not then express them. Often frank, and apparently imprudent in the expression of his purposes, no one knew better than Napoleon how to conceal them either by reticence or by dissimulation. The only hint that can be found of ulterior purposes is his caution to Joseph that better terms could be obtained from the United States at a later date, but he assented to the conclusion of a temporary treaty, September 30, 1800. He pressed negotiations with Spain so actively that Berthier signed the treaty for the retrocession of Louisiana the following day, October 1, 1800. In compensation to Spain for this cession France engaged to create the kingdom of Etruria, composed of Tuscany and adjacent territory, and to seat on its throne the son of the duke of Parma, who was son-in-law of the king of Spain.
Napoleon was now master of the situation. Whatever plans he may have formed, it was in his power to execute. How far he agreed with Talleyrand in the policy of making Louisiana valuable to France by the slow process of colonial development is very doubtful. His temperament was too eager to await the tardy returns of invested capital. He needed all his resources for present gambling and quick profits. Europe was his battle ground, and the conquest of England his immediate object. All else was subsidiary. If England could be subdued he was then, indeed, master of the world. He was not indifferent to the glory of restoring to France the American possessions, the loss of which had been for many years a source of national humiliation. Neither was he insensible of the wisdom of Talleyrand s colonial policy, yet such a policy made peace with England a necessity. He knew that France had been compelled to give up her American possessions for lack of a navy, and his penetrating genius could not fail to see that France could not hold colonies across the ocean three thousand miles away, in the face of the navies of Great Britain. He had not forgotten the Egyptian campaign, which he
