Page:ACLU v. NSA Opinion (August 17, 2006), US District Court, East-Michigan.djvu/42

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(1995); and Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).

Indeed, in Zweibon, Judge Wright enumerates a number of Defendants' practical arguments here (including judicial competence, danger of security leaks, less likelihood of criminal prosecution, delay, and the burden placed upon both the courts and the Executive branch by compliance) and finds, after long and careful analysis, that none constitutes adequate justification for exemption from the requirements of either FISA or the Fourth Amendment. Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 641. It is noteworthy, in this regard, that Defendants here have sought no Congressional amendments which would remedy practical difficulty.

As long ago as the Youngstown case, the Truman administration argued that the cumbersome procedures required to obtain warrants made the process unworkable.[1] The Youngstown court made short shift of that argument and, it appears, the present Defendants' need for speed and agility is equally weightless. The Supreme Court in the Keith[2], as well as the Hamdi[3] cases, has attempted to offer helpful solutions to the delay problem, all to no avail.

XI. Conclusion

For all of the reasons outlined above, this court is constrained to grant to Plaintiffs the Partial Summary Judgment requested, and holds that the TSP violates the APA; the Separation of Powers doctrine; the First and Fourth Amendments of the United States Constitution; and the statutory law.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the final claim of data-mining is granted, because litigation of that claim would require violation of Defendants' state secrets privilege. [*43]

  1. See generally Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
  2. See generally U.S. v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972)
  3. See generally Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)