Page:Brundtland Report.djvu/293

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.

A/42/427
English
Page 293


transport of those weapons. and the mining of minerals for their production all place enormous demands on energy and mineral resources and are a major contributor to pollution and environmental deterioration.

28. The distorting effects of the 'arms culture' are most striking in the deployment of scientific personnel. Half a million scientists are employed on weapons research world-wide, and they account for around half of all research and development expenditure.[1] This exceeds the total combined spending on developing techssleeves for new energy sources, improving human health. raising agricultural productivity, and controlling pollution. Military research and development – $70.80 billion world-wide in 198 is growing at twice the rate of military spending as a whole.[2] At the same time, there is a paucity of resources available for monitoring global climatic change, for surveying the ecosystems of disappearing rain forests and spreading deserts, and for developing agricultural technologies appropriate to rainfed, tropical agriculture.

29. Nations are seeking a new era of economic growth. The level of spending on arms diminishes the prospects for such an era especially one that emphasizes the more efficient use of raw materials, energy, and skilled human resources. It also ha a bearing, albeit indirect, on the willingness of rich countries to provide development assistance to developing countries. Clearly, there is no simple correspondence between reduced defence spending and increased aid. There are other reasons aside from domestic resource constraints for a reluctance to expand aid, and nations cannot wait for disarmament before devoting more resources to ensuring sustainable development. Nonetheless, increased defence spending puts pressure on other budgetary items, and aid is an easy target, despite being a relatively small outlay for most donor countries.[3]

30. Although redeployment is clearly possible, resources currently employed in military applications cannot be redeployed quickly or easily elsewhere in other sectors or other countries. There are technics! problems in achieving such a transformation, not least the contribution made by military spending to jobs in economies with high unemployment. And beyond the technical problems are questions of political will. Nonetheless, some countries China, Argentina, and Peru, for example have recently shown that it is both technically and politically possible to make substantial shifts from military to civilian spending within a short time.[4]

4. World Armaments and the Growth of the 'Arms Culture'

31. Traditionally, nations have adhered to an 'arms culture' They find themselves locked into arms competitions fuelled among other things by powerful vested interests in the 'military-industrial complex' as well as in the armed forces themselves. Industrial nations account for most of the military expenditures and the production and transfer of arms in international society. However, the influence of this 'arms culture' is not confined to these nations. It is present also in the developing world, fostered both by the desire of many

/…
  1. Sivad, 1986 edition. op. cit.; SIPRI Yearbook. op. cit.
  2. M. Ackland-Hood, 'Military Research and Development Expenditure', SIPRI Yearbook, op. cit.
  3. According to calculations based on OECD Development Assistance Committee data, which are not universally accepted, together with Sivard, total non-military development aid measured in net concessional flows from industrial to developing countries represents roughly 5 per cent of the amount spent by all industrial countries on armaments. For the United States, foreign aid accounts for per cent of armaments spending, and for the USSR, 1.5 per cent. In Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, by contrast, the proportion is close to 30 per cent, and it is over 10 per cent for Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, FRG, and Switzerland.
  4. According to L.R. Browr et el., in State of the World 1986 (London: W.W. Norton, 1986), China in 1972 spent l per cent of its gross national product (GNP) on military purposes, one of the highest levels in the world. Since 1970 (except for 1979), the government has systematically reduced this until by 1985 it amounted to only 7.5 per cent in mid 1985 the government announced it would cut the armed forces to 3.2 million, a drop of 2 per cent. In Argentina, by 1984 new President Raul Alfonsin had cut arms outlays to half their peak level of 1980 (nearly 4 per cent of GNP) by reordering priorities and shifting resources to social programmes. Peruvian President Alan Garcia Perez, on taking office in mid-1985, announced he would reduce military outlays, which then totalled 5 per cent of GNP, or one-quarter of the federal budget. First he cancelled half the order for 26 French Mirage fighter planes.