the meaning of the self. The self, we insist, is social; it is the whole man, considered not as an isolated unit, but as part of a family, an organ in a body-politic, and a member of a religious community. While retaining his own individuality he merges his interests, desires, aspirations, and duties in those of the family and community of which he is a part. He identifies himself with the ends which he seeks as a loyal servant of his vocation. Thus his real self becomes his family, or his profession, or his state, or his church. When we understand self in this sense, the conflict between the adherents of self-denial and the partisans of self-assertion very largely disappears. Or at least, while the practical conflict will remain till the end of time, it is possible to reach a theoretical conclusion, which, while compromising nothing, yet recognises that, as we might expect from the persistence with which they have been defended, there is some truth in each of the opposing views. They contain truths which contribute to the truth. The truth in this matter will only be recognised if we keep clearly before our minds the meaning which we have assigned to the self.
What, then, is our conclusion? It is this. Self-denial cannot be the ultimate moral ideal. For self-denial as the absolute moral end would involve the abnegation of the whole self; and that is impossible. It would imply not merely the sacrifice of a man's private self, but also the renunciation of the family and the state and the church. And no apostle of self-denial has ever advocated that. However extreme an ascetic may be, he never denies the
