SOCIAL CONTROL. III.
BELIEF.
THE working of the legal and social sanctions described in the last paper is not without grave shortcomings.
1. They do not control that which is done in secret. The law, with all its argus-eyed sleuths, and the press, with all its ferreting reporters, cannot destroy the opportunities of men sur- reptitiously to get on at the expense of their fellows. Every- body cannot be watched all the time. As the institutions of family and property are always exposed to the secret assaults of trespassers, the need is felt for something that will intimidate a man when he is alone.
2. Law and public opinion are frequently paralyzed by the power of the man they seek to restrain. The current saying, "There is one law for the rich and another for the poor," wit- nesses that even now the courts do not dispense unvarying justice. The success with which bold or influential men can browbeat their accusers, hoodwink the public, and pluck profit from open offense is proverbial. In view of the failures 1 of the regular restraining organs, men long for a higher tribunal, where wrongs may be righted and the transgressor get his dues.
3. Human sanctions reach only the outward deed. But it is idle to repress actions when the evil disposition is untouched. Sooner or later opportunity comes and the evil will flashes into
1 The weakness of the English common law courts in restraining the powerful led to petitions to the Chancellor, the keeper of the King's conscience. Thus originated the Court of Chancery. " Most of these ancient petitions appear to have been pre- sented in consequence of assaults and trespasses . . . for which the party complain- ing was unable to obtain redress, in consequence of the maintenance or protection afforded to his adversary by some powerful baron, or by the sheriff or other officer of the county in which they occurred." Preface to calendars of the Proceedings in Chancery, 1827. The petitioner usually beseeches the Chancellor to interfere "for luff of God and in way of charitee."
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