robinson, supra, at 207. In the case presently before the court, the Plaintiffs have chosen to bring suit against private entities, the corporations who allegedly held slaves, and their successors in interest. For example, the first named Defendant is FleetBoston Corporation, which Plaintiffs allege is a successor in interest to Providence Bank, which allegedly financed and profited from the slave trade. SCAC, 9[ 1 116- 126. Many reparations advocates, however, focus their attention on the United States government as the proper party to pay reparations. See Note, supra, at 1700 ("Reparations are not intended to hold individual Americans living today morally responsible for the acts of their forefathers, but rather to insist that the country apologize for its wrongful acts and take the necessary steps to bridge the racial divide and to alleviate the economic and social disparities that resulted from those acts."); see also Hopkins, supra, at 2551-52 (advocating that the United States government pay these reparations).

The following general definition of slave "reparations" thus emerges. "[Repparations mean truth commissions that document the history of racial crimes and the current liability for those crimes, apologies that acknowledge liability, and payments to settle the account." Cultural War, supra, at 1190. These payments may be made in the form of a trust, with the descendants of slaves named as trust beneficiaries, or other forms of subsidies given to the descendants, and could be made by private entities who have allegedly profited from slavery (as the plaintiffs in the instant suit urge). The reparations movement more commonly insists, however, that the United States government should make these payments. Reparations are justified, advocates argue, on several grounds, including that of an alleged moral and legal debt owed to descendants of slaves, and the historical precedents of reparations for the victims of other historical injustices. However, there are a number of cogent arguments against reparations, including the arguments that present day Americans are not morally or legally liable for historical injustices, that the debt to African-Americans has already been paid, and that reparations talk is divisive, immersing African-Americans in a culture of victimhood.

2. Previous Attempts at Slave Reparations

*10 Reparations advocates identify five different time periods during which reparations for slavery were seriously discussed in one form or another. See Vincene Verdun, If the Shoe Fits, Wear It: An Analysis of Reparations to African Americans, 67 TUL. L.REV. 597, 600 (1993) . First, during and immediately after the Civil War, both Congress and President Lincoln attempted to confiscate property from former slaveowners, and to redistribute that land to former slaves. Id. at 600-01. These attempts ultimately failed in 1865, when President Johnson ordered that lands be returned to their "pre-Civil War owners." Id. at 602.

The second period of attempts at slave reparations, occurring near the turn of the century, included attempts to establish pension funds for former slaves. Id. at 602-03. The third attempt at reparations, occurring during World War II, was not a proposal to pay African-Americans a sum of money; the proposal was rather to "provid[e] for the migration and colonization of negroes to newly acquired territories." Id. at 603. The fourth period of attempts at reparations coincided with the civil rights movement of the 1960's. Id. Various black activists such as James Forman, Audley Moore, and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., demanded, or in some cases, hinted at, slave reparations for African-Americans. Id. at 603- 05. For example, in his celebrated "I Have a Dream" speech, Dr. King asserted that "America has given the Negro people a bad check, which has come back marked 'insufficient funds.' " Id. at 604.

Finally, the fifth, and current period of attempts at slave reparations began with the Civil Liberties Act of 1988. Id. at 605-06. This Act provided $20,000, and a formal apology from the United States government to Japanese-Americans who were interned during World War II. Pub.L. No. 100-383 102 Stat. 903 (1988) ; see also Korentatsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the constitutionality of military and executive orders issued during World War II which excluded individuals of Japanese descent from the West Coast, and provided for the detention of those individuals in "assembly or relocation centers"). Seizing on what appeared to be Congress' willingness to right the wrongs of history, reparations activists began their efforts anew. Numerous grassroots organizations formed to advocate slave reparations. Verdun, supra, at 606 nn.26-27. In 1989, U.S. Representative John Conyers introduced a bill that would have established a commission to study the effects of slavery on present day African-Americans, and to study whether reparations would be appropriate. H.R. 3745, 101st Cong. (1989). The preamble to Conyers' proposed legislation stated that its intent was

to acknowledge the fundamental injustice, cruelty, brutality, and inhumanity of slavery in the United States and the 13 American colonies between 1619 and 1865 and to establish a commission to examine the institution of slavery, subsequent de jure and de facto racial and economic discrimination against African Americans, and the impact of these forces on living African Americans, [and] to make recommendations to the Congress on appropriate remedies, and for other purposes.

*11 Id. Conyers has introduced similar legislation to each Congress since 1989, but none of these bills has made it out of committee. See, e.g., H.R. 40, 108th Cong. (2003), H.R. 40, 107th Cong. (2001).

3. The Legislature as the Proper Forum to Achieve Slave Reparations

Despite Representative Conyers' lack of success before Congress, some reparations activists today still assert that the legislature, rather than the courts, is the best forum in which to introduce their claims. See, Westley, supra, at 436 ("It is Congress, and perhaps the legislatures of the former slave states, that must be persuaded to enact reparations"); Note, supra, at 1704 ("There are concrete benefits of working in the legislative branch rather than the judicial branch"). Activists acknowledge that there are significant problems involved with bringing the issue of reparations for slavery before a court of law.

The specific problem with bringing this issue before a court is that courts are equipped for, and charged with the responsibility of, "dealing with claims by victims against well-identified wrongdoers...." See Conceptual and Legal Problems, supra, at 502. Claims asserting harms against groups of long dead victims, perpetrated by groups of long dead wrongdoers, are particularly difficult to bring in modern American courts of law. "First, the victims are making claims against people who are not themselves wrongdoers. Furthermore, that defendant class may not have any current benefit from the harm.... Often the perpetrators cannot be identified with specificity or are no longer alive." Id. at 503. For these reasons, plaintiffs in reparations suits will inevitably face the conceptual problems of standing and statutes of limitations. Westley, supra, at 435. However, reparations advocates who bring their claims before legislatures face no such problems. "[L]egislatures may hold hearings, make findings, and pass resolutions or laws on any matter affecting the public interest and within the scope of constitutional power. Substantively, legislatures provide a friendlier forum than courts for racial remedies." Id.

In addition to reparations offered to Japanese individuals interred during World War II, at least one state legislature has passed a bill authorizing reparations for past racial injustices. See C. Jeanne Bassett, House Bill 591: Florida Compensates Rosewood Victims and Their Families for a Seventy- One-Year-Old Injury, 22 FLA. ST. U.L.REV. 50 3 1(994) . In January 1923, the small town of Rosewood, Florida, inhabited entirely by African- Americans, was burned to the ground by a group of whites after a white woman claimed she had been raped by an African-American man. Id. at 505-07. In addition, at least eight African-Americans were murdered. Id.; see also Martha Minow, Not Only or Myself- Identity, Politics, and Law, 75 OR. L.REV. 647, 679 (1996). In 1994, Florida passed House Bill 591, which authorized compensation for the victims of this massacre, and their direct descendants. Bassett, supra, at 517-18. The compensation included up to $150,000 for each survivor, and college scholarships for their descendants. Id.

*12 Legislatures, both federal and state, are thus sometimes inclined to award compensation to victims of historical injustices. See Pub.L. No. 100- 383. 102 Stat. 903 (1988) (awarding compensation to Japanese individuals interred during World War II); see also Bassett, supra, (describing how the Florida legislature awarded compensation to victims and descendants of victims of the 1923 Rosewood, Florida massacre). Courts of law, however, are constrained by judicial doctrine and precedent, including concepts of standing, statutes of limitations, and the political question doctrine. Legislatures, both state and federal, face no such conceptual and doctrinal constraints. For that reason, advocates of slave reparations may resolve to bring their concerns and demands to the legislative and executive branches of the government, rather than the adjudicative and adversarial judicial branch.

III. OVERVIEW OF THE PROCEEDINGS

A. Parties

1. Plaintiffs

Beginning in 2002, a number of lawsuits were filed by descendants of slaves seeking reparations from private corporations that were alleged to have unjustly profited from the institution of slavery. On October 25, 2002, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred these actions to this court for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407. See In re African- American Slave Descendants Litigation, No. 1491, 231 F.Supp.2d 1357 (Jud.Pan.Mult.Lit., Oct. 25, 2002). This litigation then consisted of nine individual lawsuits. As directed by the court, the individual Plaintiffs filed a consolidated complaint, which, upon later review, the court dismissed without prejudice. The court held that the Plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action, had no standing to bring the suit, and that the suit was barred by the political question doctrine and statutes of limitations. See In re African-American Slave Descendants Litigation, No. 1491, 304 F.Supg.2d 1027 (N.D.111.2004) . The court then granted Plaintiffs leave to file a second amended complaint. Plaintiffs have since filed their Second Consolidated and Amended Complaint, which also consists of nine individual suits. See SCAC. (FN31 The Plaintiffs in the SCAC include the following: Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, (FN41 Mary Lacey Madison, [FN51 Andre Carrington, 1FN61 John Bankhead, as administrator of the Estate of Edlee Bankhead, (FN71 Richard Barber, Sr., fFN81 Hannah Hurdle-Toomey, as administrator of the Estate of Andrew Jackson Hurdle, [FN91 Marcelle Porter, as administrator of the Estate of Hettie Pierce, [FN101 Julie Mae Wyatt-Kervin,_[FN111 the Estate of Emma Marie Clark, [FN121 Ina Bell Daniels Hurdle McGee, [FN131 Cain Wall Sr., and seven other individuals who assert they were formerly enslaved, _ [FN141 and Antoinette Harrell Miller. [FN151 These named Plaintiffs (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Plaintiffs"), on behalf of themselves and the classes they seek to represent, rFN161 seek reparations on behalf of all "formerly enslaved Africans and their descendants," and all living "former enslaved African-Americans and their descendants...." See SCAC, 1 48. Specifically, Plaintiffs seek an accounting, disgorgement of profits, the creation of an "independent historical commission" to study Defendants' actions, a constructive trust, restitution, and compensatory and punitive damages arising out of the named Defendants' alleged past and continued wrongful conduct relating to the institution of slavery. See Id. 1 3.

FN3. The citations in this Opinion are to the paragraphs as styled in Plaintiffs' Complaint; however, in certain instances the numbering of paragraphs does not proceed in chronological order.

FN4. Farmer-Paellmann alleges that she is the "great-great-granddaughter of Clara and Abel Hinds, Africans who were enslaved on a South Carolina sea island rice plantation." See SCAC,1 65.

FN5. Madison alleges that her "ancestors were slaves in the agricultural, cotton, and tobacco industry in Virginia and North Carolina." See SCAC,1 68.

FN6. Carrington alleges that his maternal and paternal ancestors "were slaves in North Carolina, and ... were involved in the cotton and tobacco industries." See SCAC,1 71.

FN7. The Estate of Edlee Bankhead alleges that Bankhead's parents were enslaved in Mississippi. See SCAC,1 74.

FN8. Barber alleges that his ancestors were born into slavery, and were enslaved in the agricultural industry and other industries. See SCAC,19[ 76-79.

FN9. Hurdle-Toomey alleges that her father, Andrew Jackson Hurdle, was a slave who was sold into slavery when he was ten years old. See SCAC, 9[ 81.

FN 10. Porter alleges that her great grandmother, Hettie Pierce, was a slave in North Carolina. See SCAC, 9 [ 84.

FNI L Wyatt-Kervin alleges that she is the daughter of former slaves, Jake and Louise Wyatt. See SCAC, 9 [ 85.

FN12. Clark's Estate alleges that Clark was a slave in Louisiana from 1927-1934. See SCAC, 1 86.

FN13. McGee alleges that she is the "great grand-daughter of Andrew Jackson Hurdle, an enslaved African." See SCAC,1 90.

FN 14. See SCAC, 9[ % 92-100.

FN 15. Miller alleges that she is a descendant of a former slave, Carrie Richardson. See SCAC, 9[ 102.

FN16. Plaintiffs refer to a proposed class of plaintiffs, and assert that this suit may be brought as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b). See SCAC, 1 49. Plaintiffs have not, however, filed any separate motion for class certification pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

2. Defendants

*13 The named Defendants (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Defendants") are seventeen present-day companies whose predecessors are alleged to have been unjustly enriched through profits earned either directly or indirectly from the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade and slavery between 1619 and 1865, as well as post-Emancipation slavery.

Defendants include the following companies: FleetBoston Financial Corporation, CSX Corporation, Aetna Inc., Brown Brothers Harriman & Company, New York Life Insurance Company, Norfolk Southern Corporation, Lehman Brothers Corporation, Lloyd's of London, Union Pacific Railroad, JP Morgan Chase, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Brown and Williamson, Liggett Group Inc., Canadian National Railway, Southern Mutual Insurance Company, American International Group ("AIG"), and Loews Corporation. [FN171

FN17. Loews Corporation does not join in the present motion to dismiss. Loews has filed a separate motion to dismiss, based on grounds it asserts are unique to it.

Plaintiffs allege that FleetBoston, through its predecessor bank, made loans to slave traders and also collected custom duties and fees on ships engaged in the slave trade. See Id. 1 y [125-26. Plaintiffs further allege that "FleetBoston engaged in a self-concealed business enterprise so that the Plaintiffs and others similarly situated would not be aware of the existence of this enterprise," and, in more recent times, "made various misleading statements to the Press from March 2000 to February 2002, attempting to disassociate its predecessor company from its current company." Id. 1 128.

Plaintiffs allege that CSX "is a successor-in-interest to numerous predecessor railroad lines that were constructed or run, at least in part, by slave labor." Id. 9[ 129. Plaintiffs further allege that "CSX engaged in a self-concealed business enterprise as the plaintiffs and others similarly situated would not be aware of the existence of this enterprise," and, in more recent times, "withheld information or made a misleading statement to the Press regarding their participation in and profiting from slavery." Id. 19[ 131-33.

Plaintiffs allege that "Aetna's predecessor in interest, provided the instrumentality of slavery by underwriting insurance policies for slave owners against the loss of their African slaves...." Id. 1 136. Plaintiffs further allege that "Aetna engaged in a self-concealed business enterprise as the plaintiff class and/or plaintiff ancestors would not be aware of the existence of this enterprise ...." and, in more recent times, "withheld information or made a misleading statement regarding their participation in and profiting from slavery." Id. 9[ 9[ 142-43.

Plaintiffs allege that Brown Brothers Harriman "is the successor corporation to Brown Brothers & Co.," which "loaned millions directly to planters, merchants and cotton brokers throughout the South." Id. 11 145-46. Plaintiffs also allege that "Louisiana court records dating back to the 1840's ... reveal the firm's ownership of at least two cotton plantations totaling 4,614 acres and the plantations' 346 slaves...." Id. 9[ 148. Plaintiffs further allege that "Brown Brothers Harriman engaged in a self-concealed business enterprise as the plaintiff class and/or plaintiff ancestors would not be aware of the existence of this enterprise ...." and, in more recent times, "withheld information or made a misleading statement based on press reports in an attempt to disassociate itself from its predecessor's business." Id. 11 151-52.

*14 Plaintiffs allege that "New York Life's predecessor-in-interest, Nautilus Insurance, earned premiums from its sale of life insurance to slave owners." Id. 9[ 155. Plaintiffs further allege that "New York Life engaged in a self-concealed business enterprise as the plaintiff class and/or plaintiff ancestors would not be aware of the existence of this enterprise ...." and, in more recent times, "withheld information or made misleading statements regarding their participation in and profiting from slavery." Id. 19 159, 162.

Plaintiffs allege that Norfolk Southern "is a successor-in-interest to numerous railroad lines that were constructed or run, in part, by slave labor." Id. 1 163. Plaintiffs further allege that Norfolk "participated in the institution of slavery in that it derived the benefits of unpaid slave labor and it provided financial supports to slave owners and slave traders." Id. 9I 165.

Plaintiffs allege that the founder of Lehman Brothers, Henry Lehman, and his brothers "grew rich as middlemen in the slave-grown cotton trade." Id. y[ 168. Plaintiffs further allege that Lehman Brothers owned slaves. Id. 1 171.

Plaintiffs allege that Lloyd's of London "insured ships utilized for the Trans-Atlantic slave trade." Id. 1 173. Plaintiffs further allege that "Lloyd's engaged in a self-concealed business enterprise as the plaintiff class and/or plaintiffs' ancestors would not be aware of the existence of this enterprise...." Id. 9[ 174.

Plaintiffs allege that Union Pacific "is a successor in- interest to numerous predecessor railroad lines that were constructed or run in part by slave labor." Id. 9[ 177. Plaintiffs further allege that "Union Pacific engaged in a self-concealed business enterprise as the plaintiff class and/or plaintiffs' ancestors would not be aware of the existence of this enterprise ...." and, in more recent times, "withheld information or made a misleading statement regarding their participation in profiting from slavery." Id. y[ y[ 178-79.

Plaintiffs allege that "two of [the] predecessor banks that merged to become J.P. Morgan Chase were behind a consortium to raise money to insure slavery." Id. 9[ 181. Plaintiffs further allege that "J.P. Morgan Chase engaged in a self-concealed business enterprise as the plaintiff class and/or plaintiffs' ancestors would not be aware of the existence of this enterprise," and, in more recent times, "withheld information or made a misleading statement regarding their participation in and profiting from slavery." Id. 9[ 182.

Plaintiffs allege that R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Brown & Williamson, Liggett Group, and Loews Corporation (parent company of Lorillard Tobacco Company) were all once part of the American Tobacco Company. Id. 9 197. As parts of this larger enterprise, Plaintiffs assert, these Defendants are "all beneficiar[ies] of assets acquired through the forced and uncompensated labors of enslaved African-Americans." Id. 9[ 185; see also Id. 11 201, 204, and 210.

*15 Plaintiffs allege that Canadian National Railway "is the successor-in-interest to seven predecessor railroad lines, that were constructed and/or run in part by slave labor." Id. 9[ 213. Plaintiffs further allege that "Canadian National engaged in a self-concealed business enterprise as the plaintiff class and/or plaintiff ancestors would not be aware of the existence of this enterprise...." Id. 9[ 215.

Plaintiffs allege that Southern Mutual Insurance "issued policies on the lives of slaves in Louisiana." Id. 9[ 219. Plaintiff further alleges that Southern Mutual "aided and abetted those who engaged in the maintenance of slavery through the intentional infliction of emotional distress." Id. 1 218.

Plaintiffs allege that AIG's predecessors "provided instrumentalities of slavery by selling insurance policy [sic] to cover the lives of enslaved Africans with slave owners as beneficiaries." Id. 9 221. Plaintiffs further allege that AIG's predecessors "aided and abetted those who engaged in the maintenance of slavery." Id. 9[ 223.

As evidenced by Plaintiffs' allegations, and as the court shall further discuss, their SCAC is devoid of any allegations that connect the specifically named Defendants or their predecessors and any of the Plaintiffs or their ancestors.

B. Pleadings

1. Factual Allegations of Plaintiffs' Second Consolidated and Amended Complaint

Plaintiffs' SCAC begins with a narration of the historical background of the Transatlantic Slave Trade in America. The Complaint proceeds to describe the Slave Codes, which various States enacted in order to perpetuate the institution of slavery. The Complaint also chronicles how the forced labor of enslaved Africans helped to build our Nation and enrich early American industry, while simultaneously dismantling a culture and impoverishing a race of fellow men and women.

The SCAC then outlines the beginnings of laws that outlawed the trafficking and trade of slaves, which progressed into a body of law that found the institution of slavery to be contrary to the Natural Law of Man. The Complaint proceeds to allege that despite this body of law that found the institution of slavery to be contrary to the Natural Law of Man, the vestiges of slavery, in the form of racism, have resulted in modern-day disparities between descendants of slaves and the remainder of our society.

Ultimately, the SCAC alleges that "Defendants' actions caused Plaintiffs economic losses and cultural psychic scars and heretofore without remedy." SCAC, 9 41. Plaintiffs allege that the practice of slavery has caused the following specific social inequities:

twenty-six (26) percent of African-Americans in the United States live in poverty compared to eight (8) percent of whites .... 14.7 percent of African- Americans have four-year college degrees, compared with 25 percent of whites.... [A] black person born in 1996 can expect to live, on average, 6.6 fewer years than a white person.... African- Americans are more likely to go to jail, to be there longer and ... to receive the death penalty.... [African-Americans] lag behind whites according to every social yardstick: literacy, life expectancy, income and education. They are more likely to be murdered and less likely to have a father at home.... Black families earn only $580 for every $1000 earned by white families.

*16 Id. 1 41 n. 1.

2. Counts of Plaintiffs' Second Consolidated and Amended Complaint

Count I of Plaintiffs' SCAC is styled: "Conspiracy." Plaintiffs allege that "[e]ach of the defendants acted individually and in concert with their industry group and with each other, either expressly or tacitly, to participate in a plan that was designed in part to commit the tortious acts referred to herein." Id. 9I 258.

Count II is styled: "Conversion." Plaintiffs allege that "[t]he enslaved Africans had a property right in themselves." Id. 1 270. Plaintiffs then allege that "[t]his property right was wrongfully and illegally taken." Id. 1 271. Plaintiffs further allege that "defendants have willfully and wrongfully misappropriated and converted the value of [slave] labor and its derivative profits into defendants' own property." Id. 1 278. Plaintiffs' prayer for relief under Count Il seeks an accounting of profits earned from slave labor, a constructive trust imposed on such profits, restitution, equitable disgorgement, and punitive damages. See Id. 1 280.

Count III is styled: "Unjust Enrichment." Plaintiffs allege that "[d]efendants' failure to pay for the labor provided by the slaves without receiving any compensation, has allowed defendants to retain a benefit at the expense of plaintiffs and their ancestors." Id. T 284. Plaintiffs further allege that "[d]efendants have failed to account for and or return to plaintiffs and the plaintiff class the value of their ancestors' slave labor and/or the profits and benefits the defendants derived therefrom...." Id . y[ 283. Plaintiffs' prayer for relief under Count III seeks an accounting of profits earned from slave labor, a constructive trust imposed on such profits, restitution, equitable disgorgement, and punitive damages. See Id. 1 288.

Count IV is styled: "Replevin." Plaintiffs allege that "defendants hold personal property that was never properly vested in them ... because the enslaved person's work was unpaid, stolen, and forcibly held." Id. 9 9 290- 91. Plaintiffs further allege that defendants "fraudulently concealed the cause of action from the heirs or the estates [of Plaintiffs], so that the statute of limitations does not begin to accrue until the full facts of the cause of action are revealed to the heirs and the estate [of Plaintiffs]." Id. 1 296. Plaintiffs' prayer for relief under Count IV seeks an accounting of profits earned from slave labor, a constructive trust imposed on such profits, restitution, equitable disgorgement, and punitive damages. Id. 9f 298.

A second Count IV is styled: " 42 U.S.C. & 1982 . " [FN181 Plaintiffs allege that as a result of the Defendants' conduct in denying slaves the value of their labor, and restricting slaves' access to corporate records regarding Defendants' participation in slavery, the Plaintiffs' ancestors' and their descendants' rights to inherit and convey property have been violated in contravention of 42 U.S.C. § 1982. Id. 1 300.

FN18. Plaintiffs allege Count IV twice. The first Count IV is styled "Replevin." The second Count IV is styled " 42 U.S.C. 1982. "

*17 Count V is styled: "Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress . Plaintiffs allege that "Defendants' predecessor companies aided or abetted, or under other theories of secondary liability .. , participated in, allowed, or implicitly or recklessly, sanctioned, and/or benefited from an institution that relied on the sexual exploitation, violent abuse and rape to achieve its goals of a malleable and unpaid work force." Id. 9[ 305. Plaintiffs further allege that "[t]he violence and crimes against the enslaved group were done with the calculated intent of demeaning, subjugating, and controlling the enslaved population for the purposes of exploitation for profit and for the direct benefit of commercial industries." Id. Plaintiffs' prayer for relief under Count V seeks an accounting of profits earned from slave labor, a constructive trust imposed on such profits, restitution, equitable disgorgement, and punitive damages. Id. y[ 310.

Count VI is styled "Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress." Plaintiffs allege that, as a result of Defendants' negligent conduct and omissions in relation to the slave trade and the slavery industry, "Plaintiffs and their deceased enslaved African ancestors suffered emotional distress and mental anguish." Id. 9[ 314. Counts VII--XIII [FN191 of the Plaintiffs' Complaint allege violations of various state consumer protection laws. Specifically, Count VII alleges violations of the New York Consumer Protection from Deceptive Acts and Practices Law, NY Gen. Bus. Law § § 349-350; Count IX alleges violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act, Tex. Bus. & Com.Code § 17.41 et seq.; Count X alleges violations of California's Preservation and Regulation of Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 17200 et seq.; Count XI alleges violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 Ill. Comn. Stat. 505/ 1 et seq.; Count XII alleges violations of the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 51:1401 et seq.; Count XIII alleges violations of the New Jersey Unfair Trade Practices Law, NN-J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-1 et seq. See SCAC 11 315-366.

FN19. Plaintiffs include no Count VIII.

In essence, the Plaintiffs seek reparations from Defendants for their alleged roles in the institution of human chattel slavery as it existed in the United States from 1619 through 1865, to date.

3. Plaintiffs' Second Consolidated and Amended Complaint is Not Materially Different from Plaintiffs' First Consolidated and Amended Complaint

Plaintiffs' SCAC repeats many of the same factual and legal allegations found in Plaintiffs' First Consolidated and Amended Complaint ("FCAC"). The FCAC and the SCAC both begin with a lengthy allegation of the historical background of the Trans- Atlantic Slave Trade, the institution of slavery in the colonies and the United States, the "state slave codes" which gave legal sanction to slavery, the honors of slavery, and the eventual abolishment of slavery. Both Complaints then go on to allege that the institution of slavery still negatively impacts African- Americans. The Complaints allege, inter alia, that African-Americans receive fewer college degrees than whites, have less income than whites, and are more likely to be incarcerated than whites. The Complaints further allege that participation in the slave trade and the institution of slavery is a direct cause of these harms.

*18 Both Complaints include the following Counts: Conspiracy, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Conversion, Unjust Enrichment, and 42 U.S.C. § 1982. The Conspiracy Counts are generally materially similar, and they are virtually identical in places. Compare FCAC, 9[ 1 215-17 with SCAC,19[ 257- 67. The Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Counts again are generally materially similar, and they are virtually identical in places. Compare FCAC, 9[ 9[ 232-35 with SCAC, 9[ 9[ 304- 10. The Conversion Counts are also generally materially similar, and they are virtually identical in places, although Plaintiffs now allege that the slaves had a property interest in themselves as well as a property interest in their labor. Compare FCAC, 9[ 9[ 239-42 with SCAC, 9[ 9[ 268-80. The Unjust Enrichment Counts as well are materially similar, and are virtually identical in places. Compare FCAC, 11 243-53 with SCAC, 9[ 9[ 281-88. The 42 U.S.C. § 1982 Count is virtually identical in both Complaints. Compare FCAC, 11 254-60 with SCAC, 11 299- 303. Both Complaints also include numerous Counts alleging violations of various state consumer fraud and fair trade statutes. Compare FCAC, 9[ 9I 244-53 with SCAC, 9 9 315-66. Plaintiffs' allegations in the various SCAC Counts are, in many places, word for word repetitions of allegations made in FCAC Counts. Compare, e.g., FCAC, 9[ 255 with SCAC, 9[ 300.

The SCAC adds new Counts of Replevin and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress. However, the fundamental problems contained within the FCAC, Plaintiffs' lack of standing, the political question issue, the statutes of limitations, and Plaintiffs' failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, have not been resolved by the SCAC. Plaintiffs' SCAC still fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and also fails to allege any facts that would indicate that Plaintiffs have standing, that the issue of slave reparations is not a political question, or that the applicable statutes of limitations have not expired.

4. Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Consolidated and Amended Complaint

Defendants have responded to Plaintiffs' Second Consolidated and Amended Complaint with the present Joint Motion to Dismiss, brought pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6) . [FN201 See Defs.' Joint Mot. to Dismiss Pls.' Second Consolidated and Amd. Compl., at 1. Defendants allege four separate grounds which, they assert, warrant dismissal: (1) Plaintiffs' claims fall short of both constitutional and prudential standing requirements; (2) all of Plaintiffs' claims are time-barred; (3) Plaintiffs' claims present a nonjusticiable political question; and (4) Plaintiffs fail to state any cognizable claim. Id. at 1-2.

FN20. Loews Corporation has not joined in the present Motion to Dismiss. Loews Corporation has filed a separate Motion to Dismiss, to which Plaintiffs have failed to reply. The court therefore dismisses this action as to Defendant Loews Corporation, pursuant to Local Rule 78.3.

Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Consolidated and Amended Complaint is now fully briefed and before the court.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Justiciability Doctrines

*19 Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution provides that federal courts have jurisdiction only if presented with a "Case" or "Controversy." The requirement of a case or controversy imposes a "dual limitation" upon the federal courts. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968) . First, the requirement of a case or controversy serves to "limit the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process." Id. Second, the requirement of a case or controversy serves to "define the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government." Id. This "dual limitation" found in the requirement of a case or controversy is enforced by what have been termed the justiciability doctrines of Article III, which state the fundamental limits on federal judicial power in our system of government. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) . "Concerns of justiciability go to the power of the federal courts to entertain disputes, and to the wisdom of their doing so." Renne v. Geary. 501 U.S. 312, 316 (1991) . The justiciability doctrines include principles such as the prohibition against advisory opinions, standing, ripeness, mootness, and the political question doctrine. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 46 (Aspen Law & Business 1997). "The Article III doctrine that requires a litigant to have 'standing' to invoke the power of a federal court is perhaps the most important of these doctrines." Allen. 468 U.S. at 750.

1. Standing

Defendants first assert that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring these claims in a federal court. Mem. in Supp. of Defs.' Joint Mot. to Dismiss Pls.' Second Consolidated Amd. Compl., at 2-3 (hereinafter, "Mem. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss II"). fFN211 The doctrine of standing ensures that a litigant is the proper party to bring a matter before a federal court for adjudication, by asking if that specific litigant has a sufficient stake in the matter to invoke the federal judicial process. This central principle of United States Supreme Court jurisprudence has deep historical roots. See Miss. & M.R. Co. v. Ward. 67 U.S. 485, 491 (1863) ("unless he shows that he has sustained, and is still sustaining, individual damage, he cannot be heard"). As the Supreme Court recently reiterated: "We have consistently stressed that a plaintiffs complaint must establish that he has a 'personal stake' in the alleged dispute, and that the alleged injury suffered is particularized as to him." Raines v. Bvrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819 (1997).

FN21. Defendants incorporate by reference their previous Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs' First Consolidated and Amended Complaint (hereinafter " Mem. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss I") into their present Memorandum.

a. Historical Overview of the Doctrine of Standing

The requirement that a litigant demonstrate standing- -a personal stake in an alleged dispute--to bring a matter before a court for adjudication has been a bedrock principle in our system of law, as well as the common law system from which our system of law developed. The standing doctrine comes from the well-known common law doctrine of locus standi, which translated from Latin means "place of standing." In essence, the doctrine of locus standi concerns whether an individual has the legal capacity to institute proceedings. See, e.g., S.M. Thio, Locus Standi and Judicial Review 13-14, 235-36 (1971) (analyzing the doctrines of standing in the United States and in other common law countries). The concept of standing, or locus standi, was well known to the early federal courts. See, e.g., Southern Exp. Co. v. Western MCR. Co.. 99 U.S. 191, 201 (1878) (holding that since appellant had no legally cognizable interest in the suit, appellant "can, therefore, have no locus standi in a court of equity").

*20 The standing doctrine serves to reinforce that "[t]he province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals...." Marbury v. Madison. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) . As stated in an authoritative nineteenth century treatise: "The general rule is that the action should be brought in the name of the party whose legal right has been affected, against the party who committed or caused the injury, or by or against his personal representative." Joseph Chitty, A Treatise on Pleading and Parties to Actions 1 (G. & C. Merriam 1867). In specific reference to tort actions, that treatise provides:

The action for a tort must in general be brought in the name of the person whose legal right has been affected, and who was legally interested in the property at the time the injury thereto was committed; for he is impliedly the party injured by the tort, and whoever has sustained the loss is the proper person to call for compensation from the wrongdoer.

Id. at 59 (emphasis in original and footnotes omitted). This treatise was relied upon by the United States Supreme Court in Tyler v. Judges of Court of Registration. 179 U.S. 405, 407 (1900) , in which the Supreme Court discussed the proper parties to litigation. In elucidating the standing doctrine's focus on the rights of individuals, the Tyler Court stated:

The prime object of all litigation is to establish a right asserted by the plaintiff or to sustain a defense set up by the party pursued. Save in a few instances where, by statute or the settled practice of the courts, the plaintiff is permitted to sue for the benefit of another, he is bound to show an interest in the suit personal to himself, and even in a proceeding which he prosecutes for the benefit of the public, as, for example, in cases of nuisance, he must generally aver an injury peculiar to himself, as distinguished from the great body of his fellow citizens.

Id. at 406. In Tyler, the Court reiterated that the doctrine of standing "has been announced in so many cases in this court that it may not be considered an open question." Id.

This core aspect of the doctrine of standing--that a litigant must demonstrate a personal stake in an alleged dispute--has remained unchanged as the Supreme Court has elucidated the modern formulation and rationale for the doctrine.

b. Modern Formulation of the Doctrine of Standing

The modern standing doctrine involves both constitutional limitations on federal courts, based on Article III, and prudential limitations on the exercise of federal court jurisdiction. See, e .g., Warth v. Seldin. 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). "Article III standing ... enforces the Constitution's case or controversy requirement...." Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S.Ct. 2301, 2308 (2004). The Supreme Court has explained that "prudential standing encompasses 'the general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiffs complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.' " Id. at 2309 (quoting Allen v. Wri.eht. 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)). Without the doctrine of standing, "the courts would be called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public significance even though other governmental institutions may be more competent to address the questions...." Id.

*21 The modern formulation of the constitutional limitations of the standing doctrine was elucidated in Luian v. Defenders of Wildlife. 504 U.S. 555 (1992), where the Supreme Court stated:

Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact--an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of--the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.

Luian, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (citations and internal quotations omitted). The principle of standing is therefore commonly viewed as requiring a legally sufficient relationship between the parties in a suit. "Under the standing doctrine, the relationship becomes legally important only if the defendant is in some way both directly responsible for causing [plaintiffs] injury, and able to redress it ." Eric J. Miller, Representing the Race: Standing to Sue in Reparations Lawsuits, 20 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 91, 93 (2004). "This triad of injury in fact, causation, and redressability constitutes the core of Article III's case-or-controversy requirement." Steel Co. v. Citizens For a Better Environment. 523 U.S. 83, 103-04 (1998). These constitutional limitations on standing "are not confined to the facts of any particular case, but are broadly relevant to standing in any Article III controversy." Plotkin v. Ryan, 239 F.3d 882, 884 (7th Cir.2001); see also Books v. Elkhart County Ind, 401 F.3d 857, 861 (7th Cir.2005 ).

The party seeking to invoke federal court jurisdiction has the burden of establishing the elements of standing. See Luian, 504 U.S. at 561 . "[S]ince they are not mere pleading requirements but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiffs case, each element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation." Id. The present motion is a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) , and in this posture "we must presume that the general allegations in the complaint encompass the specific facts necessary to support those allegations." Citizens For a Better Environment. 523 U.S. at 104 .

" However, [w]here standing is challenged as a factual matter, the plaintiff bears the burden of supporting the allegations necessary for standing with competent proof." Perry v. Village of Arlington Heights. 186 F.3d 826, 829 (7th Cir.1999) (quoting Retired Chicago Police Assn v. City of Chicago, 76 F.3d 856, 862 (7th Cir.1996)) (internal quotations omitted); see also McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp of Indiana 298 U.S. 178, 189 1936 (indicating that the party invoking federal court jurisdiction must "allege in his pleading the facts essential to show jurisdiction [and][i]f he fails to make the necessary allegations he has no standing"). " 'Competent proof requires a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that standing exists." Perry, 186 F.3d at 829 (quoting NLFC. Inc. v. Devcom Mid-America. Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 237 (7th Cir.1995 ; see also McNutt, 298 U.S. at 189 (stating that when "allegations of jurisdictional facts are challenged ... in any appropriate manner, [the party alleging jurisdiction] must support them by competent proof;" and if unchallenged, the federal courts "may demand that the party alleging jurisdiction justify his allegations by a preponderance of evidence").

e. Plaintiffs' Allegations in Support of their Standing to Maintain this Suit

*22 In general, Plaintiffs claim that the source of their injury is the institution of slavery. Plaintiffs first point to four distinct injuries which they allege are sufficient to confer them standing to maintain this suit. Plaintiffs allege that they currently suffer concrete, direct harm as descendants of slaves, in that they presently do not have "the same opportunities as [do] their white contemporaries, ... [do] not have to overcome barriers to their human right to development which their white contemporaries [do] not, ... suffer irreparable psychological damage from the loss of their history, language and culture," ... and that they do not "know the actual birth names of ... their forebearers and, consequently, to this day do not know their own real names." Pls.' Mem. in Opp. to Defs.' Joint Mot. to Dismiss the Second Amended and Consolidated Compl., at 1-2 (hereinafter " Mem. i n Opp. to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss II"). Next, Plaintiffs allege that particular Plaintiffs, Cain Wall and his children, and Emma Clark, were themselves actually enslaved in the twentieth century. Id. at 2 . WN221 Plaintiffs then allege that, as they have filed or will the necessary paperwork become file to administrators of their ancestor's estates, they have suffered an actual, particularized injury by being denied their rightful inheritances. Id.

FN22. Plaintiffs do not, however, allege that these specific Plaintiffs were enslaved by Defendants or any predecessors-in-interest of Defendants. Even if these allegations were true, any harms suffered by these specific Plaintiffs are not "fairly traceable" to the Defendants. See Luian. 504 U.S. at 560-61 . Such allegations are therefore insufficient to confer standing on these specific Plaintiffs. See Id.

Further, Plaintiffs allege that they have "suffered segregation, lost opportunity, diminished self-worth and value, loss of property rights, loss of derivative property rights, and psychological harm...." SCAC, 9[ 108. Plaintiffs also allege that they are "presently consumers of Defendants" and have been injured by certain communications made by the Defendants concerning Defendants' respective roles in the institution of slavery. See Id. y[ 104. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that "[d]ue to unconscionable, fraudulent and deceptive public communications made by defendants, plaintiffs suffered the harm of being misled, confused, and deceived about the roles the defendants played in the enslavement of African people." Id. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege injury through the Defendants' alleged continuing violation of state consumer protection laws. SCAC, Counts VII-XIII; Mem. in Opp. t o Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss II, at 9-14.

However, "[e]ven if [Plaintiffs'] claimed injury is sufficiently specific, it is not clear that [Plaintiffs themselves are] harmed. The fact of having an enslaved ancestor, even one transported, insured, or put to work by the defendants, does not seem sufficient injury without something more." Miller, supra, at 97 (commenting specifically on the instant case). "[D]escent from slaves is not of itself an injury, rather the sorts of legally relevant injuries are harms suffered by individuals that are attributable to the ongoing effects of slavery." Id. The type of injuries Plaintiffs are alleging in this case therefore cannot be understood as run-of-the-mill, traditional injuries as are commonly found in most tort claims. Plaintiffs are alleging that injuries to their long-dead ancestors are causing them concrete harm today. "[P]arties suffering non-traditional injuries must prove, to a virtual certainty, the causal link between the action challenged and the claimed injury...." Laveta Casdorph, The Constitution and Reconstitution of the Standing Doctrine, 30 ST. MARY'S L.J. 471, 502 1(999) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs face insurmountable problems in establishing "to a virtual certainty" that they have suffered concrete, individualized harms at the hands of Defendants. "[A]n essential prerequisite to bringing suit is the plaintiffs' ability to establish with precision her relationship to the injury and the defendant." Miller, supra, at 93. In terms of slavery reparations, the " 'traditional' model ... seeks suit against a defendant or defendants on behalf of a plaintiff class comprised of descendants of slaves." Id. In such situations, plaintiffs "assume[ ] that a familial relationship between the ancestor victim and the descendant plaintiff--what might be called hereditary or genetic standing--is sufficient to bring suit." Id. An assumption such as this is difficult to implement in practice. "The notion that standing can be inherited (the 'genetic' theory of standing) is ... legally ... suspect; and the notion that groups, rather than individuals, have standing to sue, is legally insupportable." Id. at 94.

(1). Constitutional Limitations on Standing

(a). Derivative Harm

*23 It is well-established that a plaintiff must " 'show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant.' " Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 454, 472 (1982) (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979)) . Plaintiffs cannot establish a personal injury by merely identifying tort victims and alleging a genealogical relationship. The illegal conduct at issue here, the institution of slavery, is alleged to have directly affected Plaintiffs' ancestors. Plaintiffs now, more than a century later, point to that horrific institution as the source of their derivative injury. [FN231 However, Plaintiffs' own choice of words, derivative, should be sufficient to signify the standing problem in this case. See SCAC, 9[ 114. Plaintiffs fail to allege that they have personally suffered a concrete and particularized injury as a result of Defendants' putatively illegal conduct; rather, Plaintiffs' alleged injury is derivative of the injury inflicted upon enslaved African-Americans over a century ago. See, e.g., Id. 91 111 ("Each Plaintiff African-American slave descendant has suffered by the Defendants' failure to pay their ancestors for their labor as slaves or as sharecroppers, peons or even slaves"). This is insufficient to establish standing, and contrary to centuries of well-settled legal principles requiring that a litigant demonstrate a personal stake in an alleged dispute. See, e.g., Tyler, 179 U.S. at 406-07 (stating that a plaintiff must "aver an injury peculiar to himself, as distinguished from the great body of his fellow citizens"); Luian, 504 U.S. at 560 (stating that a "plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact--an invasion of a legally protected interest which is ... concrete and particularized"); Raines, 521 U.S. at 819 (stating that "a plaintiff's complaint must establish that he has a 'personal stake' in the alleged dispute, and that the alleged injury suffered is particularized as to him"); see also Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U.L.REV. 881, 881-82 (1983) ("I suggest that courts need to accord greater weight than they have in recent times to the traditional requirement that the plaintiff's alleged injury be a particularized one...."). To recognize Plaintiffs' standing in this case "would transform the federal courts into 'no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned bystanders.' " Allen, 468 U.S. at 756 (citing United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)) .

FN23. Several of the named Plaintiffs allege to have been slaves during the twentieth century, but also fail to establish standing to sue Defendants for their alleged injuries. See discussion infra at n.22, and 44-45.

In addition, the injury alleged cannot be "conjectural or hypothetical." Luian, 504 U.S. at 560. Plaintiffs allege injury through being "denied the economic wealth of his or her ancestors' labor;" Plaintiffs also allege they hold a "derivative and inherited property right in their ancestors' lost pay...." SCAC, y[ % 113- 14. However, Plaintiffs' claim to the economic wealth of their ancestors' labor is conjectural. While most would like to assume that they will be the beneficiaries of their ancestors' wealth upon their demise, this is a mere assumption. Plaintiffs can only speculate that their ancestors' estates would have been passed on to them, and cannot say that they would have inherited their ancestors' lost pay. This is insufficient to show a personal injury to Plaintiffs.

*24 Further, the Plaintiffs must allege a "causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of." Luian, 504 U.S. at 560 . "[T]he injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court...." Id. The allegations of Plaintiffs' SCAC do not link these Defendants to the alleged harm. Plaintiffs fail to allege any facts in their Complaint that directly link the specifically named Defendants to the alleged injuries suffered by the Plaintiffs; nor does the Plaintiffs' Complaint allege a direct connection between any of the named Defendants and any of the Plaintiffs' ancestors. The named Plaintiffs who allege that they are descendants of enslaved African- Americans fail to allege that their ancestors were enslaved by any of the seventeen specifically named Defendants. Likewise, the named Plaintiffs who allege that they were slaves fail to allege that they were enslaved by any of the seventeen specifically named Defendants. Plaintiffs' only response to this fundamental defect is to allege that Defendants were engaged in "co-dependent" industries and therefore are generally and vicariously liable for the institution of slavery. However, Plaintiffs fail to allege how their alleged harms are "not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court...." See Luian. 504 U.S. at 560 . Plaintiffs offer no allegations that Defendants had any relationship with specific entities that enslaved the named Plaintiffs or their ancestors. More than "unadorned speculation" is required to establish standing. See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org.. 426 U.S. 26, 3-44 (1976) .

(b). Continuing Injury

Plaintiffs' allegations that they suffer injury on a continuing basis also fail to establish the requisite standing. Plaintiffs claim a continuing injury through the allegation that "[t]hey still endure daily indignities from the legacy of slavery, including, but not limited to, racial profiling, racial slurs, and improper and hurtful assumptions regarding their overall status." SCAC, 1 115. Further, Plaintiffs allege that they "continue[ ] to be harmed to the present day, in that each ... are deprived job opportunities, caused psychic harm, denied ability to inherit his or her fore-parents wealth." Id. 9I 110.

Plaintiffs' allegations of continuing harm are no different than the allegations of continuing harm made by the plaintiffs in Cato v. United States. 70 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir.1995), and other similar cases. In Cato, descendants of enslaved African-Americans filed a complaint against the United States government seeking damages due to the enslavement of, and subsequent discrimination against, African- Americans. Cato, 70 F.3d at 1105 . The plaintiffs in Cato alleged injuries based on "disparities in employment, income, and education" between African-Americans and other racial groups. Id. at 1109. The Cato court found that such allegations were insufficient to establish an injury personal to the plaintiffs so as to establish the plaintiffs' standing; rather, such injuries were "a generalized, class-based grievance...." Id. Other courts faced with similar complaints have also found that those plaintiffs had failed to establish their standing to litigate claims based on continuing injuries alleged to be the result of slavery. See, e.g., Bell v. United States, No. CIV. A. 301CV0338D, 2001 WL 1041792, at *2 (N.D.Tex. Aug. 31, 2001) (plaintiff lacked standing to file suit against United States government seeking damages for the enslavement of African-Americans); Bey v. United States Department of Justice. No. 95 CIV 10401. 1996 WL 413684, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 1996) (same); Langley v. United States, No. C 95- 4227, 1995 WL 714378, at *2 (N.D.Cal. Nov. 30, 1995) (same); 'Himiva v. United States, No. 94 C 4065, 1994 WL 376850, *2 (N.D.Ill. July 15, 1994) ("Although it is extremely regrettable that this country's history, as well as the history of many other countries, includes a significant history of slavery, the plaintiff does not have proper standing under the law to recover damages for this reprehensible time period"). Like the plaintiffs' allegations in Cato and the other slavery reparations cases decided after Cato, Plaintiffs' allegations of continuing harm in this case do not establish a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact, as these allegations are too speculative and generalized. See Luian 504 U.S. at 560-61.

*25 Plaintiffs argue that the other lawsuits seeking reparations for acts related to the institution of slavery are distinguishable on the grounds that those cases were brought by pro se plaintiffs, acting without the guidance of counsel, and against the United States Government, protected from suit by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 1FN241 These are distinctions without a difference. Those pro se plaintiffs could have been represented by attorneys and the result would not have changed. [FN251 Furthermore, the doctrine of sovereign immunity was only one of many jurisdictional bars to suit in those cases, including standing. The constitutional limitations on standing, including an injury-in-fact, are not confined to the facts of any particular case, but are broadly relevant to standing in any Article III controversy." Plotkin, 239 F.3d at 884. Like the plaintiffs in those cases, Plaintiffs fail to allege any concrete and particular injury-in-fact that they have suffered apart from their race generally.

FN24. Plaintiffs make this argument in their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss, 9-10 (hereinafter "Mem. i n Opp. to Defs.' Mot. t o Dismiss I"). Plaintiffs "incorporate by reference" their Mem. in Opp. to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss I into their present Mem. in Opp. to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss II.

FN25. In fact, courts give special treatment to pro se litigation. See, e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (holding courts that allegations of pro se complaints are held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers"); see also Castro v. United States. 540 U.S. 375. 381- 82, 124 S.Ct. 786, 791-92 (2003) (indicating that while holding pro se complaints to less stringent standards, may recharacterize such motions in order to avoid unnecessary dismissal or inappropriately stringent application of formal labeling requirements).

Further, Plaintiffs' Complaint is devoid of any allegations that any specific conduct of the Defendants was a cause of the continuing injuries of which Plaintiffs complain. Such wide-ranging social ills are not even alleged "to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court." Luian. 504 U S. at 560 . Plaintiffs' allegations of abstract stigmatic injury are not cognizable absent specific allegations of conduct on behalf of the Defendants that has been directed at Plaintiffs or their ancestors. Cf. Allen. 468 U.S. at 755-56.

(c). Miscellaneous Injury

Lastly, Plaintiffs allege injury, in their status as consumers of the Defendants, through being misled, confused, and deceived about the roles the Defendants played in the enslavement of African peoples, as a result of Defendants' public communications. See SCAC, y[ 104. Plaintiffs also allege harm through the Defendants' "intentional misrepresentations" relating to their involvement in securing profits from slavery. See Id. 9[ 227. These alleged injuries relate to causes of action pled in Plaintiffs' Complaint as violations of various state consumer protection laws. See Id. Counts VII-XIII. Plaintiffs argue that their allegations that Defendants have violated these State consumer protection laws are sufficient to confer them standing to pursue these claims. See Mem. in Opp. to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss II, § IV. Further, Plaintiffs argue that some of these statutes do not even require that an injury be alleged, and therefore their standing to pursue these claims is a given. See Mem. in Opp. to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss I, at 11.

This argument misses the mark. The assertion that a state statute dispenses with the requirement that an injury be alleged does not, and cannot, abrogate constitutional limitations imposed by Article III that a personal injury-in-fact is a prerequisite for standing to sue in a federal court. See, e.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317 (1943) (holding that state legislatures may not expand the jurisdiction of the federal district courts); see also Rifkin v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc.. 248 F.3d 628, 631 (7th Cir.2001) (same). These constitutional limitations on standing cannot be altered by either state or federal law. See Gladstone, Realtors. 441 U.S. at 100 (holding that Congress may not abrogate the constitutional limitations on standing); Watson v. TarRlev. 59 U.S. 517, 520 (1855) (holding that "[state] laws cannot affect, either by enlargement or diminution, the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States as vested and prescribed by the constitution and laws of the United States"); see also U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause). Further, Plaintiffs cannot use their standing to pursue one type of claim in a State court in order to establish their standing to pursue all of the claims asserted in the present case in a federal court. "The plaintiffs must establish the district court's jurisdiction over each of their claims independently; they are not permitted to use one count of their complaint to establish federal subject matter jurisdiction and a separate count to establish standing." Rifkin, 248 F.3d at 634 .

*26 Moreover, these injuries alleged in Plaintiffs' status as consumers of Defendants do not establish a legally cognizable injury. Aside from alleging a general state of confusion, the Plaintiffs fail to allege any injury-in-fact that has come about as a result of that confusion. "The injury alleged must be ... distinct and palpable, and not abstract or conjectural or hypothetical." See Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (citations omitted). Additionally, "in ruling on standing, it is both appropriate and necessary to look to the substantive issues ... to determine whether there is a logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated." Flast 392 U.S. at 102. "Such inquiries into the nexus between the status asserted by the litigant and the claim he presents are essential to assure that he is a proper and appropriate party to invoke federal judicial power." Id.

Plaintiffs allege that "defendants are engaging in continued intentional misrepresentations and deceptive statements to the consuming public about their roles in the enslavement of Africans. They are unjustly enriched by these commercial acts and omissions...." SCAC, 9[ 227. Plaintiffs fail to allege that Defendants have any cognizable duty to reveal any such information, nor do Plaintiffs allege any concomitant right to obtain such information. Moreover, Plaintiffs make this conclusory statement without any specific factual allegations in support of it. Plaintiffs offer unsupported conclusions wrapped in legally significant terms, such as "intentional misrepresentation" and "unjust enrichment," which are insufficient to establish standing. "The requirements of Article III are not satisfied merely because a party requests a court of the United States to declare its legal rights, and has couched that request for forms of relief historically associated with courts of law in terms that have a familiar ring to those trained in the legal process." Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 471. Again, more than "unadorned speculation" and conclusory allegations are required to establish standing. See Simon, 426 U.S. at 43-44 .

(d). Conclusion

In response to all these deficiencies, Plaintiffs argue that " '[s]tanding can be supported by a very slender reed of injury.' " Mem. in Opp. to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss I, at 4 (citing 13 Charles Allen Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3531.4 (2d ed.1984)) . Plaintiffs are correct that standing can be supported by a very slender reed of injury, as the cases which they cite provide. Yet, this "slender reed" must still have its roots in the soil of an injury personal to the Plaintiffs, not a "derivative harm" uprooted from the soil of another's injury.

Plaintiffs wish to litigate the issue of slavery without establishing that they have suffered some concrete and particularized injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the Defendants. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472; Luian 504 U.S. at 560. However, "[t]he fundamental aspect of standing is that it focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated." Flast, 392 U.S. at 99 . "In other words, when standing is placed in issue in a case, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable." Id. at 99-100. Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the first and most basic requirement of constitutional standing--a concrete and particularized personal injury. See Luian. 504 U.S. at 560 . Plaintiffs cannot establish a personal injury sufficient to confer standing by merely alleging some genealogical relationship to African-Americans held in slavery over one-hundred, two-hundred, or three-hundred years ago. In attempting to litigate the unopposed issue of slavery rather than their personal injuries,

Plaintiffs also cannot satisfy the second requirement of constitutional standing--injury that is fairly traceable to the conduct of the defendants. See Id. Plaintiffs do not allege that they had any present property interest that was injured as a result of these specific Defendants' actions, nor that any action of the Defendants wronged them in any way that would be cognizable under tort theory. Plaintiffs fail to allege any conduct by the seventeen specifically named Defendants that individually affected any of the Plaintiffs.

*27 In sum, the allegations of Plaintiffs' Complaint fail to support their standing to maintain this suit, as required by Article III of the United States Constitution.

(2). Prudential Limitations on Standing

Beyond the constitutional limitations on the standing doctrine, there are prudential limitations on the exercise of federal court jurisdiction. See, e.g., Warth, 422 U.S. at 498 . These additional prudential limitations on standing may exist even though the Article III requirements are met because "the judiciary seeks to avoid deciding questions of broad social import where no individual rights would be vindicated and to limit access to the federal courts to those litigants best suited to assert a particular claim." Gladstone, Realtors, 441 U.S. at 99-100 . Like the constitutional limitations on the standing doctrine, these prudential limitations ensure that federal courts adhere to the separation of powers concept and are "founded in concern about the proper, and properly limited, role of the courts in a democratic society." Warth. 422 U.S. at 498 . However, "unlike their constitutional counterparts, they can be modified or abrogated by Congress." Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 15 4, 162 (1997) .

One of these prudential limits on standing is that a litigant must normally assert his own legal interests rather than those of third parties. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-14 (1976) ; Warth. 422 U.S. at 499. Another is that the federal courts should "refrain[ J from adjudicating 'abstract questions of wide public significance' which amount to 'generalized grievances,' pervasively shared and most appropriately addressed in the representative branches." Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475 (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 499-500

(a). Plaintiffs Impermissibly Attempt to Assert the Legal Rights of Absent Third Parties

As a general rule, a litigant must assert his own legal rights and cannot assert the legal rights of a third-party. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio. 499 U.S. 400, 410 1(991) ; Singleton, 428 U.S. at 113-14 . However, a litigant may assert the rights of absent third-parties in certain limited situations. In determining whether a litigant who seeks standing to assert the legal rights of a third-party may do so, a two-part inquiry is involved. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States. 491 U.S. 617, 623 n.3 (1989) . First, the litigant must have personally suffered some injury-in-fact adequate to satisfy Article III's case or controversy requirement. See Id.; see also Singleton, 428 U.S. at 112 . Second, certain prudential considerations must point in favor of permitting the litigant to assert the third-party's legal rights. See Caplin, 491 U.S. at 623 n.3 . Among the prudential considerations to consider are the requirements that the litigant must have a legally sufficient relation to the third-party, see Powers, 499 U.S. at 411; see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 196 (1976) , and there must exist some hindrance to the third-party's ability to protect his or her own rights. See Powers. 499 U.S. at 411; see also Singleton, 428 U.S. at 115-116 .

*28 To the extent that Plaintiffs are attempting to assert the legal rights of their ancestors, Plaintiffs cannot do so because they themselves have failed to establish that they have personally suffered some injury-in-fact adequate to satisfy Article III's case-or controversy requirement. See Singleton, 428 U.S. at 112. In addition, prudential considerations militate against allowing such claims. First, Plaintiffs have not alleged a legally sufficient relation to their ancestors. All that Plaintiffs allege is a genealogical relationship, and more is required under the law in order to confer third-party standing. Cf. Gilmore v. Utah. 429 U.S. 1012, 1016-17 (1976) (indicating that a mother had no standing to contest her son's execution). Plaintiffs make no allegations of any relationship sufficient, whether by common law or statute, to confer them standing to pursue the claims of their deceased ancestors. Cf. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163 (1990) (recognizing a next-friend's standing to sue in certain situations); United Food & Comm. Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group. 517 U.S. 544,558 (1996) (recognizing that the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. & 2101 et seq., grants unions standing to sue on behalf of its members). Furthermore, Plaintiffs do not allege that they are assignees of a legally cognizable claim against the named Defendants. Second, Plaintiffs have not alleged that any hindrance existed to their ancestors' ability to have protected their own rights over the last century. Cf. Johnson v. McAdoo, 45 App. D.C. 440, 441 (D.C.1916), affd, 244 U.S. 643 (1917) (evidencing a claim for slavery-based reparations nearly a century ago).

In sum, Plaintiffs have not established third-party standing to assert the legal rights of their ancestors.

(b). Plaintiffs Impermissibly Attempt to Litigate a Generalized Grievance Which is Best Addressed in the Representative Branches

As currently framed, Plaintiffs' Complaint seeks to litigate a generalized grievance over one of the most horrific chapters of our Nation's history rather than a personal dispute, which the federal courts are able to adjudicate. For the reasons stated in the following section, such an "abstract question[ ] of wide public significance" should be left to the representative branches of our system of government. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475.

2. The Political Question Doctrine

Defendants also argue that the court should dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint because the issue of reparations to former slaves presents a non justiciable political question. See Mem. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss II, at 3. Although the court has dispositively determined that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring the claims raised in their Complaint, with an abundance of caution, the court will next determine whether the political question doctrine provides an independent basis for dismissal.

a. Overview of the Political Question Doctrine

*29 It is well-established that the federal courts will not adjudicate questions that fall within the purview of the political question doctrine. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) . Like standing, mootness and ripeness, the political question doctrine is a justiciability limitation with its prudential roots dating back to the 18th century. See, e.g., Hayburn's Case, 2 U S. (2 Dall.) 408, 410 (1792) (invalidating a statute authorizing the Executive branch to accept or reject federal court determinations of pension eligibility for Revolutionary War veterans); Marburv. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170 ("Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court."). The political question doctrine restricts judicial review that might interfere with other branches of the federal government. See McIntyre v. Fallahay, 766 F.2d 1078, 1081 (7th Cir.1985) . Even in cases where the federal court has subject matter jurisdiction, it could choose not to exercise its jurisdiction to avoid interfering with decisions previously made by the Executive or Legislative branches (hereinafter the "Representative Branches"). See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1990) . When the court reaches this conclusion, the question becomes non justiciable-- meaning not appropriate for judicial review. The nonjusticiability of a political question is based primarily on the constitutional principle of separation of powers inherent in the text of the Constitution and the policy of judicial self-restraint. See Baker. 369 U.S. at 210; see also Kashani v. Nelson, 793 F.2d 818, 827 (7th Cir.1986) ; Flynn v. Shultz, 748 F.2d 1186, 1189 (7th Cir.1984) ; Calvin v. Conlisk, 520 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir.1975 . Although the political question doctrine is just one aspect of a broader justiciability issue, it has been "applied in cases involving extremely diverse issues." Flynn, 748 F.2d at 1189; see also Baker, 369 U.S. at 211-18.

However, not all issues having political implications or significant political overtones are non-justiciable under the political question doctrine. See Japan Whaling Assn v. American Cetacean Soc.. 478 U.S. 221, 229-30 (1986) ; see also I. N.S. v. Chadha. 462 U.S. 919, 921 (1983) . Rather the Supreme Court has said that " '[i]n determining whether a question falls within (the political question) category, the appropriateness under our system of government of attributing finality to the action of the political departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination are dominant considerations.' " Baker, 369 U.S. at 210 (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 (1939)) . To further frame the issue, the Supreme Court has identified at least six factors ("Baker factors") the court should consider to determine whether a matter raises a non-justiciable political question, including:

*30 [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.

Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; see also Kashani, 793 F.2d at 827 . When any one of the foregoing Baker factors is implicated, the court should refrain from adjudicating the issue to prevent unwarranted interference with decisions properly made by the Representative Branches of the federal government. See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 393-94; Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.

Following Baker, the Supreme Court "has not retreated from the analytical framework it established." Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 405 F.3d 727, 739 (9th Cir.2005) (holding that dismissal of victims of World War II war crimes Complaint was not warranted because the court could resolve property claims without expressing lack of respect for federal government's political branches). Other recent decisions have elaborated on the Baker criteria. Last Term, the Supreme Court revisited the Baker decision, stating that the factors enumerated in that case are "probably listed in descending order of both importance and certainty." Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (holding that political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable). After Vieth, courts have taken a "slightly different approach to interpreting the phrase 'judicially discoverable and manageable standards.' " Alperin, 405 F.3d at 747. "Instead of focusing on the logistical obstacles, we ask whether the courts are capable of granting relief in a reasoned fashion or, on the other hand, whether allowing the ... [c]laims to go forward would merely provide 'hope' without a substantive legal basis for a ruling." Id. (citing Vieth, 541 U.S. at 304).

b. Application of the Political Question Doctrine

Before determining whether any of the Baker factors require dismissal under the political question doctrine, the court must first decide the applicability of the political question doctrine based on the nature of Plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs argue that the political question doctrine is inapplicable here because their claims are private, not political. See Mem. in Opp. to Defs .'Mot. to Dismiss I, at 25 (emphasis added); see also Mem. in Opp. to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss II, at 4. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that the doctrine does not apply because their "claims are brought by private individuals against private corporations for both tort and property harms that were occasioned by defendants' particular acts of years past, as well as their acts of today." fFN261 Mem. in Opp. to Defs.'s Mot. to Dismiss I, at 25. The court rejects Plaintiffs' argument for two reasons. First, there are numerous cases where the federal courts have dismissed claims by private plaintiffs against private defendants on the basis of the political question doctrine. The majority of these cases arise in the context of reparations claims arising out of World War II. See, e.g., Kelberine v. Societe Internationale, 363 F.2d 989, 995 (D.C.Cir.1966) ; In re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litig., 129 F.Supp.2d 370, 382 (D.N.J.2001) ; Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co.. 67 F.Supp.2d 424, 489 (D.N.J.1999) ; Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG. 65 F.Supp.2d 248, 282- 85 (D.N.J.1999).

FN26. In support of their position, Plaintiffs rely on Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2nd Cir.1995 , a case which is clearly distinguishable from the present case. In Kadic, the Second Circuit declined to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims under the Alien Tort Claims Act alleging gross human rights abuses against a Bosnian Serb leader on the basis of the political question doctrine. 70 F.3d at 250 . The Kadic court cautioned that "judges should not reflexively invoke these doctrines to avoid difficult and somewhat sensitive decisions ..." and added that "[a]lthough these cases present issues that arise in a politically charged context, that does not transform them into cases involving nonjusticiable political questions." Id. at 249. However, in reaching its decision, the Kadic court stated that it did not have to decide the issue of whether judicial involvement would interfere with actions of other branches of the federal government because the court obtained a " 'Statement of Interest' " signed by both the Solicitor General and the State Department's Legal Advisor expressly disclaiming any concern that the political question doctrine should be invoked. Id. at 250. No such "Statement of Interest" has been or could be sought in the present case.

*31 Second, although Plaintiffs couch their claims as tort or property claims for acts committed by private corporate defendants, this alone does not preclude the application of the political question doctrine. The Supreme Court has stated that the identity of the litigants is immaterial to the questions raised by the political question doctrine. See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 394 . Additionally, when determining whether the political question doctrine applies, the court must look to the nature of the underlying litigation, not the specific claims enumerated in the complaint. See Renne. 501 U.S. at 316 (to determine justiciability, the court must examine the "pleadings and record to determine the nature of the dispute and the interests of the parties in having [the issue] resolved"); see also Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (indicating the need for a "discriminating inquiry into the precise facts and posture of the particular case" when distinguishing between "political questions" and "political cases"). Thus, the issue becomes whether Plaintiffs' claims are the type of claims that have been committed to the Representative Branches for resolution. See In re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litig., 129 F.Supp.2d at 378 .

Finally, Plaintiffs assert that the issue of reparations is a distinct and separate issue from issues of "[e]quality under the law and freedom from discrimination." Mem. in Opp. to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss II, at 4. In other words, Plaintiffs argue that the legislation Congress has passed granting African- Americans full citizenship and equality under the law does not amount to, or serve as a substitute for, legitimate and meaningful reparations for slavery. Id. Plaintiffs therefore argue that the political question doctrine does not apply to the issue of slave reparations. Id. at 4-5. It is clear, however, that Congress has considered the issues of reparations for slavery numerous times, in contexts distinct from that of equal rights under the law. See, e.g., H.R. 40, 108th Cong. (2003) and H.R. 40, 107th Cong. (2001) (proposing a Congressional committee to study the effects of slavery on the present African-American community); An Act to Establish a Bureau for the Relief of Freedmen and Refugees, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507 (March 3, 1865) (creating the Freedman's Bureau, which was to provide former slaves with, inter alia, food, clothing, and job placement); H.R. 29, 40th Cong. ", 2 (1867) (proposing that Confederate property be seized and distributed to former slaves).

Plaintiffs' Complaint indicates that the underlying nature of their lawsuit seeks reparations for Defendants' participation in slavery dating back as far as the year 1619. See SCAC, y[ 5. Although Plaintiffs request both equitable and legal relief, the bulk of this relief centers on Plaintiffs' claim for restitution. For example, Plaintiffs seek, among other things, the following remedies: (1) an accounting of the "monies, profits, and/or benefits derived by defendants" from the slave trade and slavery; (2) "a constructive trust in the value of said monies, profits, and/or benefits," (3) "full restitution in the value of all monies, profits, and/or benefits derived by defendants' use of slave labor," (4) "equitable disgorgement" of these "monies, profits, and/or benefits," and (5) any other appropriate damages. See Id. 9 9 288, Prayer for Relief. These remedies collectively provide the basis for calculating and distributing the amount of restitution sought; that is the amount in which Plaintiffs claim that Defendants wrongfully benefited from Plaintiffs' ancestors' unpaid slave labor. See United States v. Shenard, 269 F.3d 884, 885 (7th Cir.2001) (defining restitution as usually meaning the return of ill-gotten gains to which the holder is not legally entitled). Courts have consistently held that claims seeking restitution for forced labor are claims for reparations. See Iwanowa. 67 F.Supp.2d at 485 n.84; see also Burger-Fischer, 65 F.Supp.2d at 281-82 . Such claims clearly raise a question as to whether the Judicial branch of the federal government is best suited to resolve the issue. See Cato, 70 F.3d at 1110 (holding that plaintiffs' claims for slavery reparations presented a nonjusticiable political question); see also Kelberine, 363 F.2d at 995 (concluding that plaintiffs' claims for reparations against private corporate defendant for its involvement in a "Nazi Conspiracy" during World War II were barred by political question doctrine).

*32 To further support this conclusion, in a recent action seeking relief from a German company and its American subsidiaries for damages resulting from the plaintiffs' forced labor in Nazi Germany during World War Il, the District Court for the District of New Jersey rejected the very same argument that Plaintiffs raise here. See In re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litig. 129 F.Supp.2d at 375 (rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that the political question doctrine cannot preclude a claim for reparations brought by an individual against a private company when the underlying abuse alleged was "fundamentally interrelated with the Nazi war effort").

As a result, Plaintiffs' assertions that their claims are private rather than political, and that the issue of reparations is different from the issue of equal rights under the law, do not preclude the court from inquiring into whether this case presents a nonjusticiable political question. Further, given the nature of Plaintiffs' claims, an analysis of the political question doctrine is necessary. Having reached this conclusion, a review of Plaintiffs' Complaint reveals that all of the Baker factors are present in the underlying litigation.

(I). A Textually Demonstrable Constitutional Commitment of the Issue to a Coordinate Political Department

The Constitution commits to the Representative Branches of the United States Government the authority to resolve the issue of reparations to former slaves resulting from the Nations role in the institution of slavery. As stated above, historians have long debated whether the issue of slavery was the actual cause of the Civil War. See infra, Part II.E. However, regardless of what actually caused the Civil War, it is clear that the abolition of slavery as an institution was a fundamental concern of the Representative Branches both during and after the war. See, e.g., Donald G. Nieman, Promises to Keep: African-Americans and the Constitutional Order, 1776 to the Present 54 (Oxford University Press 1991). Under the Constitution, the war powers are reserved to the Representative Branches of the federal government. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8; U.S. Const. art. II, § 2; see also Doe v. Bush. 323 F.3d 133, 137 (1st Cir.2003). These powers not only include the power to declare and prosecute war, but also extend to the power to ensure a just and lasting peace following the conclusion of a war. See Ladue & Co. v. Browne