Page:Dictionary of National Biography volume 40.djvu/55

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men were collected within six miles of Haidarabad, that ten thousand of the Khandesh tribe were coming down the left bank of the Indus, that seven thousand men under Rustam were in rear of his left flank at Khunhera, that ten thousand under Shir Muhammad were marching from Mirpur, while in the mountains on the right bank of the Indus thousands were ready at a signal to pour down upon the plains. He therefore ridiculed Outram's proposal. On 12 Feb. 1843 Outram met the amirs, who, with the exception of Nasir Khan, signed the draft treaties; but the excitement in the city was so great that Outram and his staff were threatened and insulted on their way back to their quarters. Next day the amirs represented that they could not restrain their followers, and on the 15th the residency was attacked, and Outram and his gallant band, after some hours' siege, fought their way to the steamers, which carried them off to rejoin the main force.

Napier had waited at Nowshera until 6 Feb. He then marched to Sakarand, where he halted on 11 Feb. After three days he reached Sindabad, and on 16 Feb. he was at Matari. Towards evening he heard that the enemy were ten miles off, entrenched in the bed of the Falaili river near Miani (Meanee). The lowest estimate of the enemy's strength was twenty-two thousand. Napier's force was less than 2,800, and this number was further reduced by six hundred men, of whom two hundred were sent with Outram to fire the forests on the enemy's flank, while four hundred men were in charge of baggage. Of the 2,200 men remaining, fewer than five hundred were Europeans.

The enemy was discovered at daybreak of the 17th, and at nine o'clock in the morning the British line of battle was formed. The baggage, the animals, and the large body of camp followers were formed up in the British rear, and surrounded with a ring of camels facing inwards, with bales between them for the armed followers to fire over. This improvised defence was guarded by 250 Poona horse and four companies of infantry. Napier's order of battle was—artillery with twelve guns and fifty sappers on the right, 22nd Queen's regiment next, and on the left the 25th, 12th, and 1st grenadier native regiments in succession, the whole in echelon; on the left of the line were the 9th Bengal cavalry and the Sind or Jacob's horse. The enemy had eighteen guns, and were strongly posted on a curve of the river, convex to the British, with a skikargah on each side flanking their front. The skikargah, or woody enclosure, on the left was covered towards the plain by a stone wall; behind the wall six thousand Baluchis were posted.

Giving the order to advance, Napier rode forward, and noting an opening in the wall on his right flank, with an inspiration of genius thrust a company of the 22nd regiment and a gun into the space, telling Captain Tew to block the gap, and if necessary die there, thus paralysing the six thousand Baluchis within with a force of eighty men. Tew died at his post, but his diminished company held the gap to the end. The main body of the British, advancing in columns of regiments in echelon under heavy fire, formed into line successively as each regiment approached the river Falaili, and charged up the bank, but staggered back on seeing the sea of turbans and of waving swords that filled all the broad, deep bed of the river, now dry. For over two hours the British line remained a few yards from the top of the bank, advancing to deliver their fire into the masses of the enemy in the river-bed, and returning to load. The Baluchis, driven desperate by the increasing volleys of the British, pressed upon from behind, and unable to retreat, made frequent charges; but, as these were not executed in concert along their line, the British troops were able to overlap round their flanks and push them back over the edge. The Baluchis fought stubbornly. No fire of musketry, discharge of grape, or push of bayonet could drive them back. Leaping at the guns, they were blown away by scores at a time, their gaps being continually filled from the rear. Napier could not leave this desperate conflict. He saw the struggle could not last much longer, and, judging that the supreme moment had come, he sent orders to his cavalry on the left to charge on the enemy's right. He himself rode up and down his infantry line, holding, as it seemed, a charmed life, while urging his men to sustain the increasing fury of the enemy. The British cavalry swept down on the enemy's right, dashed through their guns, rode over the high bank of the river, crossed its bed, gained the plain beyond, and charged into the enemy's rear with irresistible fury. Then the Baluchis in front looked behind, and the British infantry, seizing the opportunity, charged with a shout, pushed the Baluchis into the ravine, and closed in hand-to-hand fight. The battle was won. The Baluchis slowly moved off, as if half inclined to renew the conflict. With a British loss of twenty officers and 250 men out of 2,200, no less than 6,000 Baluchis were killed or wounded, and more than three times as many were in retreat. Napier was content. Quarter was neither asked nor given, but there was no