Page:Confederate Military History - 1899 - Volume 1.djvu/61

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CONFEDERATE MILITARY HISTORY.
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basis in our constitutional federal republic. To put it in the least objectionable form, the States, in their undelegated powers, are as important, as supreme, as the general government, and the theory of State subjugation, of provincial dependencies, is a pure afterthought to justify arbitrary and ungranted authority. It is indisputable that by far the greater part of the topics of legislation, the whole vast range of rights of person and property where the administration of law and justice comes closest home to the daily life of the people are exclusively or chiefly within the power of the States. The number of topics of legislation which lie outside the pale of national legislation greatly exceeds the number to which the power of State legislation does not extend. (Federalist, No. 14; Mich. Lect., 244; i Calhoun, 197, 204, 214-15.) If the Union be indissoluble, with equal or greater propriety we may affirm that the States are equal and indestructible.

When the adoption of the Constitution was under discussion before the State conventions, with an uncertain result, its enemies were alarmed on account of the magnitude of powers conferred on the general government and its friends were fearful because of alleged feebleness in comparison with extent of reserved powers; but neither party contended that an increase or diminution of power could constitutionally be made by implication and inference so as to equip the central government with all the means it derived in the warfare with antagonists. The authors of The Federalist the essays written to secure the acceptance of the Constitution insisted that the apprehended inequality did not exist, and that should it be developed, the States would be able to control. Hamilton wrote: "The general government can have no temptation to absorb the local authorities left with the States. * * * It is, therefore, improbable that there should exist a disposition in the Federal councils to usurp the powers with which commerce,