Page:EB1911 - Volume 08.djvu/288

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DILATATION—DILL
271

estimate of their probable cost. In the case of a vacant benefice, the new incumbent and the old incumbent or his representatives may lodge objections to the surveyor’s report on any grounds of fact or law, and the bishop, after consideration, may make an order for the repairs and their cost, for which the late incumbent or his representatives are liable. The sum so stated becomes a debt due from the late incumbent or his representatives to the new incumbent, who shall pay over the money when recovered to the governors of Queen Anne’s Bounty. The governors pay for the works on execution on receipt of a certificate from the surveyor; and the surveyor, when the works have been completed to his satisfaction, gives a certificate to that effect, the effect of which, so far as regards the incumbent, is to protect him from liability for dilapidations for the next five years. Unnecessary buildings belonging to a residence house may, by the authority of the bishop and with the consent of the patron, be removed. An amending statute of 1872 (Ecclesiastical Dilapidations Act (1871) Amendment) relates chiefly to advances by the governors of Queen Anne’s Bounty for the purposes of the act.


DILATATION (from Lat. dis-, distributive, and latus, wide), a widening or enlarging; a term used in physiology, &c.


DILATORY (from Lat. dilatus, from differre, to put off or delay), delaying, or slow; in law a “dilatory plea” is one made merely for delaying the suit.


DILEMMA (Gr. δίλημμα, a double proposition, from δί– and λαμβάνειν), a term used technically in logic, and popularly in common parlance and rhetoric. (1) The latter use has no exact definition, but in general it describes a situation wherein from either of two (or more) possible alternatives an unsatisfactory conclusion results. The alternatives are called the “horns” of the dilemma. Thus a nation which has to choose between bankruptcy and the repudiation of its debts is on the horns of a dilemma. (2) In logic there is considerable divergence of opinion as to the best definition. Whately defined it as “a conditional syllogism with two or more antecedents in the major and a disjunctive minor.” Aulus Gellius gives an example as follows:—“Women are either fair or ugly; if you marry a fair woman, she will attract other men; if an ugly woman she will not please you; therefore marriage is absurd.” From either alternative, an unpleasant result follows. Four kinds of dilemma are admitted:—(a) Simple Constructive: If A, then C; if B, then C, but either B or A; therefore C. (b) Simple Destructive: If A is true, B is true; if A is true, C is true; B and C are not both true; therefore A is not true. (c) Complex Constructive: If A, then B; if C, then D; but either A or C; therefore either B or D. (d) Complex Destructive: If A is true, B is true; if C is true, D is true; but B and D are not both true; hence A and C are not both true. The soundness of the dilemmatic argument in general depends on the alternative possibilities. Unless the alternatives produced exhaust the possibilities of the case, the conclusion is invalid. The logical form of the argument makes it especially valuable in public speaking, before uncritical audiences. It is, in fact, important rather as a rhetorical subtlety than as a serious argument.

Dilemmist is also a term used to translate Vaibhashikas, the name of a Buddhist school of philosophy.


DILETTANTE, an Italian word for one who delights in the fine arts, especially in music and painting, so a lover of the fine arts in general. The Ital. dilettare is from Lat. delectare, to delight. Properly the word refers to an “amateur” as opposed to a “professional” cultivation of the arts, but like “amateur” it is often used in a depreciatory sense for one who is only a dabbler, or who only has a superficial knowledge or interest in art. The Dilettanti Society founded in 1733–1734 still exists in England. A history of the society, by Lionel Cust, was published in 1898.


DILIGENCE, in law, the care which a person is bound to exercise in his relations with others. The possible degrees of diligence are of course numerous, and the same degree is not required in all cases. Thus a mere depositary would not be held bound to the same degree of diligence as a person borrowing an article for his own use and benefit. Jurists, following the divisions of the civil law, have concurred in fixing three approximate standards of diligence—viz. ordinary (diligentia), less than ordinary (levissima diligentia) and more than ordinary (exactissima diligentia). Ordinary or common diligence is defined by Story (On Bailments) as “that degree of diligence which men in general exert in respect of their own concerns.” So Sir William Jones:—“This care, which every person of common prudence and capable of governing a family takes of his own concerns, is a proper measure of that which would uniformly be required in performing every contract, if there were not strong reasons for exacting in some of them a greater and permitting in others a less degree of attention” (Essay on Bailments). The highest degree of diligence would be that which only very prudent persons bestow on their own concerns; the lowest, that which even careless persons bestow on their own concerns. The want of these various degrees of diligence is negligence in corresponding degrees. These approximations indicate roughly the greater or less severity with which the law will judge the performance of different classes of contracts; but English judges have been inclined to repudiate the distinction as a useless refinement of the jurists. Thus Baron Rolfe could see no difference between negligence and gross negligence; it was the same thing with the addition of a vituperative epithet. See Negligence.

Diligence, in Scots law, is a general term for the process by which persons, lands or effects are attached on execution, or in security for debt.


DILKE, SIR CHARLES WENTWORTH, Bart. (1810–1869), English politician, son of Charles Wentworth Dilke, proprietor and editor of The Athenaeum, was born in London on the 18th of February 1810, and was educated at Westminster school and Trinity Hall, Cambridge. He studied law, and in 1834 took his degree of LL.B., but did not practise. He assisted his father in his literary work, and was for some years chairman of the council of the Society of Arts, besides taking a prominent part in the affairs of the Royal Horticultural Society and other bodies. He was one of the most zealous promoters of the Great Exhibition (1851), and a member of the executive committee. At the close of the exhibition he was honoured by foreign sovereigns, and the queen offered him knighthood, which, however, he did not accept; he also declined a large remuneration offered by the royal commission. In 1853 Dilke was one of the English commissioners at the New York Industrial Exhibition, and prepared a report on it. He again declined to receive any money reward for his services. He was appointed one of the five royal commissioners for the Great Exhibition of 1862; and soon after the death of the prince consort he was created a baronet. In 1865 he entered parliament as member for Wallingford. In 1869 he was sent to Russia as representative of England at the horticultural exhibition held at St Petersburg. His health, however, had been for some time failing, and he died suddenly in that city, on the 10th of May 1869. A selection from his writings, Papers of a Critic (2 vols., 1875), contains a biographical sketch by his son.

His son, Sir Charles Wentworth Dilke, Bart. (1843–  ), became a prominent Liberal politician, as M.P. for Chelsea (1868–1886), under-secretary for foreign affairs (1880–1882), and president of the local government board (1882–1885); and he was then marked out as one of the best-informed and ablest of the advanced Radicals. He was chairman of the royal commission on the housing of the working classes in 1884–1885. But his sensational appearance as co-respondent in a divorce case of a peculiarly unpleasant character in 1885 cast a cloud over his career. He was defeated in Chelsea in 1886, and did not return to parliament till 1892, when he was elected for the Forest of Dean; and though his knowledge of foreign affairs and his powers as a critic and writer on military and naval questions were admittedly of the highest order, his official position in public life could not again be recovered. His military writings are The British Army (1888); Army Reform (1898) and, with Mr Spenser Wilkinson, Imperial Defence (1892). On colonial questions he wrote with equal authority. His Greater Britain (2 vols., 1866–1867) reached a fourth edition in 1868, and was followed by Problems of Greater Britain (2 vols., 1890) and The British Empire (1899). He was twice married, his second wife (née