against armies already in the field, ready to march upon campaigns for conquest.
The Confederate Congress was not in session during these exciting events and President Davis with his entire cabinet and executive officials was still at Montgomery. The States were barely adjusted to their new relations and it was not possible for the Confederate States to do more than to rapidly gather together their men to defend their soil. No hostile movement against Washington was feasible, but the cry of danger to the capital was shrewdly used at once to rally the North. While Virginia, North Carolina and Maryland were yet in the Union on the date of the proclamation of Lincoln, they would unquestionably have refused permission for the transportation of any troops of the existing Confederacy across their territory to attack Washington. Probably the secession of Maryland would have imperiled the capital but it was in no wise endangered even after the secession of Virginia by the prompt movement of that State to gain possession of Harper s Ferry. Yet the politic appeal for troops to rally for defense of the nation s capitol was made with good effect, and the excitement was increased in consequence of the position taken by Maryland that the United States ought not to use that State in conveying armed men to invade Virginia. Governor Hicks had consented to ask the administration to respect the wishes of Maryland to have no Federal troops sent over its territory to invade Virginia, and on April i6th Mr. George P. Kane telegraphed to know whether an attempt would be made to pass volunteers from Xcw York intended to make war upon the South. On the iQth General Thomas, adjutant-general, wired that " Governor Hicks has neither right nor authority to stop troops coming to Washington. Send them on prepared to fight their way through if necessary," which message was sent "by order of the Secretary of war. The military department of Washington was at once extended over Maryland, Delaware and
