On 17 July Major-general (Sir) Thomas Reed [q. v.], who had assumed the command of the Delhi field force on the death of Barnard (5 July), was compelled to resign on account of ill-health, and made over the command to Wilson, conferring upon him the rank of brigadier-general, in anticipation of the sanction of the government, as he was not the senior officer in camp. The selection was confirmed, and Wilson was promoted by the governor-general to be a major-general for special service on 29 July. He was promoted to the establishment of major-generals on 14 Sept. 1857.
The details of the fighting outside Delhi are authoritatively given in Norman's ‘Narrative of the Campaign of the Delhi Army,’ 1858, while those of the siege and the fighting inside will be found in the works quoted at the end of this article. On 25 Aug. Wilson was still occupying the Ridge in front of Delhi, preparing for the siege operations, and awaiting the arrival of the siege guns, when he learned that a body of the enemy had moved out to attack his rear. He despatched Brigadier-general John Nicholson [q. v.], with 2,200 men and twelve guns, to meet them at Najafgarh, where a most successful action was fought. Both the governor-general and Sir John Lawrence now wrote to Wilson to urge the political importance of the capture of Delhi as soon as an assault was practicable after the arrival of the siege train. But Wilson ‘was ill; responsibility and anxiety had told upon him. He had grown nervous and hesitating, and the longer it was delayed the more difficult the task appeared to him’ (Lord Roberts, Forty-one Years in India, chaps. xvii. and xviii.) The siege train had arrived by 5 Sept., and the reinforcements by the 8th. The siege proper began on 7 Sept., when Wilson issued a spirited order to the troops. He was nevertheless reluctant to incur the hazard of assault without more European troops. Colonel Richard Baird Smith [q. v.], the chief engineer, then sent him a memorandum emphatically in favour of immediate action; on this Wilson wrote a minute to the effect that to him it appeared that the results of the proposed operations would be thrown on the hazard of a die, but having nothing better to suggest he yielded to the judgment of the chief engineer (Kaye, Hist. of the Sepoy War, iii. 553). The breaches became practicable by the night of 13 Sept., and the assault next day placed Wilson within the city. When, however, he realised the failure of one column, the falling back of another, and the heavy losses sustained, he anxiously inquired whether he could hold what had been taken. Baird Smith's answer was prompt and decisive, ‘We must do so’ (Kaye, iii. 618). The capture of the city was triumphantly completed on 20 Sept., after much hard fighting, and the first decisive blow struck at the mutiny.
Wilson's conduct as a commander at Delhi has been the subject of controversy, some of it quite recent. His letter of 18 July, after taking over the command, written in French to Sir John (afterwards first Lord) Lawrence (Kaye, Hist. of the Sepoy War, ii. 589), threatening to withdraw to Karnal unless speedily reinforced; his draft to the governor-general of 20 Aug., holding out no hope of taking the place ‘until supported by the force from below;’ and his contemplation of the possibility of a retirement to the Ridge on the afternoon of 14 Sept., when the successful assault had placed him within the city—these have been given as instances of a want of that energy, determination, and dash which have always carried with them victory over the natives of India, and the want of which, had it not been for strong and resolute advisers, might have proved fatal to success.
On the other hand, it has been maintained that, ill informed of what was going on in the country, Wilson believed that reinforcements of European troops were available, and could be obtained if sufficiently pressed for. Lawrence, while deprecating delay, most earnestly impressed upon Wilson the disastrous and far-reaching consequences that would result from failure, and it is contended that the strongest minded man might have well hesitated to attack under such circumstances without adequate means. Moreover, a Fabian policy led the mutineers to continue to pour into Delhi instead of moving about the country in small bands, attacking weak places and murdering Europeans. Had there been a capable commander in the city, he could, without weakening the defence of the quarter attacked, have sent thousands of men to capture the Ridge camp, with the hospital, ammunition, and stores; and it is affirmed that if any hesitation were shown by Wilson as to holding on to Delhi on 14 Sept. it was due to his supreme anxiety for the safety of the Ridge and his sick and wounded there, together with a desire for encouragement to proceed.
The responsibility which rested upon the general was indeed a heavy one, and Wilson, good soldier as he was, with all his experience and distinguished service, was not a man of strong character. Fortunately he had with him resolute men who supported him, and upon whom he wisely, although
