work or utilized in some way the result of the author's labors. The borderland between infringement and "fair use" is peculiarly and necessarily one of uncertainty, not so much because of ambiguity in the statute as of difficulty in determining the extent of use within which it is said non curat lex. No statute can be so clear or so complete as to obviate questions of this kind. In general there must be copying of a material or substantial part. What is a material or substantial part, constituting infringement, is a difficult question of fact.
Principle of infringement"Copying is not confined to literal repetition," said Judge Clifford, in Lawrence v. Dana, in the U. S. Circuit Court in 1869, "but includes also the various modes in which the matter of any publication may be adopted, imitated, or transferred, with more or less colorable alterations to disguise the source from which the material was derived; nor is it necessary that the whole, or even the larger portion of the work, should be taken in order to constitute an invasion of copyright." The Chancery Division, through Lord Chief Justice Alverstone, took the extreme course in Trengrouse v. "Sol" Syndicate, in 1901, of holding a work an infringement, though less than a page was taken from the plaintiff's football guide.
Infringement by indirect copyingInfringement may be by indirect as well as by direct copying. In the case of Cate v. Devon in 1889, in the Chancery Court, the defense that the copying was not from the original copyright work but from a newspaper reprint, was rejected. Infringement may be through quite a different medium from the original; thus a shorthand reproduction of a lecture on "The dog as the friend of man," published in a text-book of shorthand, was held in the Chancery case of Nichols v. Pitman, in 1884, to be an infringement of the lecture as much as if in ordinary type.
