Observations on Man (6th edition)/Part I/Introduction

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742232Observations on Man (6th edition) — Part I: IntroductionDavid Hartley


OBSERVATIONS ON MAN,

&c. &c.





PART I.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE FRAME OF THE HUMAN BODY AND MIND, AND ON THEIR MUTUAL CONNEXIONS AND INFLUENCES.


INTRODUCTION.


MAN consists of two parts, body and mind.

The first is subjected to our senses and inquiries, in the same manner as the other parts of the external material world.

The last is that substance, agent, principle, &c. to which we refer the sensations, ideas, pleasures, pains, and voluntary motions.

Sensations are those internal feelings of the mind, which arise from the impressions made by external objects upon the several parts of our bodies.

All our other internal feelings may be called ideas. Some of these appear to spring up in the mind of themselves, some are suggested by words, others arise in other ways. Many writers comprehend sensations under ideas; but I every where use these words in the senses here ascribed to them.

The ideas which resemble sensations, are called ideas of sensation: all the rest may therefore be called intellectual ideas.

It will appear in the course of these observations, that the ideas of sensation are the elements of which all the rest are compounded. Hence ideas of sensation may be termed simple, intellectual ones complex.

The pleasures and pains are comprehended under the sensations and ideas, as these are explained above. For all our pleasures and pains are internal feelings, and conversely, all our internal feelings seem to be attended with some degree either of pleasure or pain. However, I shall, for the most part, give the names of pleasure and pain only to such degrees as are considerable; referring all low evanescent ones to the head of mere sensations and ideas.

The pleasures and pains may be ranged under seven general classes; viz.

1. Sensation;

2. Imagination;

3. Ambition;

4. Self-interest;

5. Sympathy;

6. Theopathy; and,

7. The Moral Sense; according as they arise from,

1. The impressions made on the external senses;

2. Natural or artificial beauty or deformity;

3. The opinions of others concerning us;

4. Our possession or want of the means of happiness, and security from, or subjection to, the hazards of misery;

5. The pleasures and pains of our fellow-creatures;

6. The affections excited in us by the contemplation of the Deity; or

7. Moral beauty and deformity.

The human mind may also be considered as endued with the faculties of memory, imagination, or fancy, understanding, affection, and will.

Memory is that faculty by which traces of sensations and ideas recur, or are recalled, in the same order and proportion, accurately or nearly, as they were once actually presented.

When ideas, and trains of ideas, occur, or are called up in a vivid manner, and without regard to the order of former actual impressions and perceptions, this is said to be done by the power of imagination or fancy.

The understanding is that faculty by which we contemplate mere sensations and ideas, pursue truth, and assent to, or dissent from, propositions.

The affections have the pleasures and pains for their objects; as the understanding has the mere sensations and ideas. By the affections we are excited to pursue happiness, and all its means, and to fly from misery, and all its apparent causes.

The will is that state of mind which is immediately previous to, and causes, those express acts of memory, fancy, and bodily motion, which are termed voluntary.

The motions of the body are of two kinds, automatic and voluntary. The automatic motions are those which arise from the mechanism of the body in an evident manner. They are called automatic, from their resemblance to the motions of automata, or machines, whose principle of motion is within themselves. Of this kind are the motions of the heart, and peristaltic motion of the bowels. The voluntary motions are those which arise from ideas and affections, and which therefore are referred to the mind; the immediately preceding state of the mind, or of the ideas and affections, being termed will, as noted in the last article. Such are the actions of walking, handling, speaking, &c. when attended to, and performed with an express design.

This may serve as a short account of the chief subjects considered in the first part of these observations. These subjects are so much involved in each other, that it is difficult, or even impossible, to begin any where upon clear ground, or so as to proceed entirely from the data to the quæsita, from things known to such as are unknown. I will endeavour it as much as I can, and for that purpose shall observe the following order.

First, I shall lay down the general laws, according to which the sensations and motions are performed, and our ideas generated.

Secondly, I shall consider each of the sensations and motions in particular, and inquire how far the phænomena of each illustrate, and are illustrated by, the foregoing general laws.

Thirdly, I shall proceed in like manner to the particular phænomena of ideas, or of understanding, affection, memory, and imagination; applying to them what has been before delivered.

Lastly, I shall endeavour to give a particular history and analysis of the six classes of intellectual pleasures and pains; viz. those of imagination, ambition, self-interest, sympathy, theopathy, and the moral sense.