Index:Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-3d.djvu

Title	United States – Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense, Part V. B. 3. Book 4
Author	The Pentagon
Year	2011
Publisher	U.S. Government
Location	Washington, D.C.
Source	djvu
Progress	To be proofread
Transclusion	Index not transcluded or unreviewed
Volumes	Part I Part II Part III Part IV: A. 1 A. 2 A. 3 A. 4 A. 5 B. 1 B. 2 B. 3 B. 4 B. 5 C. 1 C. 2a C. 2b C. 2c C. 3 C. 4 C. 5 C. 6.a C. 6.b C. 6.c C. 7.a C. 7.b C. 8 C. 9.a C. 9.b C. 10 Part V: A. Vol. I. A A. Vol. I. B A. Vol. I. C A. Vol. II. D B. 1 B. 2.a B. 2.b B. 3.a B. 3.b B. 3.c B. 3.d B. 4 Book I B. 4 Book II Part VI: A B C-1 C-2 C-3 C-4

Pages (key to Page Status)

Cover Front Title CONTENTS xlv xlvi xlvii xlviii xlix l li lii liii liv 1956. 1057 1058 1059 1060 1061 1062 1063 1064 1065 1066 1067 1068 1069 1070 1071 1072 1073 1074 1075 1076 1077 1078 1079 1080 1081 1082 1083 1084 1085 1086 1087 1088 1089 1090 1091 1092 1093 1094 1095 1096 1097 1957. 1098 1099 1100 1101 1102 1103 1104 1105 1106 1107 1108 1109 1110 1111 1112 1958. 1113 1114 1115 1116 1117 1118 1119 1120 1121 1122 1123 1124 1125 1126 1127 1128 1129 1130 1131 1132 1133 1134 1135 1136 1137 1138 1139 1140 1141 1142 1143 1144 1145 1146 1147 1148 1149 1150 1151 1152 1153 1154 1155 1156 1157 1158 1159 1160 1161 1162 1163 1164 1165 1166 1167 1168 1169 1170 1171 1172 1173 1174 1175 1176 1177 1178 1179 1180 1181 1182 1959. 1183 1184 1185 1186 1187 1188 1189 1190 1191 1192 1193 1194 1195 1196 1197 1198 1199 1200 1201 1202 1203 1204 1205 1206 1207 1208 1209 1210 1211 1212 1213 1214 1215 1216 1217 1218 1219 1220 1221 1222 1223 1224 1225 1226 1227 1228 1229 1230 1231 1232 1233 1234 1235 1236 1237 1238 1239 1240 1241 1242 1243 1244 1245 1246 1247 1248 1960. 1249 1250 1251 1252 1253 1254 1255 1256 1257 1258 1259 1260 1261 1262 1263 1264 1265 1266 1267 1268 1269 1270 1271 1272 1273 1274 1275 1276 1277 1278 1279 1280 1281 1282 1283 1284 1285 1286 1287 1288 1289 1290 1291 1292 1293 1294 1295 1296 1297 1298 1299 1300 1301 1302 1303 1304 1305 1306 1307 1308 1309 1310 1311 1312 1313 1314 1315 1316 1317 1318 1319 1320 1321 1322 1323 1324 1325 1326 1327 1328 1329 1330 1331 1332 1333 1334 1335 1336 1337 1338 1339 1340 1341 1342 1343 1344 1345 1346 1347 1348 1349 1350 1351 1352 1353 1354 1355 1961. 1356 1357 1358 1359 1360 1361 1362 1363 1364 1365

V.B.3. (Book IV)

JUSTIFICATION OF THE WAR - - INTERNAL COMMITMENTS

The Eisenhower Administration, 1953 - 1960

Contents and

Chronological List of Documents

1956 French Withdrawal - 1960

	1956⁠(cont'd)	Page
	⁠
269.	The state Department informs Defense of the understanding that TERM personnel will perform functions of training which are inseparable from tasks of recovering and maintaining MDAP equipment. Only formal approval by the ICC is necessary for the TERM to arrive in Vietnam. State Letter to Secretary of Defense, 1 May 1956	1057
270.	The Army states its position on the Southeast Asia issue. Specifically, the U.S. should qualify its position with neutral nations, should allocate the major proportion of U.S. resources into economical and technical assistance, should assist indigenous forces to provide internal security, should prepare to intervene against aggression, and should oppose continuance of colonialism. Army Memorandum for NSC Planning Board, 20 June 1956	1060
271.	The President approves U.S. military action to encourage Vietnamese military planning for defense against external aggression and to manifest other ways to assist Vietnam to defend itself in accordance with the Manila Pact Secretary of Defense Memorandum for JCS, 16 July 1956	1064
272.	The intelligence estimate of the political, economic and military situation in Vietnam through mid-1957 concludes that: (1) DRV will not attempt an invasion of South Vietnam; (2) the trend toward stability in South Vietnam will continue barring invasion, guerrilla action, or death of Diem; (3) basic economic progress will be slow; and (4) significant sect resistance has been eliminated; but 8–10,000 armed communists pose a serious internal security problem. NIE 63-56, 17 July 1956	1066
273.	The President approves NSC 5612 statement of U.S. policy in mainland Southeast Asia. This policy treats the Viet Minh as not constituting a legitimate government and sets forth actions to prevent the Viet Minh, from expanding their political influence and territorial control in Free Vietnam and Southeast Asia. NSC 5612/1, 5 September 1956	1082
274.	The JCS recommend that the United States make no specific force commitments to the SEATO, but that the Military Advisor inform SEATO nations of the U.S. forces deployed and available to the Pacific for contingency planning. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 16 November 1956	1096
275.	Defense urges the State Department to seek international concurrence in the abolition of the ceiling on MAAG personnel in Vietnam in order to fulfill increased training requirements resulting from withdrawal of French training missions. ISA Memorandum to State, 15 April 1957	1098
276.	Vietnam seems clearly persuaded that its interests lie in stronger affiliation with the Free World. The Army in Vietnam is now capable of insuring internal security. 321st NSC Meeting, 12 May 1957	1100
277.	The prospects for North Vietnam for the next year are estimated. Essentially, it is concluded that the DRV remains in firm control even though there have been outbreaks of sporadic violence, that the DRV would attack only if Moscow and Peiping were sure that the U.S. would not intervene, and that the DRV will continue its tactics of "peacefu1 competition." NIE 63.2-57, 14 May 1957	1101
278.	President Diem discusses his plans and programs with Deputy Secretary Donald Quarles. Among these are the resettlement programs, road building, the SEATO plan, and reorganizing the Army structure to include an increase in strength to 170,000. ISA Memorandum for Record, 15 May 1957	1103
279.	Progress is reported in developing a representative government in Vietnam. Executive leadership is strong but effective counter measures against non-violent communist subversion remains a priority requirement NSC Planning Board Meeting, 26 November 1957	1108
280.	The NSC considers a progress report on U.S. policy on mainland Southeast Asia (NSC 5612/1) which is essentially the same as the Planning Board report. 347th NSC Meeting, 5 December 1957	1111
281.	NSC 5809 reaffirms that the national independence of Southeast Asia is important to the security interests of the United States. NSC 5809 contains draft revisions of NSC 5612/1. A statement of policy on the special situation in North Vietnam is included which continues to treat the Viet Minh as not constituting a legitimate government. NSC 5809, 2 April 1958	1113
282.	In general, the U.S. is achieving its objectives in Vietnam. Major problems which exist consist of the continued dependence on foreign aid, political and security problems of the Diem Government. Both military and economic assistance will be reduced in FY 58 and FY 59, compared to FY 57. OCB Report on Southeast Asia, 28 May 1958	1134
	1959
283.	Draft editorial amendments of NSC 5429/5 are forwarded to the National Security Council for consideration. Substantive change in U.S. policy is not intended but elimination of ambiguity in use of the term "hot pursuit" where doctrinal meaning in international law conflicts with use in NSC 5429/5. JCS study on "hot pursuit," 23 October 1958, is included. Memorandum for the NSC, 5 January 1959	1148
284.	Vietnam displays serious concern about developments in Laos, Cambodia's recognition of Communist China, and the U.S. position in the Taiwan straits. Major problems facing the U.S. are Diem's internal political position, internal security, and economic development. CIA analysis and financial summaries of assistance programs to Southeast Asia are included. OCB Report on Southeast Asia, 7 January 1959	1156
285.	Defense (TSA) suggests that it is advisable to withhold the replacement of F-BF aircraft in VNAF with AD-4 type aircraft. Defense Memorandum for JCS, 22 January 1959	1183
286.	The JCS recommends improvement of Tan Son Nhut Airfield and Tourane Airfield be improved for jet aircraft "under the guise of commercial aviation." JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 19 March 1959	1184
287.	Responsibilities within the Defense Department are assigned for the twenty courses of action in the OCB "Operation Plan for Vietnam." Among the courses of action are: popularize the image of Vietnam among neutralists, probe weaknesses of the Viet Cong, develop maximum combat capabilities of RVNAF, and encourage GVN to maintain an effective Self-Defense Corps. ISA Memorandum for JCS, 20 May 1959	1185
288.	An intelligence analysis of the situation in Vietnam and estimates of possible developments conclude that (1) the prospect of reunification of DRV and GVH is remote, (2) Diem will be President for many years by repressing opposition via the Can Lao political apparatus, (3) internal security forces will not be able to defeat DRV supported guerrilla and subversive forces, (4) GVN will continue to rely heavily on U.S. aid, (5) and DRV is in full control of North Vietnam and likely to continue harassment of GVN and Laos. NIE 63-59, 26 May 1959	1190
289.	The Department of State submits a draft revision of NSC 5429/5, U.S. policy in the Far East. The principle objectives of U.S. policy should be: (1) preservation of territorial and political integrity of Asian nations against communist expansion, (2) deterrence of local or general war, (3) bring about desirable changes in the Communist Bloc, (4) strengthen the economic, political and military position of the Free Far East, (5) promote Free World Unity, and (6) identify the U.S. with Asian aspirations. NSC Memorandum for the Planning Board, 29 June 1959	1196
290.	The JCS submits their and the Services' views on U.S. policy in the Far East. "The U.S. faces a delicate problem in presenting its Far Eastern policy to the world. A U.S. policy will not be very sympathetically received if it is presented in the purely negative terms of preventing communist expansion or the reduction of its power." JCS Memorandum for NSC Staff, 14 July 1959	1211
291.	A resurgence of tensions between Vietnam and Cambodia threatens to frustrate U.S. objectives in Cambodia. In Vietnam the Diem Government continues its strong controls which antagonize the Vietnamese elite. "Vietnamese military forces have improved under the MAAG training program." OCB Report on Southeast Asia, 12 August 1959	1236
292.	An intelligence analysis of Communist capabilities and intentions in Laos concludes that the Communist resumption of guerrilla warfare in Laos is a reaction to initiatives of U.S. support of Laos. The chances of Communist success are high at a low risk. Non-Asian forces intervening in Laos increase the likelihood of communist invasion, but preference would be to diplomacy, propaganda, and guerrilla action to cause the West to back down. SNIE 68-2-59, 18 September 1959	1242
293.	The U.S. seeks to increase the MAAG ceiling on personnel before furnishing the ICC with plans for withdrawal or phase-out of TERM. ISA Memorandum for Joint Staff, 20 October 1959	1248
	1960
294.	The evolution of political conditions necessitates that policy guidance should be directed at the problem of dealing with Sihanouk of Cambodia, "by all odds the major single factor in Cambodia and the principal target of U.S. policy." Further, the guidance of NSC 5809 is not adequate to cope with the situation in Laos. OCB Special Report on Southeast Asia, 10 February 1960	1249
295.	The Vietnam Country Team prepares a special report on the current security situation in Vietnam. "…the rural population is generally apathetic towards the Diem Government and there are signs of considerable dissatisfaction and silent opposition." Without support of the rural population, no final solution can be found to the internal security problem. Militarily, the GVN organization lacks unity of command. The situation is summed up. "…the government has tended to treat the population with suspicion or to coerce it and has been rewarded with an attitude of apathy or resentment." Saigon 278 to State, 7 March 1960	1254
296.	Williams testified that he was working "MAAG out of a job" and this is impressive to Senator Mansfield and the Foreign Relations Committee. Mansfield requests information on the situation which now requires "the addition of 350 men to the MAAG." Mansfield Letter to Lt General Williams, 5 May 1960	1276
297.	Williams replies that the 350 spaces referred to are the TERM personnel now in deactivation. The turnover of TERM spaces to MAAG ends the "subterfuge as actually TERM has had the undercover mission as logistical advisers since activation." Williams MAGCH-CH91 to OSD (for Mansfield), 20 May 1960	1279
298.	The President approves changes in NSC 5809 and directs implementation as NSC 6012, "U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia." Policies toward Vietnam are essentially unchanged. NSC 6012, 25 July 1960	1281
299.	Developments in South Vietnam indicate an adverse trend end if they remain unchanged will almost certainly cause the collapse of President Diem's regime. SNIE 63 1-60, 23 August 1960	1298
300.	The U.S. assesses the possible coup groups in Saigon (e.g. peasants, communists, labor, students, Catholic refugees, sects, police and Army) and concludes that long term effects of any demonstration depends on the attitude of the Army. Saigon 538 to State, 5 September 1960	1302
301.	Lansdale offers several proposals to meet the threat to security posed by the Viet Cong in Vietnam. Specifically, he recommends shifting the MAAG function emphasis to assistance on tactical operations, increasing the MAAG staff, priority be given to furnishing selective equipment, more emphasis on counter-guerrilla intelligence training, and certain actions on activities of the Civil Guard, civic action, and MAP requiring interagency coordination. Lansdale Memorandum for ISA, 13 September 1960	1307
302.	The Diem regime is confronted by two separate, but related dangers -- a non-communistic coup attempt in Saigon and gradual Viet Cong extension of control in the countryside. U.S. objectives rest on a strongly anti-communist but popularly supported government; continued failures by Diem is cause to seek alternative leaders. Saigon 624 to State, 16 September 1960	1311
303.	The U.S. suggests numerous political actions to President Diem, among them are Cabinet changes, more responsibility for Cabinet members, alteration of the Can Lao Party from a secret organization to a normal political party, investigation of Government departments by the National Assembly, freer press functions, and measures to enhance the Government's support in rural areas. In addition, it is suggested that Ngo Dinh Nhu, the President's brother, be given an ambassadorial post outside the country. Saigon 157 to State, 15 October 1960	1317
304.	Diem's responses to the suggestions for political action and removal of Nhu outwardly show no resentment. Saigon 802 to State, 15 October 1960	1323
305.	The U.S. urges preparation of an over-all plan, acceptable to GVN, for integration and centralized direction of maximum resources to combat the insurgency. DOD-State 653 to Saigon, 19 October 1960	1325
306.	U.S. urges Diem and the coup leaders to reach a quick agreement and avoid further bloodshed. Herter 775 to Saigon, 11 November 1960	1327
307.	Lansdale suggests that, in light of the abortive coup against Diem, General McGarr's role should be expanded to permit freer contact with President Diem. Ambassador Durbrow has apparently lost "personal stature" with Diem and should be removed. Lansdale Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 11 November 1960	1328
308.	Diem may react firmly toward the coup leaders since there are similarities to the circumstances of the 1954 attempt. Also Diem is probably now very suspicious of Ambassador Durbrow. State Cable 775 invited. Durbrow to engage in this "demoralizing meddling In Vietnam's affairs." Lansdale Memorandum for Douglas, 15 November 1960	1330
309.	The JCS consider that there is a valid requirement to increase the helicopter lift capability of the Vietnamese armed forces at this time, in view of the deteriorating internal security situation in Vietnam. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 1 December 1960	1332
310.	Nhu and Diem are rankled by American press stories on "autocratic regime." There is below the surface talk of another coup. The coup has increased chances of neutralism and anti-Americanism among GVN critics. It is recommended to continue to urge Diem to adopt effective programs even though the situation in Vietnam is highly dangerous to U.S. interests. Saigon 1151 to State, 5 December 1960	1334
311.	The U.S. assessment of the Laotian situation is that, if present trends continue, it will remain one of "confusion, drift, and disintegration.…Laos is heading toward civil war." SNIE 68-60, 6 December 1960	1340
312.	The Bon Oum Government is in control, but faces critical problems in the continuing Laos situation. Immediate matters of concern are to bolstering Phoumi forces, forestall Nehru on reconstituting the ICC, and assumption by the U.S. of primary advisor status. 470th NSC Meeting 20 December 1960	1346
313.	Diem stresses his need for 20,000 additional troops. Diem states also that corvee labor is the only way to collect "equivalent taxes" from peasants. Durbrow urges adoption of liberalizing programs. Saigon 1216 to state, 24 December 1960	1348
314.	Ambassador Durbrow hands a memorandum on liberalization to President Diem. Specifically, suggestions are made to: (1) publicize budget hearings, (2) authorize the Assembly to conduct investigations, (3) work out an effective press code, (4) and grant broader credit to the peasants. Saigon 264 to State, 27 December 1960	1353
	1961
315.	Defense reviews its files to determine the actions taken with State concerning Defense requirement$ for facilities in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. No requests for facilities in Laos or Vietnam have been made to state except for correspondence on improvement of two airfields in Vietnam. ISA Memorandum for NSC, 4 January 1961	1356
316.	The Coumter Insurgency Plan (CIP) for South Vietnam is submitted for approval to Washington. MAAG prepared most of the CIP which is based on State and DOD guidance. Some of the recommendations set forth have already been communicated to GVN. The Country Team is not unanimous, however, on the recommended 20,000-man increase in RVNAF -- Durbrow maintains reservations. The CIP, which is em enclosure to Tele 276, is not reproduced here. Saigon 276 to State, 4 January 1961	1357
317.	President Eisenhower meets with President-elect John F Kennedy on the subject of Laos. Attendees are Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, Douglas Dillon, and Clark M. Clifford. Eisenhower gives the impression that if Laos applies for SEATO aid, the obligation of the U.S. and other signatories is binding. Eisenhower says that "Laos is the key to the entire area of Southeast Asia" -- if Laos falls, then all the area is written off. Kennedy asks "how long it wold take to put a U.S. division into Laos." Memorandum of Eisenhower-Kennedy Conference, 19 January 1961	1360