Page:Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology (1870) - Volume 1.djvu/749

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source of justice; (2) That men, being bound together by a community of faculties, feelings, and desires, are led to cultivate social union--and hence justice, without which social union could not exist. Thus human nature is a second source of justice. But since human nature is intimately connected with God by reason and virtue, it follows that God and the moral nature of man are the joint sources of justice, law being the practical exposition of its principles. Much more stress is, however, laid upon the second of these two sources than upon the first, which is quickly dismissed and kept out of sight.

In the second book the author explains his views of a Model Code, illustrated by constant references to the ancient institutions of Rome. Attention is first called to the laws which relate to religion and sacred observances, which are considered under the different heads of divine worship in general, including the solemnities to be observed in the performance of ordinances, and the classification of the Gods according to the degrees of homage to which they are severally entitled; the celebration of festivals ; the duties of the various orders of priests ; the exhibition of public games; the maintenance of ancient rites; the punishment of perjury and impurity; the consecration of holy places and things; and the respect to be paid to the spirits of the departed.

The third book treated of Magistrates, commencing with a short exposition of the nature and importance of their functions as interpreters and enforcers of the laws. This is followed by a dissertation on the expediency of having one magistrate in a state to whom all the rest shall be subordinate, which leads to certain reflections on the authority of the consuls, as controlled by the tribunes. Here, however, there is a great blank, the part which is lost having contained, it would appear, an inquiry into the functions of all the chief officers of the Roman republic. What remains consists of three discussions, one on the power exercised by tribunes of the plebeians, a second on the propriety of supplying the vacancies in the senate from the number of those who had held certain appointments, and, thirdly, on the advantages and drawbacks of voting by ballot.

The scene of these dialogues is laid in the villa of Cicero, in the neighbourhood of his native Arpinum, near the point where the Fibrenus joins the Liris. The Editio Princeps forms part of the edition of the philosophical works printed at Rome in 2 vols. fol. by Sweynheym and Pannartz, 1471; see above, p. 719, b. The editions of Davis, Camb. 1727-8, containing the notes of the old commentators, and an improved text, were long held in high estimation, and frequently reprinted, but is now superseded by those of Goerenz, Leip. 1809, 8vo., forming the first volume of the collected philosophical works ; of Moser and Creuzer, Frankf. 1824, 8vo., containing everything that the scholar can desire; and of Bake, Leyden, 1842, 8vo., which is the most recent.

3. De Jure Civili in Artem redigendo.

A. Gellius quotes a sentence from a work of Cicero which he says bore the above title. The subject of civil law was also discussed in one of the last books De Legibus, but the words of Gellius can apply only to an independent treatise. See Orelli's Cicero vol. iv. pt. ii. p. 478. (Gell. i. 22; Quintil. xii. 3. § 10; Macrob. vi. 4; Cic. de Leg. iii. 20.)

4. Epistolae ad Caesarem de Republica ordinanda.

Cicero, in a letter to Atticus, (xii. 40,) written in June, в. с. 45, tells his friend, that he had made several attempts to compose an address to Caesar, in imitation of those of Aristotle and Theopompus to Alexander, but had hitherto failed (Συμϐουλευτικόν saepe conor : nihil reperio). A few days later, however, it appears to have been finished (ad Att. xiii. 26), and was soon after sent to Atticus (ad Att. xii. 49), but never forwarded to the dictator; for, having been previously submitted to his friends for their approbation, they made so many objections, and suggested so many alterations, that Cicero threw it aside in disgust. (Ad Att. xii. 51, 52, xiii. 1, 27, 28, 31.)

C. Philosophy of Morals.

1. De Officiis Libri III.

A treatise on moral obligations, viewed not so much with reference to a metaphysical investigation of the basis on which they rest, as to the practical business of the world and the intercourse of social and political life. It was composed and published late in the year в. с. 44, certainly after the end of August (iii. sub fin.), and is addressed to young Marcus, at that time residing at Athens under the care of Cratippus the Peripatetic. This being a work professedly intended for the purposes of instruction, Cicero does not dwell upon the conflicting doctrines of rival sects, but endeavours rather to inculcate directly those views which he regarded as the most correct; and, rejecting the form of dialogue, enunciates the different precepts with the authority of a teacher addressing his pupil. The discipline of the Stoics is principally followed. In the first two books, the peri kathêkontos of Panaetius served as a guide, and not a little was borrowed from Diogenes of Babylon, Antipater of Tarsus, Hecato, Posidonius, Antipater of Tyre, and others enumerated in the commentary of Beier and the tract of Lynden on Panaetius. Notwithstanding the express declaration of Cicero to the contrary, we cannot, from internal evidence, avoid the conclusion, that the Greek authorities have in not a few passages been translated verbatim, and translated not very happily, for the unyielding character of the Latin language rendered it impossible to express accurately those nice gradations of thought and delicate distinctions which can be conveyed with so much clearness and precision by the copious vocabulary and graceful flexibility of the sister tongue. (See the essay of Garve named at the end of the article.) The third book, which is occupied with questions in casuistry, although it lays claim to greater originality than those which precede it, was certainly formed upon the model of the περὶ καθηκοντός of the Stoic Hecato. But while the skeleton of the whole work is unquestionably of foreign origin, the examples and illustrations are taken almost exclusively from Roman history and Roman literature, and are for the most part selected with great judgment and clothed in the most felicitous diction.

In the first book, after a few preliminary remarks, we find a threefold division of the subject. When called upon to perform any action we must inquire, 1. Whether it is honestum, that is, good in itself, absolutely and abstractedly good; 2. Whether it is utile, that is, good when considered with reference to external objects; 3. What course