Page:EB1911 - Volume 01.djvu/875

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824
AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
  

replaced Sigel, won a combat at Piedmont, and marched on the 8th of June towards Lynchburg. The danger threatening this important point caused Lee to send thither General Early with the remnants of Jackson’s old Valley troops. Hunter’s assault (June 18) failed, and the Federals, unable to hold their ground, had to make a circuitous retreat to the Potomac by way of West Virginia.

26. Cold Harbor.—On the 3rd of June at Cold Harbor (q.v.) took place the last of Grant’s “hammering” battles in the open fields. The attack of the Federals failed utterly; not even Fredericksburg was so disastrous a defeat. Six thousand men fell in one hour’s fighting, and the total losses on this field, where skirmishing went on for many days, were 13,000. But Grant was as resolute as ever. His forces once more manœuvred against Lee’s inner flank, still found no weak spot, and eventually arrived upon the James. The river was crossed, Lee as usual conforming to the movement, and on the 15th of June the Federals appeared before the works of Petersburg (q.v.). Here, and in the narrow neck of land between the Appomattox and the James, was the ganglion of the Confederacy, and the struggle for its possession was perhaps the greatest of modern history. A first assault made at once (June 15–18) failed with a loss of 8150 men. Two sharp combats followed on the 22nd of June and the 2nd of July, as Grant once more began to feel Lee’s right. But the anniversary of Gettysburg saw Lee’s works still intact, and 72,000 men of the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the James had fallen since the campaign had opened two months before. History has few examples to show comparable to this terrible campaign in Virginia. The ruthless determination of the superior leaders had been answered splendidly by the devotion of the troops, but the men of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg were mostly dead or wounded, and the recruits attracted by bounties or compelled by the “draft,” which had at last been enforced in the North, proved far inferior soldiers to the gallant veterans whom they replaced.

27. Petersburg.—There was no formal siege of Lee’s position. A vast network of fortifications covered the front of both armies, whose flank extended far to the south-west, Grant seeking to capture, Lee to defend, the Danville railway by which the Confederates received their supplies. Richmond, though no longer of paramount importance, was no less firmly held than Petersburg, and along the whole long line fighting went on with little interruption. On the 30th of July the Federal engineers exploded a mine under the hostile works, and Burnside’s corps rushed to the assault. But the attempt ended in failure—the first defeat of the Army of the Potomac which could fairly be called discreditable. Still, Lee was losing men, few it is true, but most precious, since it was impossible to replace them, while the North poured unlimited numbers into the Federal camps. The policy of “attrition” upon which Grant had embarked, and which he was carrying through regardless of his losses, was having its effect. About this time Early, freed from the opposition of Hunter’s forces, made a bold stroke upon Washington. Crossing the Potomac, he marched eastward, and, defeating a motley force (action of the Monocacy) which General Lew Wallace had collected to oppose him, appeared before the lines of Washington. The Federal capital was at the moment almost denuded of troops, and forces hastily despatched from the James only arrived just in time to save it. Thereupon the Confederates retired, narrowly escaping Hunter, and the brief campaign came to an end with an engagement at Kernstown. Early had been nearer to the immediate success than Lee had been in 1862 and 1863, but he had failed utterly to relax Grant’s hold on Petersburg, which was becoming daily more crushing.

On the decisive theatre the Federals made their way, little by little and at a heavy cost, to the Weldon railway, and beyond it to the westward. Lee’s lines were becoming dangerously extended, but he could not allow the enemy to cut him off from the west. On the 25th of August there was a battle at Reams Station, in which the Federals were forced back, and the famous II. Corps under Hancock was for the first time routed. But Grant was tireless, and five days later another battle was fought, at Peebles Farm, in which the lost ground was regained. Butler and the Army of the James at the same time won some successes in front of the Richmond works. One more attempt to outflank Lee to the westward was made by Grant without success, before winter came on, and the campaign closed with an expedition, under the direction of General Warren, which destroyed the Weldon line. Grant had not reached Lee’s flank at any point,. and his casualties from first to last had been unprecedentedly heavy, but “hammering” was steadily prevailing where skill and valour had failed.

28. Sheridan’s Valley Campaign.—In the closing months of the year Grant’s brilliant cavalry commander Sheridan had been put in command of an army to operate against Early in the Valley. The Federals in this quarter had hitherto suffered from want of unity in the command (e.g. Banks, Fremont and McDowell in 1862). The Army of the Shenandoah would not be thus handicapped, for Sheridan was a leader of exceptional character. The first encounter took place on the Opequan near Winchester. Early was defeated, but not routed (September 9), and another battle took place near Strasburg (Fisher’s Hill) on the 22nd. Always disposing of superior numbers, Sheridan on this occasion won an important victory without much loss. A combat which took place, at Mount Jackson, during the pursuit, again ended successfully, and the triumphant Federals retired down the Valley, ruthlessly destroying everything which might be of the slightest value to the enemy. Early sharply followed them up, his men infuriated by the devastation of the “Granary of the Confederacy.” At Cedar Creek, during a momentary absence of the Federal commander, his camps were surprised by Early (October 19). The Army of the Shenandoah was routed and driven towards the Potomac. But the gallant stand of the old Potomac troops of the VI. Corps checked the Confederates. Sheridan arrived on the scene to find a new battle in progress. He was at his best at such a moment, and the rallied Federals under his command swept all before them. The victory was decisive, and, the country being now bare of supplies, the Army of the Shenandoah was sent to reinforce Grant, while the remnant of Early’s forces also went to Petersburg. Sheridan’s campaign was a famous episode of the war. It was conducted with skill, though, with twice the numbers of the enemy at his command, Sheridan’s victory was a foregone conclusion. But he had at least shown that he possessed to an unusual degree the real attribute of a great captain—power over men.

29. Sherman and Johnston.—Meanwhile Sherman had fought his Atlanta campaign. General Johnston opposed him almost on the old Chickamauga battle-ground, where the Federal commander, after a brief campaign in Mississippi and Alabama, the result of which was to clear his right flank (February 3–March 6, 1864), collected his armies—the Army of the Tennessee under McPherson, the Army of the Cumberland under Thomas (Hooker’s troops had now become part of this army) and the Army of the Ohio under Schofield. In the celebrated campaign of Atlanta the highest manœuvring skill was displayed by both the famous commanders. Whilst Grant, with his avowed object of crushing Lee’s army, lost no opportunity of fighting a battle coûte que coûte, Sherman, intent rather on the conquest of territory, acted on different lines. Johnston, than whom there was no better soldier in the Confederate service when a careful defence was required, disposed of sensibly inferior forces, and it was to be expected that the 18th-century methods of making war by manœuvring and by combats, not battles, would receive a modern illustration in Georgia. Operations began early in May 1864, and five days of manœuvring and skirmishing about Resaca and Rocky Face ended in Johnston’s retirement to Resaca. A fortnight later the same manœuvres, combined with constant “tapping” at the Confederate defences, caused him to fall back again. At Adairsville the same process was gone through, and Johnston retired to Cassville, where he offered battle. Sherman was far too wary to be drawn into an action under unfavourable conditions. If each general had been able to obtain a great battle upon his own terms, each would have fought most willingly, for neither desired a useless prolongation of the war. As it was, both declined to risk a