as also that the faculty of conclusions (judgment) is some form of sensibility; and thus, it reduced, so to say, the faculties of thought to sensual impressions and conditions.
Note 2, p. 142. On which account, either all appearances, &c.] This is a dilemma, as an objection to their doctrine, in that, "either all appearances are, as they maintain, necessarily true, or else (in opposition to their dogma, that like is recognised by like,) there is recognition by unlike;" and thus the error from contraries is made identical with the knowledge of contraries. The objection is then placed upon the obvious ground that, while sensation is allotted to all creatures, reflection, which implies reason, belongs but to few; and next, as a general argument, it shews that mental faculties, being derived from other sources than feeling, cannot be identical with sentient perceptions.
Note 3, p. 143. But it is manifest that imagination, &c.] The argument next proceeds to the subject of imagination, and as has been well observed, it is thus appropriately placed between sentient perceptions and thoughts, "as imagination cannot be without senses, or the mind without imagination." For "imagination is not identical with sensation," Aristotle[1] observes, and yet "it is called up either through thought or through sensation." Imagination then, is neither sensation nor conception, as the former depends upon external
- ↑ Metaphysica, III. 5. 23. De Motu Animalm, 8. 5.
