Page:EB1911 - Volume 09.djvu/982

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HISTORY]
EUROPE
945

in return for the Dobrudja, which it professed not to desire, was obliged to give back to Russia the portion of Bessarabia ceded after the Crimean War. In Asia Minor Russia agreed to confine her annexations to the districts of Kars, Ardahan and Batum, and to restore to Turkey the remainder of the occupied territory. As a set-off against the large acquisitions of the Slav races, the powers recommended that the sultan should cede to the kingdom of Greece the greater part of Thessaly and Epirus, under the form of a rectification of frontiers. At first the sultan refused to act on this recommendation, but in March 1881 a compromise was effected by which Greece obtained Thessaly without Epirus. Bosnia and Herzegovina were to be occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary, and the Austrian authorities were to have the right of making roads and keeping garrisons in the district of Novi-Bazar, which lies between Servia and Montenegro. In all the provinces of European Turkey for which special arrangements were not made in the treaty, the Porte undertook (Art. 23) to introduce organic statutes similar to that of Crete, adapted to the local conditions. This article, like many of the subordinate stipulations of the treaty, remained a dead letter. We may mention specially Art. 61, in which the Sublime Porte undertook to realize without delay the ameliorations and reforms required in the provinces inhabited by Armenians, and to guarantee their safety against the Circassians and Kurds. Equally unreliable proved the scheme of Lord Beaconsfield to secure good administration throughout the whole of Asia Minor by the introduction of reforms under British control, and to prevent the further expansion of Russia Cyprus Convention. in that direction by a defensive alliance with the Porte. A convention to that effect was duly signed at Constantinople a few days before the meeting of the congress (4th June 1878), but the only part of it which was actually realized was the occupation and administration of Cyprus by the British government. The new frontiers stipulated in the treaty of San Stefano, and subsequently rectified by the treaty of Berlin, are shown in the accompanying sketch-map.

The secret schemes of Russia and Austria, in so far as they were defined in the agreement of Reichstadt and the subsequent Austro-Russian treaty of Vienna, had thus been realized. Russia had recovered the lost portion of Bessarabia, and Austria had practically annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, though the nominal suzerainty of the sultan over the two provinces was maintained. But Russia was far from satisfied with the results, which seemed to her not at all commensurate with the sacrifices imposed on her by the war, and her dissatisfaction led to a new grouping of the powers. Before the opening of the Berlin congress Bismarck had announced publicly that he would refrain from taking sides with any of the contending parties, and would confine himself to playing the part of an honest broker. The announcement was received by the Russians with astonishment and indignation. What they expected was not an impartial arbiter, but a cordial and useful friend in need. In 1871 the emperor William, as we have seen, had spontaneously declared to the tsar that Germany owed to His Majesty the happy issue of the war, and that she would never forget it, and we may add that on that occasion he signed himself “Your ever grateful Friend.” Now, in 1878, when the moment had come for paying at least an instalment of this debt, and when Russia was being compelled to make concessions which she described as incompatible with her dignity, Bismarck had nothing better to offer than honest brokerage. The indignation in all classes Russian resentment against Bismarck. was intense, and the views commonly held regarding Bismarck’s “duplicity” and “treachery” were supposed to receive ample confirmation during the sittings of the congress and the following six months. On the 4th of February 1879 Prince Gorchakov wrote to the ambassador in Vienna: “Needless to say, that in our eyes the Three Emperors’ Alliance is practically torn in pieces by the conduct of our two allies. At present it remains for us merely to terminate the liquidation of the past, and to seek henceforth support in ourselves alone.” The same view of the situation was taken in Berlin and Vienna, though the result was attributed, of course, to different causes, and the danger of serious complications became so great that Bismarck concluded with Andrássy in the following October (1879) a formal defensive alliance, which was avowedly directed against Russia, and which subsequently developed into the Triple Alliance, directed against Russia and France.

The causes of the rupture are variously described by the different parties interested. According to Bismarck the Russian government began a venomous campaign against Germany in the press, and collected, with apparently hostile intentions, enormous masses of troops near the German and Austrian frontiers, whilst the tsar adopted in his correspondence with the emperor William an arrogant and menacing tone which could not be tolerated. On the other hand, the Russians declare that the so-called Press-Campaign was merely the spontaneous public expression of the prevailing disappointment among all classes in Russia, that the military preparations had a purely defensive character, and that the tsar’s remarks, which roused Bismarck’s ire, did not transgress the limits of friendly expostulation such as sovereigns in close friendly relations might naturally employ. Subsequent revelations tend rather to confirm the Russian view. After an exhausting war and without a single powerful ally, Russia was not likely to provoke wantonly a great war with Germany and Austria. The press attacks were not more violent than those which frequently appear in newspapers which draw their inspiration from the German foreign office, and the accusations about the arrogant attitude and menacing tone of Alexander II. are not at all in harmony with his known character, and are refuted by the documents since published by Dr Busch. The truth seems to be that the self-willed chancellor was actuated by nervous irritation and personal feeling more than by considerations of statecraft. His imperial master was not convinced by his arguments, and showed great reluctance to permit the conclusion of a separate treaty with Austria. Finally, with much searching of heart, he yielded to the importunity of his minister; but in thus committing an unfriendly act towards his old ally, he so softened the blow that the personal good relations between the two sovereigns suffered merely a momentary interruption. Bismarck himself soon recognized that the permanent estrangement of Russia would be a grave mistake of policy, and the very next year (1880), negotiations for a treaty of defensive alliance between the two cabinets were begun. Nor did the accession to the throne of Russia of Alexander III., who had long enjoyed the reputation of being systematically hostile to Germans, produce a rupture, as was expected. Six months after his father’s death, the young tsar met the old kaiser at Danzig