Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God/Lecture 5

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search


FIFTH LECTURE


We may sum up what has gone before as follows. The heart ought not to have any dread of knowledge; the determinateness of feeling, the content of the heart, ought to have a substantial form. Feeling or the heart must be filled by the Thing or true object by what actually exists, and consequently be broad and true in character. But this Thing, this substantial element, is simply the truth of the Divine Spirit, the Universal in-and-for-itself, though just because of this it is not the abstract Universal, but the Universal in the development which belongs essentially to itself. The substantial element is thus essentially implicit thought, and exists in thought. But thought, what constitutes the really inner nature of faith itself, if it is to be known as essential and true—in so far as faith is no longer something implicit and merely natural, but is regarded as having entered into the sphere of knowledge with all its requirements and claims—must at the same time be known as something necessary, and must have gained a consciousness of itself and of the connected nature of its development. It thus extends and proves itself at the same time; for, speaking generally, to prove simply means to become conscious of the connection, and consequently of the necessity of things, and in relation to our present design it means the recognition of the particular content in the Universal in-and-for-itself, and of how this absolute truth itself is the result, and is consequently the final truth of all particular content. This connection, which is thus present to consciousness, must not be a subjective movement of thought outside of reality, but must follow this latter, and must simply unfold its meaning and necessity. Knowledge is just this unfolding of the objective movement of the content, of the inner necessity which essentially belongs to it, and it is true knowledge since it is in unity with the object. For us this object must be the elevation of our spirit to God, and is thus what we have referred to as the necessity of absolute truth in the form of that final result into which everything returns in the Spirit.

But because it contains the name of God, the mention of this end may easily have the effect of rendering worthless all that was urged against the false ideas of knowledge, cognition, and feeling, and all that was gained in the way of a conception of true knowledge.

It has already been remarked that the question as to whether our reason can know God, was made a formal one; that is to say, it was referred to the criticism of knowledge, of rational knowledge in general, and connected with the nature of faith and feeling in such a way that what is included under these special heads is to be understood apart altogether from any content. This is the position taken up by immediate knowledge, which itself speaks with the fruit of the tree of knowledge in its mouth, and transfers the problem to the formal sphere since it bases the justification of such knowledge, and of this exclusively, on the reflections which it makes regarding proof and philosophical knowledge, and as a consequence it has to put the true and infinite content outside of the range of its reflections, because it does not get beyond the idea of finite knowledge and cognition. With this presupposition of a knowledge and cognition which are merely finite, we contrasted the knowledge which does not remain outside of the Thing or true reality, but which, without introducing any of its own qualities, simply follows the course of true reality, and we have directed attention to the substantial element in feeling and the heart, and have shown that, speaking generally, it exists essentially for consciousness and for conscious thought, in so far as its truth has to be worked out in what constitutes its most inner nature. But owing to the mention of the name of God, this object defined as knowledge in general, as well as the study of it, have been forced into an inferior position, and connected with that subjective way of looking at things for which God is something above. Since, in what has gone before, this aspect of the matter has received sufficient elucidation, and can be here indicated merely, rather than examined in detail, the only other thing to do would be to explain the relation of God in and to knowledge as deduced from the nature of God. In connection with this it may be remarked, first of all, that our subject, namely, the elevation of the subjective spirit to God, directly implies that in this very act of elevation the one-sidedness of knowledge, that is, its subjectivity, is abolished, and that it is itself essentially this process of abolition and absorption. Consequently, the knowledge of the other side of the subject, namely, the nature of God, and, together with this, His relation in and to knowledge, comes in here of itself. But there is one drawback connected with what is of an introductory and incidental character, and is yet necessary here, and it is this, that any thorough treatment of the subject renders it superfluous. Still we may so far anticipate as to say that there can be no thought here of carrying our treatment of the subject to the point reached by the explanation so intimately connected with it, of the self-consciousness of God, and of the relation of His knowledge of Himself to the knowledge of Himself in and through the human spirit. Without referring you here to the more abstract and systematic discussions on this subject to be found in my other works, I may call attention to a very remarkable book which has recently appeared, entitled, “Aphorisms on Agnosticism and Absolute Knowledge in Relation to the Science of Christian Faith,” by C. Fr. G          l (Berlin: C. Franklin). It makes reference to my statement of philosophical principles, and contains quite as much thoroughly grounded Christian belief as it does speculative and philosophical depth. It throws light on all the points of view from which the Understanding directs its attack on the Christianity of knowledge, and answers the objections and counter-arguments which the theory of agnosticism (Nichtwissen) has brought against philosophy. It shows in particular the misunderstanding and the want of understanding of which the pious consciousness is guilty when it ranges itself on the side of the explaining Understanding in connection with the principle of agnosticism, and thus makes common cause with it in its opposition to speculative philosophy. What is there advanced regarding the self-consciousness of God, His knowledge of Himself in men, and Man’s knowledge of himself in God, has direct reference to the point of view just indicated, and it is marked by speculative thoroughness while casting light on the false opinions which have been attributed alike to philosophy and to Christianity in connection with these subjects.

But even in connection with the purely general ideas to which we here confine ourselves, in order that, taking God as the starting-point, we may discuss the relation in which He stands to the human spirit, we are met more than anywhere else by an assumption which is in contradiction with any such design—namely, that we do not know God; that even in the act of believing in Him we do not know what He is, and therefore cannot start from Him. To take God as the starting-point would be to presuppose that we were able to state, and had stated, what God is in Himself as being the primary object. That assumption, however, permits us to speak merely of our relation to Him, to speak of religion and not of God Himself. It does not permit of the establishment of a theology, of a doctrine of God, though it certainly does allow of a doctrine of religion.

If there is not exactly any such doctrine, we at least hear much talk—an infinite amount of it, or rather, little talk with infinite repetitions—about religion, and therefore all the less about God Himself. This everlasting explanation of religion, of its necessity, its usefulness, and so on, together with the insignificant attempts to explain God, or the prohibition even of any attempt at explaining His nature, is a peculiar phenomenon of the culture of our time. We get off most easily when we rest contented with this standpoint, so that we have nothing before us but the barren characterisation of a relation in which our consciousness stands to God. As thus understood, religion means at least that our spirit comes into contact with this content, and our consciousness with this object, and is not merely, so to speak, a drawing out of the lines of longing into empty space, an act of perception which perceives nothing and finds nothing actually confronting it. Such a relation implies, at all events, this much, that we not only stand in a certain connection with God, but that God stands also in a certain connection with us. This zeal for religion expresses, hypothetically at least, something regarding our relation to God, if it does not express exclusively what would be the really logical outcome of the principle of the impossibility of knowing God. A one-sided relation, however, is not a relation at all. If, in fact, we are to understand by religion nothing more than a relation between ourselves and God, then God is left without any independent existence. God would, on this theory, exist in religion only, He would be something posited, something produced by us. The expression that God exists in religion only, an expression which is both frequently employed and found fault with, has, however, the true and important meaning that it belongs to the nature of God in His condition of complete and perfect independence that He should exist for the spirit of Man, and should communicate Himself to Man. The meaning here expressed is totally different from that previously referred to, according to which God is merely a postulate, a belief. God is, and gives Himself to men by coming into a relation with them. If this word is is limited to the expression of the truth that we do indeed know or recognise the fact that God is, but do not know what He is, and is thus used with a constantly recurring reflection on knowledge, then this would imply that no substantial qualities can be attributed to Him. Thus we should not have to say we know that God is, but could merely speak of is; for the word God introduces an idea, and consequently a substantial element, a content with definite characteristics, and apart from these God is an empty word. If in the language of this agnosticism (Nichtwissen) those characteristics to which we must still find it possible to refer are limited to express something negative—and for this the expression the Infinite is peculiarly appropriate, whether by it is meant the Infinite in general or those so-called attributes extended into infinity—then all that this gives us is merely indeterminate Being, abstraction, a kind of supreme or infinite Essence which is expressly our product, the product of abstraction, of thought, and does not get beyond being mere Understanding.

If, however, God is not thought of as existing in subjective knowledge merely, or in faith, but if it is seriously meant that He exists, that He exists for us, and has on His part a relation to us, and if we do not get beyond this merely formal characteristic, it is all the same implied that He communicates Himself to men, and this is to admit that God is not jealous. The Greeks of purely ancient times attributed jealousy to God when they represented Him as putting down all that was generally regarded as great and lofty, and as wishing to have and actually placing everything on a level. Plato and Aristotle were opposed to the idea of divine jealousy, and the Christian religion is still more opposed to it since it teaches that God humbled Himself even to taking on the form of a servant amongst men, that He revealed Himself to them; that, consequently, far from grudging men what is high, nay even what is highest, He, on the contrary, along with that very revelation, laid on them the command that they should know God, and at the same time indicated that this was Man’s highest duty. Without appealing to this part of the teaching of Christianity, we may take our stand on the fact that God is not jealous, and ask, Why should He not communicate Himself to Man? It is recorded that in Athens there was a law according to which any man who had a lighted candle and refused to allow another to light his at it, was to be punished with death. This kind of communication is illustrated even in connection with physical light, since it spreads and imparts itself to some other thing without itself diminishing or losing anything; and still more is it the nature of Spirit itself to remain in entire possession of what belongs to it, while giving another a share in what it possesses. We believe in God’s infinite goodness in Nature, since He gives up those natural things which He has called into existence in infinite profusion, to one another, and to Man in particular. And is He to bestow on Man what is thus merely material and which is also His, and withhold from him what is spiritual, and refuse to Man what alone can give him true value? It is as absurd to give such ideas a place in our thoughts as it is absurd to say of the Christian religion that by it God has been revealed to Man, and to maintain at the same time that what has been revealed is that He is not now revealed and has not been revealed.

On God’s part there can be no obstacle to a knowledge of Him through men. The idea that they are not able to know God must be abandoned when it is admitted that God has a relation to us, and since our spirit has a relation to Him, God exists for us, or, as it has been expressed, He communicates Himself and has revealed Himself. God reveals Himself, it is said, in Nature; but God cannot reveal Himself to Nature, to the stone, to the plant, to the animal, because God is Spirit; He can reveal Himself to Man only, who thinks and is Spirit. If there is no hindrance on God’s side to the knowledge of Him, then it is owing to human caprice, to an affectation of humility, or whatever you like to call it, that the finitude of knowledge, the human reason is put in contrast to the divine knowledge and the divine reason, and that the limits of human reason are asserted to be immovable and absolutely fixed. For what is here suggested is just that God is not jealous, but, on the contrary, has revealed and is revealing Himself; and we have here the more definite thought that it is not the so-called human reason with its limits which knows God, but the Spirit of God in Man, it is, to use the speculative expression previously employed, the self-consciousness of God which knows itself in the knowledge of Man.

This may suffice by way of calling attention to the main ideas which are floating about in the atmosphere of the culture of our time as representing the results of the “Enlightenment,” and of an understanding which calls itself reason. These are the ideas which directly meet us, to begin with, when we undertake to deal with the general subject of the knowledge of God. It was possible only to point out the fundamental moments of the worthlessness of those categories which are opposed to this knowledge, and not to justify this knowledge itself. This, as being the real knowledge of its object, must receive its justification along with the content.

Note.—The rendering of Nichtwissen in this Lecture by “Agnosticism” involves something of an anachronism, and is not technically strictly accurate; but we have no other English word which seems so well to suggest the meaning.—E.B.S.