a just man, and justice in the state is the same thing as justice in the individual. The Greek institutions which the philosophers are unanimous in commending are precisely those which the most state-ridden nations of modern times would agree in repudiating. The exhaustive discussion of all political measures, which for over two centuries has been a fixed habit of English public life, has of itself established the principle that there are assignable limits to the action of the state. Not that the limits ever have been assigned in terms, but popular sentiment has more or less vaguely fenced off departments of conduct as sacred from the interference of the law. Phrases like “the liberty of the subject,” the “sanctity of private property,” “an Englishman’s house is his castle,” “the rights of conscience,” are the commonplaces of political discussion, and tell the state, “Thus far shalt thou go and no further.”
The two contrasting policies are those of laissez-faire (let alone) and Protection, or individualism and state-socialism, the one a policy of non-interference with the free play of social forces, the other of their regulation for the benefit of the community. The laissez-faire theory was prominently upheld by John Stuart Mill, whose essay on Liberty, together with the concluding chapters of his treatise on Political Economy, gives a tolerably complete view of the principles of government. There is a general presumption against the interference of government, which is only to be overcome by very strong evidence of necessity. Governmental action is generally less effective than voluntary action. The necessary duties of government are so burdensome, that to increase them destroys its efficiency. Its powers are already so great that individual freedom is constantly in danger. As a general rule, nothing which can be done by the voluntary agency of individuals should be left to the state. Each man is the best judge of his own interests. But, on the other hand, when the thing itself is admitted to be useful or necessary, and it cannot be effected by voluntary agency, or when it is of such a nature that the consumer cannot be considered capable of judging of the quality supplied, then Mill would allow the state to interpose. Thus the education of children, and even of adults, would fairly come within the province of the state. Mill even goes so far as to admit that, where a restriction of the hours of labour, or the establishment of a periodical holiday, is proved to be beneficial to labourers as a class, but cannot be carried out voluntarily on account of the refusal of individuals to co-operate, government may justifiably compel them to co-operate. Still further, Mill would desire to see some control exercised by the government over the operations of those voluntary associations which, consisting of large numbers of shareholders, necessarily leave their affairs in the hands of one or a few persons. In short, Mill’s general rule against state action admits of many important exceptions, founded on no principle less vague than that of public expediency. The essay on Liberty is mainly concerned with freedom of individual character, and its arguments apply to control exercised, not only by the state, but by society in the form of public opinion. The leading principle is that of Humboldt, “the absolute and essential importance of human development in its richest diversity.” Humboldt broadly excluded education, religion and morals from the action, direct and indirect, of the state. Mill, as we have seen, conceives education to be within the province of the state, but he would confine its action to compelling parents to educate their children.
The most thoroughgoing opponent of state action, however, is Herbert Spencer. In his Social Statics, published in 1850, he holds it to be the essential duty of government to protect—to maintain men’s rights to life, to personal liberty and to property; and the theory that the government ought to undertake other offices besides that of protector he regards as an untenable theory. Each man has a right to the fullest exercise of all his faculties, compatible with the same right in others. This is the fundamental law of equal freedom, which it is the duty and the only duty of the state to enforce. If the state goes beyond this duty, it becomes, not a protector, but an aggressor. Thus all state regulations of commerce, all religious establishments, all government relief of the poor, all state systems of education and of sanitary superintendence, even the state currency and the post-office, stand condemned, not only as ineffective for their respective purposes, but as involving violations of man’s natural liberty.
The tendency of modern legislation is more a question of political practice than of political theory. In some cases state interference has been abolished or greatly limited. These cases are mainly two—in matters of opinion (especially religious opinion), and in matters of contract.
The mere enumeration of the individual instances would occupy a formidable amount of space. The reader is referred to such articles as England, Church of; Establishment; Marriage; Oath; Roman Catholic Church, &c., and Company; Contract; Partnership, &c. In other cases the state has interfered for the protection and assistance of definite classes of persons. For example, the education and protection of children (see Children, Law Relating to; Education; Technical Education); the regulation of factory labour and dangerous employment (see Labour Legislation); improved conditions of health (see Adulteration; Housing; Public Health, Law of, &c.); coercion for moral purposes (see Bet and Betting; Criminal Law; Gaming and Wagering; Liquor Laws; Lotteries, &c.). Under numerous other headings in this work the evolution of existing forms of government is discussed; see also the bibliographical note to the article Constitution and Constitutional Law.
GOVERNOR (from the Fr. gouverneur, from gouverner, O. Fr.
governer, Lat. gubernare, to steer a ship, to direct, guide), in
general, one who governs or exercises authority; specifically,
an official appointed to govern a district, province, town, &c.
In British colonies or dependencies the representative of the
crown is termed a governor. Colonial governors are classed
as governors-general, governors and lieutenant-governors,
according to the status of the colony or group of colonies over
which they preside. Their powers vary according to the position
which they occupy. In all cases they represent the authority
of the crown. In the United States (q.v.) the official at the
head of every state government is called a governor.
GOW, NIEL (1727–1807), Scottish musician of humble parentage,
famous as a violinist and player of reels, but more so for
the part he played in preserving the old melodies of Scotland.
His compositions, and those of his four sons, Nathaniel, the
most famous (1763–1831), William (1751–1791), Andrew (1760–1803),
and John (1764–1826), formed the “Gow Collection,”
comprising various volumes edited by Niel and his sons, a
valuable repository of Scottish traditional airs. The most important
of Niel’s sons was Nathaniel, who is remembered as
the author of the well-known “Caller Herrin,” taken from the
fishwives’ cry, a tune to which words were afterwards written
by Lady Nairne. Nathaniel’s son, Niel Gow junior (1795–1823),
was the author of the famous songs “Flora Macdonald’s Lament”
and “Cam’ ye by Athol.”
GOWER, JOHN (d. 1408), English poet, died at an advanced
age in 1408, so that he may be presumed to have been born
about 1330. He belonged to a good Kentish family, but the
suggestion of Sir Harris Nicolas that the poet is to be identified
with a John Gower who was at one time possessed of the manor
of Kentwell is open to serious objections. There is no evidence
that he ever lived as a country gentleman, but he was undoubtedly
possessed of some wealth, and we know that he was the owner
of the manors of Feltwell in Suffolk and Moulton in Norfolk.
In a document of 1382 he is called an “Esquier de Kent,” and
he was certainly not in holy orders. That he was acquainted
with Chaucer we know, first because Chaucer in leaving England
for Italy in 1378 appointed Gower and another to represent
him in his absence, secondly because Chaucer addressed his
Troilus and Criseide to Gower and Strode (whom he addresses
as “moral Gower” and “philosophical Strode”) for criticism
and correction, and thirdly because of the lines in the first edition
of Gower’s Confessio amantis, “And gret wel Chaucer whan ye
mete,” &c. There is no sufficient ground for the suggestion,
based partly on the subsequent omission of these lines and
partly on the humorous reference of Chaucer to Gower’s Confessio
amantis in the introduction to the Man of Law’s Tale, that the
friendship was broken by a quarrel. From his Latin poem
