But how different was Longstreet's treatment of his subordinate under these circumstances from Lee's! As soon as he suspects disaffection, he writes sharply through his aide, " I am directed to say that throughout the cam- paign on which we are engaged you have exhibited a want of confidence in the efforts and plans which the commanding general has thought proper to adopt, and he is apprehensive that this feeling will extend more or less to the troops under your command." ^5 When the assault is imminent, he insists that previous conviction of failure is the surest road to it. ** Please urge upon your officers the importance of making the assault with a determination to succeed. If the assault is made with that spirit, I shall feel no doubt of its success." ^6 js^^^ again : " If we go in with the idea that we shall fail, we will be sure to do so. But no men who are determined to succeed can fail. Let me urge you not to entertain such feelings for a moment. Do not let any one fail, or any thing." ^^ Imagine how Lee would have liked to say that to Longstreet on the morning of July 3, and if he had, what Longstreet would have answered.
When all is over, the general does, indeed, admit to the War Department that it may have been his fault : " It is fair to infer that the fault is entirely with me, and I desire, therefore, that some other commander may be tried." ^s This does not mean, however, that he forgets or forgives, so far as his subordinates are concerned. He prefers charges against McLaws, Law, and Robertson.
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