Page:EB1911 - Volume 19.djvu/243

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228
NAPOLEONIC CAMPAIGNS
  

The emperor was now in the direst perplexity. Kutusov was hovering on the outskirts of the city, his main body at Kaluga, some marches to the S.W., where he was in full communication with the richest portion of the empire; and now news arrived that St. Cyr, who had relieved Macdonald on his extreme left, had only 17,000 men left under arms against upwards of 40,000 Russians under Witgenstein; and to the south Tschitschagov’s army, being no longer detained on the Turkish frontier, peace having been made, was marching to join Tormassov about Brest-Litewski with forces which would bring the total of the two well over 100,000 men. Meanwhile Schwarzenberg’s force opposing these had dwindled to a bare 30,000.

The French army was thus disposed almost in an equilateral triangle with sides of about 570 m., with 95,000 men at the apex at Moscow opposed to 120,000, 30,000 about Brest opposite 100,000, and 17,000 about Drissa confronted by 40,000, whilst in the centre of the base at Smolensk lay Victor’s corps, about 30,000. From Moscow to the Niemen was 550 m. In view of this situation Napoleon on the 4th of October sent General Lauriston to the Russian headquarters to treat. Whilst waiting his return Murat was enjoined to skirmish with Kutusov, and the emperor himself worked out a scheme to assume the offensive with his whole army towards St Petersburg, calling in Victor and St Cyr on the way. This project was persisted with, until on the 18th Murat was himself attacked and severely handled (action of Tarutino or Vinkovo). On the morning of the 19th the whole army moved out to accept this challenge, and the French were thoroughly worsted on the 24th in the battle of Maloyaroslavetz.

39. The Retreat from Moscow.—Then began the celebrated retreat. It has generally been forgotten that the utter want of march discipline in the French, and not the climatic conditions, was responsible for the appalling disasters which ensued. Actually the frost came later than usual that year, the 27th of October, and the weather was dry and bracing; not till the 8th of November did the cold at night become sharp. Even when the Beresina was reached on the 26th November, the cold was far from severe, for the slow and sluggish stream was not frozen over, as is proved by the fact that Eblé’s pioneers worked in the water all through that terrible day. But the French army was already completely out of hand, and the degree to which the panic of a crowd can master even the strongest instinct of the individual is shown by the conduct of the fugitives who crowded over the bridges, treading hundreds under foot, whilst all the time the river was easily fordable and mounted men rode backwards and forwards across it.

To return to the actual sequence of events. Kutusov had been very slow in exploiting his success of the 24th and indeed had begun the pursuit in a false direction; but about the 2nd of November, headquarters of the French being at Vyazma, the Cossacks became so threatening that the emperor ordered the army to march (as in Egypt) in hollow square. This order, however, appears only to have been obeyed by the Guards, with whom henceforward the emperor marched.

Kutusov had now overtaken the French, but fortunately for them he made no effort to close with them, but hung on their flank, molesting them with Cossacks and picking up stragglers. Thus the wreck of the Grande Armée, now not more than fifty thousand strong, reached Smolensk on the 9th and there rested till the 14th. The march was then resumed, the Guard leading and Ney commanding the rearguard. Near Krasnoi on the 16th the Russian advanced guard tried to head the column off. Napoleon halted a whole day to let the army close up; and then attacked with his old vigour and succeeded in clearing the road, but only at the cost of leaving Ney and the rearguard to its fate. By a night march of unexampled daring and difficulty Ney succeeded in breaking through the Russian cordon, but when he regained touch with the main body at Orcha only 800 of his 6000 men were still with him (21st).

40. The Beresina.—From here Napoleon despatched orders to Victor to join him at Borisov on the Beresina. The cold now gave way and thaw set in, leaving the country a morass, and information came that Tschitschagov from the south had reached Borisov. He now selected Viesselovo as the point of passage and at 1 a.m. on the 23rd sent orders to Oudinot to march thither and construct bridges. In the execution of these orders Oudinot encountered the Russian advanced guard near Borisov and drove the latter back in confusion, though not before they had destroyed the existing bridge there. This sudden reassumption of the offensive threw Tschitschagov into confusion. Thus time was gained for Victor also to come up and for Oudinot to construct the bridges at Studienka near the above-mentioned place, but a spot in many respects better suited for the purpose. Thither therefore Napoleon sent his pontonniers under General Eblé, but on their arrival they found that no preparations had been made and much time was lost. Meanwhile Victor, in doubt as to the real point of passage, had left the road to Studienka open to Wittgenstein, who had followed hard on his heels.

By 4 p.m. on the 26th the bridges were finished and the passage began, but not without resistance by the Russians, who were gradually closing in. The crossing continued all night, though interrupted from time to time by failures of the bridges. All day during the 27th stragglers continued to cross, covered by such combatants as remained under sufficient discipline to be employed. At 8 a.m. on the 28th, however, Tschitschagov and Wittgenstein moved forward on both banks of the river to the attack, but were held off by the splendid self-sacrifice of the few remaining troops under Ney, Oudinot and Victor, until about 1 p.m. the last body of regular troops passed over the bridges, and only a few thousand stragglers remained beyond the river.

The number of troops engaged by the French that day cannot be given exactly. Oudinot’s and Victor’s men were relatively fresh and may have totalled 20,000, whilst Ney can hardly have had more than 6000 of all corps fighting under him. How many were killed can never be known, but three days later the total number of men reported fit for duty had fallen to 8800 only.

41. Final Operations.—Henceforward the retreat of the army became practically a headlong flight, and on the 5th of December, having reached Smorgoni and seeing that nothing further could be done by him at the front, the emperor handed over the command of what remained to Murat, and left for Paris to organize a fresh army for the following year. Travelling at the fullest speed, he reached the Tuileries on the 18th, after a journey of 312 hours.

After the emperors departure the cold set in with increased severity, the thermometer falling to 23°. On the 8th of December Murat reached Vilna, whilst Ney with about 400 men and Wrede with 2000 Bavarians still formed the rearguard; but it was quite impossible to carry out Napoleon’s instructions to go into winter quarters about the town, so that the retreat was resumed on the 10th and ultimately Königsberg was attained on the 19th of December by Murat with 400 Guards and 600 Guard cavalry dismounted.

Meanwhile on the extreme French right Schwarzenberg and his Austrians had drifted away towards their own frontier, and the Prussian contingent, which under Yorck (see Yorck von Wartenburg) formed part of Macdonald’s command about Riga, had entered into a convention with the Russians at Tauroggen (December 30) which deprived the French of their last support upon their left. Königsberg thus became untenable, and Murat fell back to Posen, where on the 10th of January he handed over his command to Eugène Beauharnais and returned to Paris.

The Russian pursuit practically ceased at the line of the Niemen, for their troops also had suffered terrible hardships and a period of rest had become an absolute necessity.

42. The War of Liberation.—The Convention of Tauroggen became the starting-point of Prussia’s regeneration. As the news of the destruction of the Grande Armée spread, and the appearance of countless stragglers convinced the Prussian people of the reality of the disaster, the spirit generated by years of French domination burst out. For the moment the king and his ministers were placed in a position of the greatest anxiety, for they knew the resources of France and the boundless versatility of their arch-enemy far too well to imagine that the end of their