Infantry, Part I: Regular Army /World War II to Korea

by John K. Mahon and Romana Danysh

• World War II to Korea

• With the end of World War II came the difficult task of demobilizing the huge wartime military establishment and of reorganizing the infantry for its peacetime role. The demobilization was extremely hasty and, as General of the Army George C. Marshall stated before a joint session of Congress, "… [it had] no relationship whatsoever to the size of the Army in the future." Furthermore, it was carried out on the basis of an individual point system, not by units. The point system was designed to be fair to the individual soldier and satisfied the insistent demands of Congress, the public, and the press to "bring the boys back home" as soon as possible, but its effects on unit integrity, efficiency, and combat capability were disastrous. There were too few units left to meet all the worldwide responsibilities the United States had acquired with victory, while infantry organizations remaining active were so understrength and suffered such constant personnel turnover that they seemed more like replacement centers than combat units.

• By 30 June 1947 demobilization was officially completed. From a peak strength of 8,291,336 on 31 May 1945 the Army had been reduced to 989,664 in only twentyfive months. During the same period the infantry totals dropped at an even faster rate from 1,782,832 to 126,121. The number of infantry regiments decreased from 288 to 41, and only seven separate infantry battalions remained active. More than threefourths of the active infantry units were assigned to divisions: 8 infantry, 2 airborne, 1 armored, and 1 cavalry. With the exception of the 88th, which was in the process of being inactivated in Italy, each infantry division had three organic infantry regiments. The airborne divisions had one glider and two parachute infantry regiments each, and the armored division had three armored infantry battalions. Only the 1st Cavalry Division still retained the square structure with four organic regiments which, although reorganized in 1945 as infantry, kept their cavalry designations. As of 1 July 1947, all separate infantry battalions and eleven regiments were stationed in the United States. The rest of the infantry regiments were overseas with nineteen in Japan and Korea and the other eleven in Germany, Italy, the Philippines, the Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, and Trinidad.

• Although the first problem of the postwar infantry was demobilization, even while that was going on plans were being made for the reorganization of infantry units in the light of the experience gained and the lessons learned during World War II. Since the war had been won and infantry organization, weapons, and tactics had proved to be effective in different theaters of operations and against different enemy forces, there was no motivation for radical innovations. The explosion of the atomic bomb was still too recent to influence infantry organization at this time. Nevertheless, it did have an indirect effect on infantry units, since in the general enthusiasm over this ultimate modern weapon the infantry was sometimes forgotten or, at any rate, overshadowed. Attempts to re-establish the office of the Chief of Infantry failed, because Army leaders believed that chiefs of the combat arms would tend to encourage undesirable branch consciousness and interbranch rivalry. To the infantry this meant that it had no official spokesman, nobody to look out for its interests, and no one to take care of its problems.

• Responsibility for the development and preparation of infantry tables of organization and equipment, formerly the function of the Chief of Infantry, had been passed in 1942 to Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, which became the Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, in March 1948. The postwar TOE's for standard and armored infantry units were published between late 1947 and mid1948 after months of careful study, evaluation,. and review. They reflected various recommendations and suggestions, particularly those of the General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, and of the Infantry Conference which was sponsored by the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, in dune 1946. Although they did not introduce any significant new organizational concepts, the 1947-48 tables brought some changes to all infantry units from the squad to the division.

• One of the most important changes was made in the rifle squad. The consensus was that the 12-man squad of World War II was too large and unwieldy. As a result, the ammunition bearer and the two scouts were eliminated, and the new unit had only nine men: a squad leader, an assistant squad leader, a BAR team of two men, and five riflemen, one of whom was armed with the sniper version of the M1 rifle. The M1, which had been highly effective and very popular during the war, was retained as the basic individual weapon of the infantryman, and a bayonet was issued with each rifle.

• With the reduction of the squad by three men, the rifle platoon lost nine rifles, but its firepower did not decrease. On the contrary, the postwar organization gave the platoon leader greater firepower under his immediate control by adding a new 9-man weapons squad to support the three rifle squads. The final World War II TOE had placed the infantry company's 2.36-inch rocket launchers and .30-caliber light machine guns in one weapons platoon. The postwar table moved both of these weapons to the new squad in the rifle platoon, leaving only 60-mm. mortars and 57-mm. recoilless rifles in the weapons platoon.

• The heavy weapons company, organic to each infantry battalion, was also streamlined under the 1947 TOE. One of the machine gun platoons was dropped and the 81-mm. mortars and 75-mm. recoilless rifles authorized in June 1945 were both reduced from six to four per company. Of its nine rocket launchers only six remained, but the new ones were the more powerful 3.5-inch bazookas, whereas the old ones had been 2.36-inch launchers.

• Even more changes were made on the regimental level. During World War II, the artillery provided such responsive and effective fire support that the infantry regiment no longer needed its own cannon company. Chemical mortar companies, on the other hand, had been frequently and very successfully attached to infantry units. Combat experience had also shown that the best antitank weapon was the tank itself and that the infantry-tank team was an extremely effective fighting unit. Accordingly, both the cannon and the antitank company were eliminated, while a heavy mortar company (armed with twelve 4.2-inch mortars) and a tank company of 148 men and twenty-two tanks became organic to the postwar infantry regiment. Additional tank support for divisional infantry units was available from a tank battalion, which was made part of the infantry division for the first time in the 1947-48 tables.

• There was no special unit for air defense in the infantry regiment, but the number of .50-caliber Browning machine guns, employed primarily as antiaircraft weapons, increased from thirty-three to forty-seven, and a newly created automatic weapons battalion in the division artillery further improved antiaircraft protection. The 1948 regiment also had a larger headquarters and headquarters company, a larger service company, and an organic medical company instead of an attached medical detachment. All of these changes, which made the postwar infantry regiment a much more powerful and sophisticated unit than its World War II predecessor, were accomplished with only a slight gain in overall regimental strength from 8,697 to 3,774.

• While three infantry regiments remained the basic combat elements of the infantry division, as they had been throughout the war, the postwar armored division had more organic infantry units than either the "heavy" or "light" armored division of World War II. The General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, had concluded that there were not enough infantrymen in the armored divisions, especially in those organized .under the "heavy" 1942 TOE's. The board recommended that three composite tank-infantry regiments, each comprised of one tank battalion and two armored rifle battalions, be assigned to the division. Although this suggestion was not adopted in the postwar organization, the ratio of infantry to tank units was improved by authorizing four armored infantry battalions for each division and four rifle companies for each battalion, thus raising the total number of armored infantry companies in the armored division from nine to sixteen.

• The structure of the armored infantry battalion (AIB) differed somewhat from that of the standard infantry battalion. The 917-man infantry battalion consisted of a headquarters and headquarters company, a heavy weapons company, and three rifle companies of 211 men each. The AIB was larger by 152 men and had a headquarters, headquarters and service company, a medical detachment, and four armored infantry companies of 208 men each. The infantry company's weapons platoon and three rifle platoons of three rifle squads and a weapons squad paralleled the armored infantry company's mortar platoon and three rifle platoons of three rifle squads and a light machine gun squad. There were ten men in the 1948 armored infantry rifle squad-one more than in its regular infantry counterpart. The tenth man drove the squad's newly issued full-tracked armored utility vehicle, M44, which replaced the half-track personnel carrier used during World War II.

• The basic weapons of the standard infantry and the armored infantry were the same, although the quantity of the weapons varied. Armored infantry units, however, were not authorized any recoilless rifles. On the other hand, they had many more rocket launchers and machine guns. In an armored rifle company, for example, there were ten bazookas and nineteen machine guns, as opposed to only three and four, respectively, in a regular rifle company. As a result, the armored infantry was capable of providing greater automatic fire support than other infantry units.

• The first postwar airborne infantry TOE's did not appear until 1 April 1950, but airborne units had been organized earlier under draft tables similar to the final published tables. Perhaps the main reason for this delay was the fact that there were more changes made in airborne organization than in other types of infantry. Despite their unique and highly specialized primary mission of seizing and holding important objectives by attack from the air, airborne units in World War II were frequently called upon to perform normal infantry missions. Both combat experience and tests conducted after the war at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, showed that they needed to be organized more like standard infantry units in order to be self-sustaining in ground operations over extended periods. The new TOE's, therefore, gave the airborne infantry more staying power.and organized it along the same lines as the regular infantry, while retaining its special air assault capability.

• During World War II there had been two types of airborne regiments-parachute and glider. After the war both of these units were eliminated, and the 1 April 1950 TOE's introduced an airborne infantry regiment, which was capable of landing by parachute, glider, or aircraft. Three of these new units were organic to the postwar airborne division, and provisions were also made for nondivisional regiments. The airborne infantry regiment had a strength of 3,376 men and contained a headquarters and headquarters company, a service company, a support company, a medical company, and three airborne infantry battalions. Its structure was similar to that of the regular infantry regiment, except that instead of a tank company and a heavy mortar company, the airborne unit had a support company. The disadvantages of not having a regimental tank company were somewhat offset in divisional units by the fact that the airborne division was authorized two organic tank battalions, while the infantry division had only one.

• The support company consisted of a company headquarters, two heavy mortar platoons armed with four 4.2-inch mortars each, and an antitank platoon with six 3.5-inch rocket launchers, three heavy .50-caliber machine guns, and six 90mm. antitank guns on airborne carriages. It was a very powerful unit, completely motorized, capable of landing by parachute or aircraft, with its own fire direction center and its own communications system. The organization of the airborne infantry battalion, company, platoon, and squad was almost identical to that of the corresponding standard infantry units. Likewise, the weapons used by both types of infantry were also the same, except for the airborne antitank gun.

• There was a considerable time lag between the publication of the postwar TOE's and the actual reorganization of infantry units under the new tables. Even after the reorganization had officially taken place, there were still differences between the paper organizations and the actual units, since most units were understrength and not fully equipped. A separate reduced strength column, to be effective in peacetime, was added to all TOE's in November 1950, but until then special cut sheets or reduction tables were prepared for infantry units by the Office, Chief of Army Field Forces.

• On the eve of the Korean War, only one of ten active combat divisions was being maintained at full strength. The others averaged about 70 percent of their authorized strength and had major shortages in equipment. For example, infantry units generally did not have the organic armor provided by the new TOE's or were equipped with lighter and older tank models than those authorized. Nor did they have their full allowances of 57-mm. and 75-mm. recoilless rifles and 4.2-inch mortars, while the 3.5-inch rocket launchers were still in the process of being tested. Many infantry battalions were short one rifle company, and in most infantry regiments only two out of the three battalions weie active. Since current infantry tactics were based on triangular organization, such reductions were very serious handicaps.

• Shortcomings in infantry personnel and equipment were caused by budget cuts; strength ceilings, and other limitations placed upon the postwar Army by an economy-minded Congress and administration. These actions were supported by a war-weary public traditionally opposed to a large peacetime military establishment and overly dependent on the atomic bomb as a deterrent to future wars. Even after demobilization had been completed and the Air Force had become a separate service, the strength of the Army still continued to decline. The crisis produced by the Soviet blockade of Berlin and the Allied airlift of supplies to the isolated city brought about a temporary increase in Regular Army personnel. By 30 June 1950, however, the actual strength had dropped again to 591,487 out of an authorized total of 630,000. The active infantry at that time numbered 130,554 officers and enlisted men.

• In mid-1950 the infantry in the Regular Army consisted of forty-six regiments and thirteen separate battalions. There were seven infantry combat divisions with three organic infantry regiments each, including the 1st Cavalry Division, which had finally been triangularized in 1949. The 2d Armored Division was organized under the 1947-48 TOE's that authorized four armored infantry battalions (AIB's) per division. The 82d Airborne Division had three airborne infantry regiments, while in the 11th Airborne Division only two of the three organic regiments were active. In addition to the ten combat divisions, there were four training divisions (three infantry and one armored), which had nine infantry regiments and four AIB's assigned to them. The eleven separate regiments were all organized as standard infantry; two of the five nondivisional battalions were AIB's and the other three were regular infantry battalions. There were no separate airborne regiments or battalions, neither of the old parachute and glider infantry nor of the new airborne infantry.

• Besides having major shortages in both personnel and equipment, the active infantry units were also inadequately trained. At first the disintegration caused by rapid demobilization had made effective unit training virtually impossible, and the numerous administrative chores of occupation duty also interfered with training programs. Occupation of the countries defeated in World War II remained by far the single greatest responsibility of the infantry throughout the 1945-50 period and was a heavy drain on the Army's overall effort. Although the duties were gradually reduced everywhere and troops were completely removed from some areas as peace treaties were signed, on the eve of the Korean War about one-third of the infantry was still on occupation duty.

• Not until late in the postwar era was more emphasis placed on training and readiness. In January 1950, General Mark W. Clark; Chief of Army Field Forces, announced that the most extensive and diversified peacetime maneuver training program in Army history was then under way. In this program infantry units participated in various joint and combined maneuvers with other Army units and with the U.S. Navy and Air Force. Exercises were also held with the armed forces of Canada, France, and other countries allied with the United States in 1949 under the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

• Infantrymen from the reserve components as well as Regular Army infantry units took part in some of these maneuvers. The National Guard and the Organized Reserve Corps, as reorganized in the 1945-50 period, were considerably larger and somewhat better trained than the reserve components of the 1930's. With many men having World War II combat experience and with better participation in paid drills, the Organized Reserve Corps' infantry was significantly less of a paper organization than it had been in the prewar period. In the National Guard, all of the twenty-five infantry divisions and twenty regimental combat teams had been Federally recognized by 30 June 1950. Also, the entire National Guard infantry had been reorganized under the postwar TOE's, as modified by special reduction tables. Although all units participated in some form of training, it took place under major handicaps because funds were limited, armory facilities were inadequate, and equipment shortages were estimated at over 50 percent. Even in mobilization planning, the reserve structure was not expected to become effective until one or two years after a general mobilization.

• By June 1950 the infantry of all components was better organized and trained than it had been at any time since the hasty post-World War II demobilization had reduced it to near impotence. Nevertheless, infantry units were far from combat ready for the war which broke out suddenly in Korea.

Notes

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