Miller v. California (413 U.S. 15)

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Miller v. California (413 U.S. 15)  (1973) 
Syllabus
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) was an important United States Supreme Court case involving what constitutes unprotected obscenity for First Amendment purposes. The decision reiterated that obscenity was not protected by the First Amendment and established the Miller test for determining what constituted obscene material.
Court Documents
Opinion of the Court
Dissenting Opinions
Douglas
Brennan

Supreme Court of the United States

413 U.S. 15

MILLER  v.  CALIFORNIA

Appeal from the Appellate Department, Superior Court of California, County of Orange

No. 85-140  Argued: January 18-19, 1972; Reargued November 7, 1972 --- Decided: June 21, 1973

Appellant was convicted of mailing unsolicited sexually explicit material in violation of a California statute that approximately incorporated the obscenity test formulated in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (plurality opinion). The trial court instructed the jury to evaluate the materials by the contemporary community standards of California. Appellant's conviction was affirmed on appeal. In lieu of the obscenity criteria enunciated by the Memoirs plurality, it is held:

1. Obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, reaffirmed. A work may be subject to state regulation where that work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex; portrays, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and, taken as a whole, does not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Pp. 23-24.

2. The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, Roth, supra, at 489, (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. If a state obscenity law is thus limited, First Amendment values are adequately protected by ultimate independent appellate review of constitutional claims when necessary. Pp. 24-25.

3. The test of "utterly without redeeming social value" articulated in Memoirs, supra, is rejected as a constitutional standard. Pp. 24-25.

4. The jury may measure the essentially factual issues of prurient appeal and patent offensiveness by the standard that prevails in the forum community, and need not employ a "national standard." Pp. 30-34.

Vacated and remanded.

[p. 16] Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Douglas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 37. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stewart and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 47.

Burton Marks reargued the cause and filed a brief for appellant.

Michael R. Capizzi reargued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Cecil Hicks.[‡]

Notes[edit]

^ . Samuel Rosenwein, A. L. Wirin, Fred Okrand, Laurence R. Sperber, Melvin L. Wulf, and Joel M. Gora filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.