Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 1 (1853).djvu/245

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knows each proposition, yet has not considered before; for thinking that a mule is pregnant, he has not knowledge in energy, nor again, on account of opinion, has he deception, contrary to knowledge, since deception, contrary to universal (knowledge), is syllogism.

Notwithstanding, whoever thinks that the very being of good is the very being of evil, will apprehend that there is the same essence of good and of evil; for let the essence of good be A, and the essence of evil B; and again, let the essence of good be C. Since then he thinks that B and C are the same, he will also think that C is B; and again, in a similar manner, that B is A, wherefore that C is A. For just as if it were true that of what C is predicated B is, and of what B is, A is; it was also true that A is predicated of C; so too in the case of the verb "to opine." In like manner, as regards the verb "to be," for C and B being the same, and again, B and A, C also is the same as A. Likewise, as regards to opine, is then this necessary, if any one should grant the first? but perhaps that is false, that any one should think that the essence of good is the essence of evil, unless accidentally, for we may opine this in many ways, but we must consider it better.