which he held for the two following years. On the dispute with Spain in 1770 he was appointed to the Cambridge of 80 guns. In 1773 he had command of the Raisonnable in the Channel, and in 1776 of the Nonsuch. In 1778 he was moved into the Conqueror, one of the squadron which went out with Vice-admiral Byron to North America, and afterwards to the West Indies, from which station Graves was recalled early in the following year, on his promotion to flag rank. On his return to England, he hoisted his flag on board the London in the Channel fleet, under the command of Sir Charles Hardy; and in 1780 sailed for North America in command of a reinforcement of six ships of the line, with which he joined Arbuthnot in July, and on 16 March 1781 took part in the action off the mouth of the Chesapeake [see Arbuthnot, Marriot]. On Arbuthnot's resigning the command in the following July, Graves remained as commander-in-chief. This squadron was not more than equal to that of the French at Rhode Island, and he had been given vaguely to understand that De Grasse might at any moment appear with a part or even the whole of the West Indian fleet. In this state of uncertainty, hearing of some reinforcements from Europe expected by the French squadron at Rhode Island, he went for a cruise off Boston, and on his return to New York on 18 Aug. found that a letter from Rodney, announcing that part of the enemy's fleet was reported to be destined for North America, had been intercepted by the French cruisers. Great stress has been laid on the miscarriage of this despatch; but, in fact, it conveyed no new intelligence, and was too vague to be of any service. Several of his ships were in immediate need of refitting, and in the meantime, on 28 Aug., Sir Samuel Hood [q. v.] with fourteen ships of the line, arrived on the coast, from the West Indies. Almost at the same time Graves had news that the French squadron had left Rhode Island. He conjectured that it had gone south, and resolved to follow. Some of his ships were not ready, but with five he crossed the bar on the 31st, and the fleet, thus consisting of nineteen sail of the line, put to sea. On the 30th De Grasse, with twenty-eight ships of the line, had anchored inside the Chesapeake, and there he was still lying when, on 5 Sept., the English fleet was sighted in the offing. Leaving four ships inside to co-operate with the troops which had been landed, and to guard the entrance of James River, the French fleet of twenty-four ships of the line put to sea, drawing out as they did so into line of battle towards the east. It was then only that Graves was aware that the enemy before him was something more than the Rhode Island squadron. The odds against him were very great, and he had neither the genius to redress the balance, nor the confidence to depart from the formal order of the fighting instructions with the risk of being shot if he failed. He formed his line also towards the east, nearly parallel to that of the enemy, and ran down to engage in the prescribed manner. The line became oblique, the rear did not get into action at all, and the van, after being engaged in succession by the whole French line, was disabled, while the French, reforming to leeward, waited a renewal of the attack. This the English fleet was in no condition to make: the French would not assume the offensive; on 10 Sept. they returned to their anchorage within the Chesapeake, and Graves went back to New York.
Cornwallis was now blocked up in his position at York and Gloucester [see Cornwallis, Charles, first marquis], and the situation was one of extreme peril. It was obviously necessary that he should be relieved, but the fleet under Graves was not equal to the task. On 24 Sept. a reinforcement of three ships arrived under Rear-admiral Robert Digby [q. v.], and with them an order to Graves to go with the London to Jamaica. It was agreed, however, that in the existing emergency the London could not be spared, and Digby, being junior to Graves, begged him to retain the command till the present operations were brought to an end. On 11 Oct. two more ships arrived from Jamaica; and by the 17th, the fleet, now consisting of twenty-five ships of the line and two of 50 guns, was ready; on the 18th it embarked the general with upwards of seven thousand men, and on the 19th crossed the bar and made sail for the Chesapeake. On this very day Cornwallis surrendered. The relieving force arrived on the 24th, too late to be of any assistance, too weak to attempt any return blow. The French fleet, swelled by the junction of the Rhode Island squadron to thirty-five sail of the line, lay securely at anchor within the Capes, and refused to meet the English outside. To cruise in sight of an unwilling and unapproachable enemy at this advanced season could do no good; Graves therefore returned to New York, where he handed over the command to Digby, and on 10 Nov. sailed in the London for Jamaica.
In the course of the long and angry controversy which afterwards raged on the subject of Cornwallis's surrender, some attempt was made to throw blame on Graves for not having his fleet already within the Chesa-
