they were not without apprehensions. They had, in deed, done a work which deserved the gratitude and applause of their countrymen, but they had exceeded their authority. How would their action be received at home? The joint letter of Monroe and Livingston, announcing the treaty, reads more like a letter of apology and explanation than a letter of triumph.
Let us see how it was received at home. At this day we can hardly believe that this acquisition met with active and violent opposition; yet such was the case. Jefferson and the Republican leaders received the news with delight. The policy of negotiation had triumphed beyond their most sanguine expectations. War was averted and the West was bound to them by new ties of gratitude. Their party had laid the foundations of future greatness for the United States and of political power for themselves. Yet there was one source of disquietude. In the contests in Washington s cabinet, be tween Jefferson and Hamilton, both of these great men had gone to extremes which both were afterward compelled to abandon. Jefferson had maintained that the general government had no powers beyond those enumerated in the Constitution. The power to acquire foreign territory was not so enumerated. He foresaw the opposition of the Federalists. He felt secure of the ratification of the treaty, but he was sensitive to the charge of inconsistency in reference to the construction of the Constitution, which he knew would be brought against him. He wished to preserve the strict construction, which he believed to be the safeguard of the rights of the States. Yet Louisiana was "an opportunity snatched from fate." It secured the expansion of the United States and the triumph of the Republican party. The opportunity must not be lost. The treaty must be ratified. Cob-Webs must be brushed away.
He wrote to the members of his cabinet and to the Republican leaders, suggesting arguments and proposing
