condition. Action must be implied, it is true, in completion or development, and, therefore, the ἐνέργεια may be contained in the ἐντελέχεια, although this may not hold good reciprocally. But the first paragraph may be cited as an example of what apparently needs elucidation—"knowledge, is, it is said, when active, (latinè, in actu,) (ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη), identical with," &c.— "la science en acte est identique," &c.— " scientia autem, ea quæ est actu, est idem quod res" and knowledge or science here, by metonymy, may, probably, mean the faculty by which knowledge is acquired or exercised; but what means this peculiar state which identifies the knowledge with the reason? All function presupposes activity and inertia; but the last as much implies identification as the first, so that the distinction between activity and completeness, although present, probably, to Aristotle, is not obvious to a modern student. The definition of the term, although dwelt upon at length, fails, it may be from the difficulty inseparable from abstract speculations, to shew either what is strictly implied by it, or how it differs from the ἐντελέχεια; it is evident that motion, in some modified sense, in the process of completion, is to be understood; but beyond this,
- Metaphysica, VIII. 6. I.