International Dimensions in seeking a Road Ahead to the Conflict in Sri Lanka - 27th March 2008

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International Dimensions in seeking a Road Ahead to the Conflict in Sri Lanka - 27th March 2008.
A presentation made by Professor Rajiva Wijesinha, Secretary – General of the Peace Secretariat ( SCOPP) at the seminar on 'Conflict in Sri Lanka: the Road Ahead', organized by the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies and the Chennai based think-tank, the Centre for Security Analysis, held at the BCIS on March 26th and 27th, 2008

by Rajiva Wijesinha
191046International Dimensions in seeking a Road Ahead to the Conflict in Sri Lanka - 27th March 2008.
A presentation made by Professor Rajiva Wijesinha, Secretary – General of the Peace Secretariat ( SCOPP) at the seminar on 'Conflict in Sri Lanka: the Road Ahead', organized by the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies and the Chennai based think-tank, the Centre for Security Analysis, held at the BCIS on March 26th and 27th, 2008
Rajiva Wijesinha


I had not intended to produce a paper for my presentation today, but I was struck last week by an article entitled ‘War of Words on the ethnic front’ by one of our more distinguished former diplomats. It raised questions that deserve detailed consideration, and I thought then that it might be useful to frame my presentation today around the issues he raised.

Essentially Mr Hussain compared the current international dimensions of our conflict with what happened when the conflict took on its currently continuing horrendous configuration. I refer to the decade between July 1977, when the UNP government led by J R Jayewardene, Prime Minister first and then President, took office, and July 1987 which saw the Indo-Lankan Peace Accord.

The analysis concludes with the statement that ‘Our war of words with India led to the air-drop, the dispatch of the Indian flotilla, the coming of the IPKF, and the temporary loss of State control over almost a third of our national territory and over half the coastline. None of that will be replicated today. But we can be sure that by now at least some important Western decision-makers will be of the view that it is time to punish Sri Lanka.’

The first part of the article deals with other resemblances, one being the comparative operational superiority of our armed forces, the second being what Mr Hussein sees as the sidelining of the Foreign Ministry - though he later claims that the Foreign Ministry is as appalling in its undiplomatic use of language as other Sri Lankans he criticizes. It is then the war of words that upsets him most, a war he relates in the last paragraph to the West, though the body of the article makes it clear it is Britain that concerns him most, and in particular a couple of responses to two pronouncements from the British Foreign Office. His interpretation however is that Sri Lanka stepped out of line, and therefore it will be punished, most obviously by the European Union withdrawing GSP+ from our trade with it.

Reading the article, one realizes how nonsensical is the myth of a golden age of our Foreign Ministry, compared to which today’s diplomats are useless. I am not of course a judge, but I have been impressed by many of the professional diplomats I have met who are now in service, from doyens such as our High Commissioner in India to the hardworking political officers in Geneva or London.

None of them would, as Mr Hussain does, have imagined that Britain was the world, none of them would have confused the gratuitous aggression against India that was practiced by the Jayewardene regime all the way until 1987 with the right to respond which our more capable officials have exercised in recent weeks. For the fact is, Sri Lanka has never – except in the case of J R Jayewardene as characterized by Mr Hussein and perhaps otherwise too, in the disgusting attacks on Tamil civilians and property in 1981 and 1983 - initiated any war, of words or otherwise.

In fact we have only tried to defend ourselves against nasty sometimes underhand attacks as when David Miliband, on the pretext of issuing a message on the sixtieth anniversary of our independence, failed to congratulate us but instead engaged in patronizing criticism which, if thought necessary, should have been made in another context. Doubtless he was ill advised, as was Lord Mark Malloch-Brown, who allowed himself to be cited by the British Tamil Forum as having claimed that the results of the last election in Sri Lanka were unfortunate. Sadly, he failed to issue a denial, and only acknowledged that he had been misquoted when he was confronted on this issue. Having agreed that he could be quoted about this, he also that he would try to have his office set the record straight, though this alas has not happened.

Of course we realize that Britain has its own political imperatives, so that, despite its occasionally preposterous pontificating, we continue to love her, and to engage with her positively, But that certainly does not mean that we should indulge her totally, as President Jayewardene did in 1982 over the Falklands War.

That was a mistake, as I am told the Foreign Ministry felt, though it could not control the President. It led to Argentina supporting the Indian initiated resolution against us at Geneva in 1983, the precursor to the humanitarian intervention India engaged in so brilliantly over the next few months, culminating in the air drop (after, not before, the flotilla), which finally convinced President Jayewardene that he should submit to Indian superiority.

The tragedy then was that such submission should not have been in question. And the reason it came into question was not the foolish words President Jayewardene used about Indira Gandhi and her son Sanjay, which Mr Hussain quotes, but the attempt to involve Sri Lanka against India in the Cold War. That was what India was concerned with, as the protocols to the Indo-Lankan Accord made crystal clear, the provisions about Trincomalee, about the oil tanks, about broadcasting facilities. Once Sri Lanka accepted that those were destructive ideas that needed to be abandoned, India proved itself as helpful as she had been in the past.

We know that, in 1983, Foreign Minister Hameed was dispatched to Britain to see if Sri Lanka could invoke the 1947 Treaty of Defence in case India intervened. Mrs Thatcher, as it turned out, was inclined to agree, in gratitude for Sri Lankan support over the Falklands, but Foreign Office counsel prevailed. Attempts to involve America too failed, and too late President Jayewardene realized what any neophyte could have told him, that the West was not going to take on India for Sri Lanka’s sake.

My point then is that Sri Lanka’s prime concern today, as it should have been then, was India. I hasten to add that I do not mean we should become a satellite for, as I wrote back in 1987, I regretted that we had subordinated ourselves in writing in the protocols to the Accord. But it was, I said, more regrettable that we had put ourselves in a position where India required such a pledge. We should have made it clear, without being asked to, that such activities were unthinkable.

For India, despite its size and capacity to dominate, has on the whole behaved with admirable restraint as far as Sri Lanka is concerned. Her position has been very clear, that she is against the division of the country, but she would like entrenchment of rights for the Tamils. Those rights are generally such as any country anxious for the wellbeing and development of all its citizens should in any case affirm – devolved decision making as to social and economic aspects, protection for language and cultural identities, equal opportunities for participation in public life.

If we stick fast to these principles, it will be easier for us to bring the struggle against terrorism to a successful conclusion. Of course I may be being naïve, and there may be other aspects to Indian policy now, but there is little evidence of this. Conversely, it would seem that, whereas India would be satisfied, provided a pluralistic political solution is provided, for the LTTE to be defeated, there are elements in the West that still wish to resurrect the LTTE. Despite assertions that they recognize the LTTE as a terrorist group, despite increasing willingness to restrict funding to the LTTE, we still hear the parrot cry about resuming negotiations with the LTTE, as though they were the only group able to represent the Tamils.

When India is clear that this is not the case, why do at least some elements in the West persist in claiming the opposite? Why do they now repeat old allegations about human rights violations, without providing assistance to ensure that these are minimized? Why, in short, did two Britishers pronounce critically in public, failing to recognize not only sixty years of continuing democracy (except for Jayewardene’s little adventure in postponing elections, which Mrs Thatcher did not think improper) but also the positive measures that our Asian friends mentioned after Lord Malloch-Brown’s outburst in Geneva?

The short answer is that I do not know, and I suspect the British do not know either. History has shown – and in particular the history of the partition of India, perhaps the most tragic episode in British colonial history – that the country is one of mixed motives, some of them idealistic, some of them crudely self-interested, some of them a legacy of the manner in which empire had initially been won, through a process of fishing in troubled waters. The legacy of partition certainly helped the West in the Cold War, and prevented the emergence of India as a major player on the world stage for half a century after independence. Perhaps with that lesson taken to heart, , this particular extension of the principle of divide and rule has manifested itself in various ways since, culminating most recently in the splitting up of Serbia.

Fortunately, the chaos into which partition, in conjunction with the Cold War, plunged South Asia for nearly half a century, has now ceased, and it is possible that, given recent events in Pakistan, better relationships throughout the region will ensure even more rapid development. Certainly it would seem that the United States has recognized the inevitable, and its support for India has now released us from the awful dichotomy of the eighties, when Sri Lanka made the wrong decision. At the same time, I believe India will not allow itself to become part of a different dichotomy, which is why we have had no problems in terms of the international community at large in maintaining positive relations with all our friends in Asia. The recent support we received at the Human Rights Council in Geneva, when a few western countries were harshly critical, from so many countries with which our future is bound, was most heartening, particularly given the very different perspectives those countries represent.

In return, Sri Lanka should strive, as it did in the sixties before we allowed ourselves to fall into Cold War involvements, to act as a force for consensus. We should take the lead in developing the agreements that will allow the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation to become as influential as, if not the European Union, at least the Association of South East Asian Nations. As a small, relatively powerless country, we could be the catalyst for the development of mutual confidence – but in order to do all that, we have to overcome our own problems.

With the support of India, and other influential players on the world stage, we may well be able to do that soon. The only roadblock we face is the excessive criticism of just a few countries in Europe, led it seems by Britain, which are trumpeted in some sections of the local press as a precursor to economic sanctions. This spate of criticism may have nothing to do with the imminence of peace based on the elimination of terrorism, and could be simply due to pressure from the diaspora. But it may also be due to a simple hankering to fish in troubled waters, which is much easier for the more sophisticated Western nations after the UN became synonymous with the West, at least as far as the majority of its cadres go, quite unlike in the days when the UN had many more senior Asians and Africans in its ranks, and some elements in the West thought it unrepresentative.

But whilst one has always admired the capacity of the British to have a go, as they put it, they are also finally quite rational, and therefore a polity that refuses to be pushed around, whilst also keeping its own house in order, will find they come round in the end. Thankfully the Sri Lankan government resisted the calls of oppositional politicians and even the Human Rights office of the European Union, to postpone elections, and made clear its commitment to democracy and pluralism through the local elections held earlier this month. With provincial councils now at last scheduled for the East, assuming the spoilers do not wreck them, the East will finally have an opportunity to exercise powers that were devolved twenty years ago, but then kept in abeyance.

In the end, the West will play by rules, though given half a chance they will bend them as much as possible. Provided the Sri Lankan situation continues to improve, the international dimension as it is termed will not be a problem. The LTTE may well believe that it will be rescued by verbal attacks on the Sri Lankan government, but provided the government continues to affirm its commitment to all its citizens, such rescue will not be possible. India has given a lead in welcoming the political processes that have now commenced. With other countries that have a better understanding of the situation supporting us, unwilling to allow separation and the creation of small client states, we can move confidently forward to dealing not only with terrorism, but also the social and economic problems which initially prompted it.

Prof Rajiva Wijesinha

Secretary General

Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process