Page:EB1911 - Volume 15.djvu/699

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KANT
671


in conscious experience. Judgment is here merely reflective; that is to say, the particular element is given, so determined as to be possible material of knowledge, while the universal, not necessary for cognition, is supplied by reason itself. The empirical details of nature, which are not determined by the categories of understanding, are judged as being arranged or ordered by intelligence, for in no other fashion could nature, in its particular, contingent aspect, be thought as forming a complete, consistent, intelligible whole.

The investigation of the conditions under which adaptation of nature to intelligence is conceivable and possible makes up the subject of the third great Kritik, the Kritik of Judgment, a work presenting unusual difficulties to the interpreter of the Kantian system. The general principle of the adaptation of nature to our faculties of cognition has two specific applications, with the second of which it is more closely connected than with the first. In the first place, the adaptation may be merely subjective, when the empirical condition for the exercise of judgment is furnished by the feeling of pleasure or pain; such adaptation is aesthetic. In the second place, the adaptation may be objective or logical, when empirical facts are given of such a kind that their possibility can be conceived only through the notion of the end realized in them; such adaptation is teleological, and the empirical facts in question are organisms.

Aesthetics, or the scientific consideration of the judgments resting on the feelings of pleasure and pain arising from the harmony or want of harmony between the particular of experience and the laws of understanding, is the special subject of the Kritik of Judgment, but the doctrine of teleology there unfolded is the more important for the complete view of the critical system. For the analysis of the teleological judgment and of the consequences flowing from it leads to the final statement of the nature of experience as conceived by Kant. The phenomena of organic production furnish data for a special kind of judgment, which, however, involves or rests upon a quite general principle, that of the contingency of the particular element in nature and its subjectively necessary adaptation to our faculty of cognition. The notion of contingency arises, according to Kant, from the fact that understanding and sense are distinct, that understanding does not determine the particular of sense, and, consequently, that the principle of the adaptation of the particular to our understanding is merely supplied by reason on account of the peculiarity or limited character of understanding. End in nature, therefore, is a subjective or problematic conception, implying the limits of understanding, and consequently resting upon the idea of an understanding constituted unlike ours—of an intuitive understanding in which particular and universal should be given together. The idea of such an understanding is, for cognition, transcendent, for no corresponding fact of intuition is furnished, but it is realized with practical certainty in relation to reason as practical. For we are, from practical grounds, compelled with at least practical necessity to ascribe a certain aim or end to this supreme understanding. The moral law, or reason as practical, prescribes the realization of the highest good, and such realization implies a higher order than that of nature. We must, therefore, regard the supreme cause as a moral cause, and nature as so ordered that realization of the moral end is in it possible. The final conception of the Kantian philosophy is, therefore, that of ethical teleology. As Kant expresses it in a remarkable passage of the Kritik, “The systematic unity of ends in this world of intelligences, which, although as mere nature it is to be called only the world of sense, can yet as a system of freedom be called an intelligible, i.e. moral world (regnum gratiae), leads inevitably to the teleological unity of all things which constitute this great whole according to universal natural laws, just as the unity of the former is according to universal and necessary moral laws, and unites the practical with the speculative reason. The world must be represented as having originated from an idea, if it is to harmonize with that use of reason without which we should hold ourselves unworthy of reason—viz. the moral use, which rests entirely on the idea of the supreme good. Hence all natural research tends towards the form of a system of ends, and in its highest development would be a physico-theology. But this, since it arises from the moral order as a unity grounded in the very essence of freedom and not accidentally instituted by external commands, establishes the teleology of nature on grounds which a priori must be inseparably connected with the inner possibility of things. The teleology of nature is thus made to rest on a transcendental theology, which takes the ideal of supreme ontological perfection as a principle of systematic unity, a principle which connects all things according to universal and necessary natural laws, since they all have their origin in the absolute necessity of a single primal being” (p. 538).

Bibliography.—Editions and works of reference are exceedingly numerous. Since 1896 an indispensable guide is the periodical review Kantstudien (Hamburg and Berlin, thrice yearly), edited by Hans Vaihinger and Bruno Bauch, which contains admirable original articles and notices of all important books on Kant and Kantianism. It has reproduced a number of striking portraits of Kant. For books up to 1887 see Erich Adickes in Philosophical Review (Boston, 1892 foll.); for 1890–1894 R. Reicke’s Kant Bibliographie (1895). See also in general the latest edition of Ueberweg’s Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie.

Editions.—Complete editions of Kant’s works are as follows: (1) G. Hartenstein (Leipzig, 1838–1839, 10 vols.); (2) K. Rosenkranz and F. W. Schubert (Leipzig, 1838–1840, 12 vols., the 12th containing a history of the Kantian school); (3) G. Hartenstein, “in chronological order” (Leipzig, 1867–1869, 8 vols.); (4) Kirchmann (in the “Philosophische Bibliothek,” Berlin, 1868–1873, 8 vols. and supplement); (5) under the auspices of the Königlich Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften a new collected edition was begun in 1900 (vol. ii., 1906) in charge of a number of editors. It was planned in four sections: Works, Letters, MSS. Remains and Vorlesungen. There are also useful editions of the three Kritiks by Kehrbach, and critical editions of the Prolegomena and Kritik der reinen Vernunft by B. Erdmann (see also his Beiträge zur Geschichte und Revision des Textes von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1900). A useful selection (in English) is that of John Watson, The Philosophy of Kant (Glasgow, 1888).

Translations.—There are translations in all the principal languages. The chief English translators are J. P. Mahaffy, W. Hastie, T. K. Abbott, J. H. Bernard and Belfort Bax. Their versions have been mentioned in the section on “Works” above.

Biographical.—Schubert in the 11th vol. of Rosenkranz’s edition; Borowski, Darstellung des Lebens und Charakters Kants (Königsberg, 1804); Wasianski, Kant in seinen letzten Lebensjahren (Königsberg, 1804); Stuckenberg, The Life of Immanuel Kant (1882); Rudolf Reicke, Kants Briefwechsel (1900). See also several of the critical works below. On Kant’s portraits see D. Minden, Ueber Portraits und Abbildungen Imm. Kants (1868) and cf. frontispieces of Kantstudien (as above).

Critical (in alphabetical order of authors).—R. Adamson, Philosophy of Kant (1879; Germ. trans., 1880); Felix Adler, A Critique of Kant’s Ethics (1908); S. Aicher, Kants Begriff der Erkenntnis verglichen mit dem des Aristoteles (1907); M. Apel, Immanuel Kant: Ein Bild seines Lebens und Denkens (1904); Arnoldt, Kritische Exkurse im Gebiete der Kantforschung (1894); C. Bache, “Kants Prinzip der Autonomie im Verhältnis zur Idee des Reichs der Zwecke” (Kantstudien, 1909); B. Bauch, Luther und Kant (1904); Paul Boehm, Die vorkritischen Schriften Kants (1906); E. Caird, Critical Philosophy of Kant (2 vols., 1889); Chalybäus, Historische Entwickelung der spekulativen Philosophie von Kant bis Hegel (5th ed., 1860); H. S. Chamberlain, Immanuel Kant (1909); Cousin, Leçons sur la philosophie de Kant (4th ed., 1864); B. Erdmann, Immanuel Kant, Kants Kritizismus in der 1 und 2 Auflage derKritik der reinen Vernunft” (1877); O. Ewald, Kants kritischer Idealismus als Grundlage von Erkenntnistheorie und Ethik (1908) and Kants Methodologie in ihren Grundzügen (1906); Kuno Fischer, Immanuel Kant (4th ed., 1898–1899), Die beiden Kantischen Schulen in Jena (1862), and Commentary on Kant’s Kritik of Pure Reason (1878); F. Förster, Der Entwicklungsgang der Kantischen Ethik bis zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1893); A. Fouillée, Le Moralisme de Kant et l’amoralisme contemporaine (1905); C. R. E. von Hartmann, Kants Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphysik in den vier Perioden ihrer Entwickelung (1894); A. Hegler, Die Psychologie in Kants Ethik (1891); G. D. Hicks, Die Begriffe Phänomenon und Noumenon in ihrem Verhältniss zu einander bei Kant (1897); G. Jacoby, Herders und Kants Aesthetik (1907); W. Kabitz, Studien zur Entwickelungsgeschichte der Fichteschen Wissenschaftslehre aus der Kantischen Philosophie (1902); M. Kelly, Kant’s Philosophy as rectified by Schopenhauer (1909); W. Koppelmann, I. Kant und die Grundlagen der christlichen Religion (1890); M. Kronenberg, Kant: Sein Leben und seine Lehre (1897; 3rd ed., 1905); E. Kühnemann, Kants und Schillers Begründung der Aesthetik (1895) and Die Kantischen Studien Schillers und die Komposition des Wallenstein (1889); H. Levy, Kants Lehre vom Schematismus der reinen Verstandesbegriffe (1901); Arthur O. Lovejoy, Kant and the English Platonists (1908); J. P. Mahaffy, Kant’s Critical Philosophy for English Readers (1872–1874); W. Mengel, Kants Begründung der Religion (1900); A. Messer, Kants Ethik (1904); H. Meyer-Benfey, Herder und Kant (1904); Morris, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (Chicago, 1882); C. Oesterreich, Kant und die Metaphysik (1906); F. Paulsen, Kant: Sein Leben und seine Lehre (1898; 4th ed., 1904; Eng. 1902); Harold H. Prichard, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge (1909); A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, The Development from Kant to Hegel (1882); and, on Kant’s philosophy of religion, in The Philosophic Radicals (1907); F. Rademaker, Kants Lehren vom innern Sinn in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1908); R. Reininger, Kants Lehre vom inneren Sinn und seine Theorie der Erfahrung (1900); C. B. Renouvier, Critique de la doctrine de Kant (1906); H. Romundt, Kants philosophische Religionslehre eine Frucht der gesammten Vernunftkritik (1902); T. Ruyssen, Kant (1900); E. Saenger, Kants Lehre vom Glauben (1903); O. Schapp, Kants Lehre vom Genie und die Entstehung der “Kritik der Urteilskraft” (1901); Carl Schmidt, Beiträge zur Entwickelung der Kant’schen Ethik (1900); A. Schweitzer, Die Religionsphilosophie Kants (1899); H. Sidgwick, Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant (1905); J. H. Stirling, Text Book to Kant (1881); G. Simmel, Kant und Goethe (1906); L. Staehlin, Kant, Lotze und Ritschl (1889); O. Thon, Die Grundprinzipien der Kantischen Moralphilosophie (1895); T. Valentiner, Kant und die platonische Philosophie (1904); C. Vorländer, Kant, Schiller, Goethe (1907); G. C. Uphues, Kant und sein Vorgänger (1906); W. Wallace, Kant (1905); M. Wartenberg, Kants Theorie der Kausalität (1899); John Watson, Philosophy of Kant Explained (1908), Kant and his English Critics