Persians out of Greek towns in Lycia and Caria, he met and routed the Persians on land and sea at the mouth of the Eurymedon in Pamphylía. In 463 after a siege of more than two years the Athenians captured Thasos, with which they had quarrelled over mining rights in the Strymon valley. It is said (Thuc. i. 101) that Thasos had appealed for aid to Sparta, and that the latter was prevented from responding only by earthquake and the Helot revolt. But this is both unproved and improbable. Sparta had so far no quarrel with Athens. Athens thus became mistress of the Aegean, while the synod at Delos had become practically, if not theoretically, powerless. It was at this time that Cimon (q.v.), who had striven to maintain a balance between Sparta, the chief military, and Athens, the chief naval power, was successfully attacked by Ephialtes and Pericles. During the ensuing years, apart from a brief return to the Cimonian policy, the resources of the league, or, as it has now become, the Athenian empire, were directed not so much against Persia as against Sparta, Corinth, Aegina and Boeotia. (See Athens; Sparta, &c.) A few points only need be dealt with here. The first years of the land war brought the Athenian empire to its zenith. Apart from Thessaly, it included all Greece outside the Peloponnese. At the same time, however, the Athenian expedition against the Persians in Egypt ended in a disastrous defeat, and for a time the Athenians returned to a philo-Laconian policy, perhaps under the direction of Cimon (see Cimon and Pericles). Peace was made with Sparta, and, if we are to believe 4th-century orators, a treaty, the Peace of Callias or of Cimon, was concluded between the Great King and Athens in 449 after the death of Cimon before the walls of Citium in Cyprus. The meaning of this so-called Peace of Callias is doubtful. Owing to the silence of Thucydides and other reasons, many scholars regard it as merely a cessation of hostilities (see Cimon and Callias, where authorities are quoted). At all events, it is significant of the success of the main object of the Delian League, the Athenians resigning Cyprus and Egypt, while Persia recognized the freedom of the maritime Greeks of Asia Minor.
During this period the power of Athens over her allies had increased, though we do not know anything of the process by which this was brought about. Chios, Lesbos and Samos alone furnished ships; all the rest had commuted for a money payment. This meant that the synod was quite powerless. Moreover in 454 (probably) the changed relations were crystallized by the transference (proposed by the Samians) of the treasury to Athens (Corp. Inscr. Attic. i. 260). Thus in 448 B.C. Athens was not only mistress of a maritime empire, but ruled over Megara, Boeotia, Phocis, Locris, Achaea and Troezen, i.e. over so-called allies who were strangers to the old pan-Ionian assembly and to the policy of the league, and was practically equal to Sparta on land. An important event must be referred probably to the year 451,—the law of Pericles, by which citizenship (including the right to vote in the Ecclesia and to sit on paid juries) was restricted to those who could prove themselves the children of an Athenian father and mother (ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἀστοῖν). This measure must have had a detrimental effect on the allies, who thus saw themselves excluded still further from recognition as equal partners in a league (see Pericles). The natural result of all these causes was that a feeling of antipathy rose against Athens in the minds of those to whom autonomy was the breath of life, and the fundamental tendency of the Greeks to disruption was soon to prove more powerful than the forces at the disposal of Athens. The first to secede were the land powers of Greece proper, whose subordination Athens had endeavoured to guarantee by supporting the democratic parties in the various states. Gradually the exiled oligarchs combined; with the defeat of Tolmides at Coroneia, Boeotia was finally lost to the empire, and the loss of Phocis, Locris and Megara was the immediate sequel. Against these losses the retention of Euboea, Nisaea and Pegae was no compensation; the land empire was irretrievably lost.
The next important event is the revolt of Samos, which had quarrelled with Miletus over the city of Priene. The Samians refused the arbitration of Athens. The island was conquered with great difficulty by the whole force of the league, and from the fact that the tribute of the Thracian cities and those in Hellespontine district was increased between 439 and 436 we must probably infer that Athens had to deal with a widespread feeling of discontent about this period. It is, however, equally noticeable on the one hand that the main body of the allies was not affected, and on the other that the Peloponnesian League on the advice of Corinth officially recognized the right of Athens to deal with her rebellious subject allies, and refused to give help to the Samians.
The succeeding events which led to the Peloponnesian War and the final disruption of the league are discussed in other articles. (See Athens: History, and Peloponnesian War.) Two important events alone call for special notice. The first is the raising of the allies’ tribute in 425 B.C. by a certain Thudippus, presumably a henchman of Cleon. The fact, though not mentioned by Thucydides, was inferred from Aristophanes (Wasps, 660), Andocides (de Pace, § 9), Plutarch (Aristides, c. 24), and pseudo-Andocides (Alcibiad. 11); it was proved by the discovery of the assessment list of 425–4 (Hicks and Hill, Inscrip. 64). The second event belongs to 411, after the failure of the Sicilian expedition. In that year the tribute of the allies was commuted for a 5% tax on all imports and exports by sea. This tax, which must have tended to equalize the Athenian merchants with those of the allied cities, probably came into force gradually, for beside the new collectors called πορισταί we still find Hellenotamiae (C.I.A. iv. [i.] p. 34).
The Tribute.—Only a few problems can be discussed of the many which are raised by the insufficient and conflicting evidence at our disposal. In the first place there is the question of the tribute. Thucydides is almost certainly wrong in saying that the amount of the original tribute was 460 talents (about £106,000); this figure cannot have been reached for at least twelve, probably twenty years, when new members had been enrolled (Lycia, Caria, Eion, Lampsacus). Similarly he is probably wrong, or at all events includes items of which the tribute lists take no account, when he says that it amounted to 600 talents at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. The moderation of the assessment is shown not only by the fact that it was paid so long without objection, but also by the individual items. Even in 425 Naxos and Andros paid only 15 talents, while Athens had just raised an eisphora (income tax) from her own citizens of 200 talents. Moreover it would seem that a tribute which yielded less than the 5% tax of 411 could not have been unreasonable.
The number of tributaries is given by Aristophanes as 1000, but this is greatly in excess of those named in the tribute lists. Some authorities give 200; others put it as high as 290. The difficulty is increased by the fact that in some cases several towns were grouped together in one payment (συντελεῖς). These were grouped into five main geographical divisions (from 443 to 436; afterwards four, Caria being merged in Ionia). Each division was represented by two elective assessment commissioners (τακταί), who assisted the Boulē at Athens in the quadrennial division of the tribute. Each city sent in its own assessment before the τακταί, who presented it to the Boulē. If there was any difference of opinion the matter was referred to the Ecclesia for settlement. In the Ecclesia a private citizen might propose another assessment, or the case might be referred to the law courts. The records of the tribute are preserved in the so-called quota lists, which give the names of the cities and the proportion, one-sixtieth, of their several tributes, which was paid to Athens. No tribute was paid by members of a cleruchy (q.v.), as we find from the fact that the tribute of a city always decreased when a cleruchy was planted in it. This highly organized financial system must have been gradually evolved, and no doubt reached its perfection only after the treasury was transferred to Athens.
Government and Jurisdiction.—There is much difference of opinion among scholars regarding the attitude of imperial Athens towards her allies. Grote maintained that on the whole the allies had little ground for complaint; but in so doing he rather seems to leave out of account the Greek’s dislike of external
