Index:Pentagon-Papers-Part V. B. 3. a.djvu

Title	United States – Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense, Part V. B. 3. a.
Author	The Pentagon
Year	2011
Publisher	U.S. Government
Location	Washington, D.C.
Source	djvu
Progress	To be proofread
Transclusion	Index not transcluded or unreviewed
Volumes	Part I Part II Part III Part IV: A. 1 A. 2 A. 3 A. 4 A. 5 B. 1 B. 2 B. 3 B. 4 B. 5 C. 1 C. 2a C. 2b C. 2c C. 3 C. 4 C. 5 C. 6.a C. 6.b C. 6.c C. 7.a C. 7.b C. 8 C. 9.a C. 9.b C. 10 Part V: A. Vol. I. A A. Vol. I. B A. Vol. I. C A. Vol. II. D B. 1 B. 2.a B. 2.b B. 3.a B. 3.b B. 3.c B. 3.d B. 4 Book I B. 4 Book II Part VI: A B C-1 C-2 C-3 C-4

Pages (key to Page Status)

Cover Front Title a Contents. i ii iii iv v vi vii viii ix x xi xii xiii xiv xv xvi xvii xviii xix xx xxi xxii xxiii xxiv xxv xxvi xxvii xxviii xxix xxx xxxi xxxii xxxiii xxxiv xxxv xxxvi xxxvii xxxviii xxxix xl xli xlii xliii xliv xlv xlvi xlvii xlviii xlix l li lii liii liv 1953. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211

V.B.3.

JUSTIFICATION OF THE WAR -- INTERNAL COMMITMENTS

The Eisenhower Administration, 1953 – 1960

Contents and
Chronological List of Documents

BOOK I	1953	Page
	⁠
1.	General Collins sends ISA a letter from General Trapnell, MAAG, Indochina, who indicates that the "most important and immediate need to the successful conclusion of the war in Indochina was more troops." Army General Staff memorandum for ISA, 15 January 1953	1
2.	The Joint Chiefs of Staff are requested to undertake a re-examination of U.S. participation in the Indochina operation giving special consideration to training indigenous forces. Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum for JCS, 19 January 1953	4
3.	President Eisenhower links the Korean war with the Indochina conflict. State of the Union Message, 2 February 1953	5
4.	The State Department proposes an exchange of military training missions between French, Vietnamese, Cambodian, Laotian and ROK's. Dulles 1644 to Saigon, 10 February 1953	6
5.	Dulles and Bidault conversations reveal that the French are relieved over Eisenhower's Indochina position. "I thank God and General Eisenhower that it took only six years to have France's contribution there recognized for what it is." A-117 to Saigon, 5 March 1953	8
6.	In reply to the Secretary of Defense request to re-examine the Indochina problem, the JCS recommend that France be "encouraged" to augment the Vietnamese forces, that the ports and airfields in Tonkin be improved, that the U. S. support the troop augmentation and port improvement with money and materials, and that France be pressured to grant greater responsibility and autonomy to the Associated States. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 13 March 1953	11
7.	Dulles outlines U.S. policy on Indochina to Bidault. The U.S.: (1) is fully aware of the importance of the French struggle; (2) sees the situation with "real sense of urgency"; (3) shares concern regarding "adequacy of the financial contribution" by Indochinese and French residents there; (4) desires agreement that Viet Minh defeat would deter CHICOM intervention; and (5) appreciates French views on participation by Associated States in discussing policy and receiving U.S. military and economic aid. Dulles 4907 to Paris, 19 March 1953	15
8.	President Eisenhower stresses the importance of EDC as a means for European viability to Mayer and LeTourneau. The "President declared that EDC is so important in American eyes that the American people would not support aid to France if they were given the impression that France is resorting to dilatory tactics in order to postpone ratification.…" Dulles 4992 to Paris, 26 March 1953	17
9.	Secretary Dulles reassures the French that a "Chinese Communist attack is unlikely" in Indochina and that any Korean armistice would have "automatically failed [its] purpose." Dulles 5001 to Paris, 27 March 1953	19
10.	The French plan to create, "strong free states, in Indochina" is to be studied even though Eisenhower feels that the timetable is too slow. The U. S. is intent on doing nothing to increase France's difficulties. Dulles 5040 to Paris, 30 March 1953	21
11.	Cost deficits of the French "strategic concept" are $231 million and $299.3 million for CY 1954 and 1955. No formal request for the U.S. to assume the deficits is made but "French intent is clear that is their plan." Dulles 1967 to Saigon, 7 April 1953	22
12.	President Eisenhower indicates publicly that an armistice in Korea should mean "an end to the direct and indirect attacks upon the security of Indochina and Malaya." The warning is clear to Red China that armies released by the armistice to attack elsewhere would make the armistice "a fraud." White House Press Release, 16 April 1953	23
13.	The JCS summarize the weaknesses of the French Plan presented by LeTourneau and Allard. Briefly, the plan is not aggressive, insufficient consideration is given to cutting the enemy supply lines, insufficient emphasis is given to placing responsibility on the Vietnamese, and the plan relies extensively on small unit operations. See also documents numbered 35, 36 and 37, below. JCS memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 21 April 1953	24
14.	The U. S. urges the French to come forward with a program which can sensibly be sold to Congress as holding promise of a satisfactory outcome, "perhaps in a couple of years." Dulles indicates that the President would favor as much as $525 million and possibly more this year if Congress could be told "this program has enough chance of success.…[that] it will largely clear up the situation." Bi-Partite US-French Conversations, 22 April 1953	27
15.	The JCS at a meeting with State informally indicates reservations on the feasibility of the French plan. The JCS feel that the French must appoint an "aggressive French military leader" to Indochina, revise the strategy toward more offensive action, and use Vietnamese forces in large rather than small units -- otherwise "U.S. aid would be wasted" in Indochina, State TOSEC 9 to Paris, 14 April 1953	31
16.	The U. S. position is clearly that "armies released in Korea" will not strike elsewhere. Since the Indochina war does not have the "status of an international war," the U. S. suggests that perhaps the French should bring the current Laos problem before the Security Council. Extract of Tripartite US-UK-French Meeting, 25 April 1953	32
17.	France is told that the U. S. proposes to recommend an FY 1954 Mutual Security Program (MSP) for France of $100 million for equipment of French units in SACEUR, $460 million in funds as 40% of Indochina war expenditure rate, and an additional unspecified amount involving trained Associated States forces. Memorandum on Aid, Paris 5673 to Secretary of State, 26 April 1953	34
18.	The French are reluctant to bring the Laos aggression before the Security Council because it "might precipitate a colonial debate." Dulles Memorandum of Conversation, 17 April 1953	37
19.	The French request for C-119 aircraft reaches Eisenhower and raises the question of sending U. S. personnel on combat missions in Indochina, Such a decision is seen as having "repercussions" and raising many problems. Douglas MacArthur, II, memorandum, 27 April 1953	38
20.	The JCS approves the loan of six C-119 aircraft to the French for use in Indochina provided they are flown by civilian pilots. The CIA is to complete the transactions. State Far East Memorandum to Dulles, 28 April 1953	39
21.	The Department of Defense accepts the French proposal to send a U. S. military mission to Indochina. State 5655 to Paris, 18 May 1953	40
22.	The U. S. is prepared to support a French request to NATO to permit diversion of French Air Force manpower to Indochina in view of the fact that "the near collapse of the maintenance and pilot capabilities of the French Air Force in Indochina is close at hand." State 5693 to Paris, 21 May 1953	42
23.	The U. S. backs down on its intent to have Thailand submit the "Laos invasion" case to the Security Council. "French attitude regarding Thai appeal has been emphatic almost to the point of hysteria." Dulles 2297 to Bangkok, 1 June 1953	44
24.	The Intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that Communist China will not invade Indochina even though hostilities conclude in Korea. The French situation, however, is expected to continue to deteriorate while the Viet Minh prestige increases. National Intelligence Estimate, NIE-91, 4 June 1953	45
25.	The Joint Chiefs of Staff propose "Terms of Reference" for the O'Daniel Military Mission to Indochina. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 10 June 1953	59
26.	The O'Daniel mission arrives in Saigon to pursue discussions with General Henri Navarre on the manner in which U. S. aid may best contribute to the French war effort. State Press Release 329, 20 June 1953	68
27.	General O'Daniel recommends to the JCS that a capability for small Industry in Indochina be established, that an increase in artillery units be approved for Indochina, and that the U. S. "think in terms of the 'Navarre Concept' in association with the war in Indochina," O'Daniel Report to JCS, 14 July 1953	69
28.	The U. S. expresses gratification at announced French political plans and indicates that the Navarre Plan "had impressed as favorably." Stress is placed on having other alternatives available if negotiations were to start, e.g., the Navarre Plan. Assurance is given the French that Communist China will not intervene in Indochina. US-France Bilateral Talks, 15 July 1953	97
29.	The French circulate a memorandum which outlines the "direction" in which an effort should be made, i.e., possible consideration of an Indochina cease-fire by the political conference which follows the Korean truce talks. French Memorandum, undated (15 July 1953 Conference)	101
30.	Dulles reports to the American people on the principal results of the foreign ministers talks. He indicates that the aid to Indochina is the second largest cost item in our Mutual Security Program (MSP). State Press Release 387, 17 July 1953	105
31.	The French are reported as "prepared to adopt the general principles of the Navarre Plan" but must have additional U.S. funding in CY 1954; however, according to Dulles, "there was no hope of getting any additional funds whatsoever from the U.S. for Indochina" and if funds are not available, the only alternative for France is withdrawal. Paris 370 to Dulles, 29 July 1953	107
32.	The French request that "the interdependence of the different theaters," i.e., Indochina and Korea, not be lost sight of by the Allied negotiators on the Korean armistice. French Aide-Memoire, 31 July 1953	109
33.	The NSC receives the first progress report on NSC 124/2. This report reviews developments and considerations relating to specific elements of policy. Memorandum for NSC, 5 August 1953	112
34.	The State Department recommends to the NSC an increase in aid to France of $400 million in the current fiscal year. Memorandum for NSC, 5 August 1953	125
35.	The Joint Chiefs of Staff, after pointing out weaknesses of the French plan, consider Navarre's concepts on conduct of the Indochina war as a "marked improvement in French military thinking" and state that if "vigorously pursued," the plan offers a promise of success sufficient to warrant additional U.S. aid. The Navarre concept is enclosed with JCS. Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 11 August 1953. (See also documents numbered 13, 36, and 37)	134
36.	The JCS learn that Secretary of Defense plans to forward their 11 August memorandum to Secretary of State so a new memorandum is drafted which makes changes to certain "overly optimistic" statements with respect to "promises of success offered by the Navarre Concept." See documents numbered 13, 35, and 37 also. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 28 August 1953	138
37.	The JCS position is changed from 11 August to include "the basic requirement for military success in Indochina" as one of creating a political climate to provide incentive for the natives to support the French and supply them with intelligence. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in considering the Navarre Concept, continue to believe that additional U.S. support should be conditioned on continued French support, demonstration of French performance, and acceptance of U.S. military advice. Radford Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 28 August 1953. (See documents numbered 13 , 35, and 36 also)	140
38.	Secretary Dulles identifies the Korean war with the war in Indochina. "A single Chinese Communist aggressive front extends from Korea on the north to Indochina on the south. State Press Release 469, 1 September 1953	142
39.	The National Security Council, at the 161st meeting, approves additional U.S. aid ($385 million) for France. The State Department view is that the Laniel government, if not supported by the U.S., may be the last French government to try to win in Indochina. NSC 161st Meeting, 9 September 1953	144
40.	The U.S. informs France of the approval of additional aid and requests assurances from the French relating to conduct of the war, pursuit of independence for the Associated States, acceptance of military advice, and no alteration of their NATO commitment. Dulles 868 to Paris, 9 September 1953	150
41.	The President approves the NSC-recommended $385 million additional aid for French Indochina. Memorandum for the NSC, 11 September 1953	153
42.	The US-French supplementary aid agreement consists of six letters exchanged between Bidault and Dillon. Three of the letters spell out French political and military undertakings, the U.S. terms and conditions, and the procedures to verify expenditures. US-France letters, 29 September 1953	156
43.	The U.S. and France publicly announce the French resolve to carry out the declaration of independence for the Associated States and the approval of additional U. S. aid. State Press Release 529, 30 September 1953	167
44.	The U. S. is concerned at the "ill-considered action of the Vietnamese National Congress" and deplores the atmosphere of the National Congress which jeopardizes the war effort. Dulles 695 to Saigon, 21 October 1953	169
45.	President Eisenhower approves the statement of NSC 162/2 as basic national security policy which addresses the Soviet threat to U. S. security. NSC 162/2, 30 October 1953	171
46.	The U. S. informs France that their urgent request for early delivery of 25 additional C-47 aircraft for Indochina has received Presidential approval. Dulles 1930 to Paris, 23 November 1953	201
47.	France reassures the U. S. that the Ho Chi Minh interview, which is considered by Laniel as 98 percent propaganda, will not affect Indochina policy in any way. Laniel has "flatly refused" President Auriol's instructions to seek the earliest possible negotiations with Ho Chi Minh. Paris 2110 to Dulles, 30 November 1953	202
48.	General Navarre, CinC French Forces, Indochina, complains to General Trapnell that the aid requests prepared by the French have been modified by the MAAG before reaching Washington. "I cannot accept having my potential whittled away in such a manner.…" Navarre letter to Trapnell, 7 December 1953	203
49.	The CIA estimates the Chinese and Soviet reactions to U. S. intervention in Indochina with ground, air, and naval forces. It is anticipated that the Communist Bloc would not overtly intervene even though decisive defeat of the Viet Minh would result but would support and augment the Viet Minh to prolong the resistance. Special CIA Estimate, SE-53, 18 December 1953	206