Page:An essay upon the constitutional rights as to slave property.djvu/11

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Slavery and the Constitution.
7


The sentiment of North Carolina, like that of Virginia, was strongly opposed to any continuance of the importation of slaves; but in both states, it was equally necessary to satisfy the minds of the people, that the property then existing in slaves was secured and protected.

When, in the convention of North Carolina, the last clause of the second section of the fourth article was read, Mr. Iredell explained the reason of the clause. "In some of the northern states," he observed, "they have emancipated all their slaves. If any of our slaves go there, and remain there a certain time, they would, by the present laws, be entitled to their freedom, so that their masters could not get them again. This would be extremely prejudical to the inhabitants of the southern states, and to prevent it, this clause is inserted in the constitution. Though the word slave be not mentioned, this is the meaning of it. The northern delegates, owing to their peculiar scruples on the subject of slavery, did not choose the word slave to be mentioned."[1]

On the other hand, the countenance given by the constitution to slavery, was urged to the north as a reason against ratifying it. Upon this subject, the following sensible remarks were made in the convention of Massachusetts, by General Heath: "I apprehend," said he, "that it is not in our power to do any thing for or against those who are in slavery in the southern states. No gentleman within these walls detests every idea of slavery more than I do. It is generally detested by the people of this commonwealth; and I ardently hope that the time will soon come, when our brethren in the southern states will view it as we do, and put a stop to it; but to this we have no right to compel them. Two questions naturally arise. If we ratify the constitution, shall we do any thing by our act to hold the blacks in slavery; or shall we become the partakers of other men's sins? I think, neither of them. Each state is sovereign and independent, to a certain degree; and they have a right, and will regulate their own internal affairs as to themselves appears proper; and shall we refuse to eat or drink, or to be united with those who do not think or act just as we do? Surely not. We are not, in this case, partakers of other men's sins; for in nothing do we voluntarily encourage the slavery of our fellow men."[2]

Sentiments of this character finally prevailed; and such sentiments should now govern the conduct of the north.


4. Laws of the United Slates.—The act of Congress, approved February 12, 1793, provides, that whenever the executive authority of any state in the Union shall demand any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any state to which such person shall have fled, and shall moreover produce the copy of an indictment found, or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any state, charging the person so demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor, or chief magistrate of the state from whence the person so charged fled, it shall be the duty of the executive authority of the state, to which such person shall have fled, to cause him or her to be arrested and secured, and notice of the arrest to be given to the executive authority making such demand, or to the agent of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and to cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear.

Another section of the same act provides, that when a person held to labor in any of the United States, under the laws thereof, shall escape into any other of the states, the person to whom such labor or service may be due, his agent or attorney, is empowered to seize or arrest such fugitive from labor, and to take him or her before any judge of the circuit or district courts of the United States, residing or being within the state, or before any magistrate of a county, city, or town corporate, wherein such seizure or arrest shall be made; and upon proof to the satisfaction of such judge or magistrate, either by oral testimony or affidavit, taken before and certified by a magistrate of any other state, that the person so seized or arrested doth, under the laws of the state from which he or she fled, owe service or labor to the person claiming him or her, it shall be the duty of such judge or magistrate to give a certificate thereof to such claimant, his agent or attorney, which shall be sufficient warrant for removing the said fugitive from labor, to the state or territory from which he or she fled.

The last section of the act declares, that any person who shall, knowingly and willingly, obstruct or hinder such claimant, his agent or attorney, in so seizing or arresting such fugitive from labor; or shall rescue such fugitive from such claimant, his agent or attorney, when so arrested, pursuant to the authority herein given or declared; or shall harbor or conceal such person, after notice that he or she was a fugitive from labor as aforesaid, shall, for either of the said offences, forfeit and pay the sum of five hundred dollars; which penalty may be recovered by, and for the benefit of such claimant, by action of debt in any court proper to try the same: saving moreover to the person claiming such labor or service, his right of action for, or on account of the said injuries, or either of them.


5. Judicial Decisions as to Fugitives from Labor.—The second section of the fourth article of the constitution, is confined to persons held to service or labor in one state, under the laws thereof, who escape into another. Where the master voluntarily carries his slave from one state into another, the master must abide by the laws of the latter

  1. Elliot's Debates: vol. 2, p. 157.
  2. Id.: vol. 1, p. 124