This is still the United States view as is set out in a luminous article in the November (1905) number of the North American Review, on the "Alternative of Reciprocity Treaties, or a Double Tariff," by Mr. John Osborne, chief of the Bureau of Trade Relations, State Department, and late Secretary of the Reciprocity Commission, a gentleman eminently competent to describe the contemporary American standpoint. Mr. Osborne maintains that "it is evident that the gratuitous extension to third Powers of commercial advantages exchanged in reciprocity between two countries, is absolutely inconsistent with the true principles of reciprocity, as understood in the United States; it would not only seriously impair and even tend to destroy the value of the original grant, but it would also involve duty reductions upon the entirety, or, at least the bulk, of importation: from the world, of the articles of merchandise affected, thus constituting a serious sacrifice in national revenues."
"If this policy," he goes on, "were adopted by our Government, it would, to be sure, simplify the reciprocity question, but the internal economic effects would be practically the same as if Congress were to revise and reduce the tariff, the only difference being that our foreign trade interests would be benefited by the employment of diplomacy, whereas simple tariff revision would ensure no immediate betterment in that respect. It will be perceived, therefore, that the American interpretation of the most-favoured-nation clause is essential to American prosperity.'
The result of the American interpretation of the clause is that each tariff has to be dealt with and applied separately. An article is taxed in as many different ways as there are contracting countries; an independent tariff is applicable to every taxed article according to its place of origin. Mr. Osborne, however, observes in his article,
