sufficient experience of the admiralty and the navy to know the evils that might result from an error in form. It was only after very sharp letters from St. Vincent and Nelson that Smith was convinced of his mistake, and, while remaining senior officer in the Levant, conducted the business as subordinate to Nelson.
Meantime he had undertaken the defence of Saint Jean d'Acre, which was to render his name famous. On 3 March 1799 he took over the command of Alexandria, and the same evening learnt that Bonaparte, on his way to Syria, had stormed Jaffa. He at once sent the Theseus to Acre, and with her, Colonel Phélypeaux, who, having shared his escape from Paris, was now serving with him as a volunteer. Phélypeaux and Miller, the captain of the Theseus, made what arrangements were possible for the defence of the town, and on the 15th they were joined by Smith in the Tigre. But their preparations would have been of little value had not the superiority at sea enabled him on the 18th to capture the whole of the siege artillery, stores, and ammunition on which Bonaparte was dependent for the prosecution of his design. The eight gunboats in which these had been embarked were also a most valuable reinforcement; and while the siege guns were mounted on the walls of the fortress, the gunboats, supported by the Tigre and Theseus, took up positions from which they enfiladed the French lines. To carry on the attack the French had only their field guns, and it was not till 25 April that they were able to bring up six heavy guns from Jaffa. Time had thus been gained, and the defences of the town put into a better state. On 4 May, after six weeks of mining, countermining, and hard fighting at very close quarters, a practicable breach was made, the mine was finished, and a general assault was ordered for the 5th. During the night, however, the besieged destroyed the mine, and the assault was postponed. On the evening of the 7th the long-expected reinforcement of Turkish troops from Rhodes came in sight, and Bonaparte, seeing the necessity of anticipating them, delivered the assault at once. The combat raged through the night with the utmost fury, and at daybreak the French held one of the towers. The Turkish ships were still some distance off becalmed, and Smith, seeing the critical nature of the struggle, landed a strong party of seamen armed with pikes, who held the breach till the troops arrived. All day the battle raged. At nightfall the assailants withdrew. Twelve days later the siege was raised. ‘In Smith's character there was a strong fantastic and vainglorious strain; but, so far as appears, he showed at Acre discretion and sound judgment, as well as energy and courage. He had to be much on shore as well as afloat; but he seems to have shown Phélypeaux and, after his death, Colonel Douglas the confidence and deference which their professional skill demanded, as he certainly was most generous in recognising their services and those of others. The good sense which defers to superior experience, the lofty spirit which bears the weight of responsibility and sustains the courage of waverers, ungrudging expenditure of means and effort, unshaken determination to endure to the end, and heroic inspiration at the critical moment of the last assault, all these fine qualities must in candour be allowed to Smith at the siege of Acre’ (Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, i. 303–4).
The news of this decisive check to the progress of the French arms in the east was received in England with great enthusiasm. The thanks of both houses of parliament were voted to Smith, and a year later a pension of 1,000l. a year was settled on him. He was given also the thanks of the city of London and the freedom of the Levant Company, together with a piece of plate and, some years later, a grant of 1,500l. From the sultan he received a pelisse and the chelingk or plume of triumph, such as were given also to Nelson for the victory in Aboukir Bay. The glory so deservedly accorded to Smith for his triumph at Acre rekindled the too exuberant vanity which the reprimands of St. Vincent and of Nelson had previously reduced within manageable limits. He again fancied himself commander-in-chief, independent of even the government, and plenipotentiary, controlled only by his younger brother, who was a long way off, at Constantinople; and thus, setting aside the positive orders from home that no terms were to be made with the enemy which did not involve the surrender of the French troops in Egypt as prisoners of war, he took on himself to conclude (24 Jan. 1800) the treaty of El Arish, by the terms of which the French soldiers, with their arms, baggage, and effects, were to be transported to France at the charge of the sultan and his allies. It was impossible for Lord Keith, who was in chief command, to approve of such a treaty [see Elphinstone, George Keith, Viscount Keith]; and the war recommenced, to be brought to an end by the campaign of 1801, through which the Tigre formed part of the squadron under Keith, and Smith was landed in command of the seamen employed on shore.
