the one strove to erect bulwarks against French aggression, the other was preparing the ground for fresh annexations. During 1803-4 the breach between the two rivals widened, because Napoleon became more and more aggressive and unceremonious in Italy and Germany. Before the end of 1803 Alexander had come to perceive the necessity of resisting him energetically in order to save Europe from complete subjection, and in August 1804 he recognized that an armed conflict was inevitable. It broke out in the following year, and after the battles of Austerlitz (December 1805) and Friedland (June 1807), in which the Russians were completely defeated, the two sovereigns had their famous interviews at Tilsit, at which they not only made peace but agreed to divide the world between them, with a sublime indifference to the interests of other states. The grandiose project was at once vaguely outlined in three formal documents, to the intense satisfaction of both parties, and on both sides there was much rejoicing at the conclusion of such an auspicious alliance; but the diplomatic honeymoon was not of long duration. The mutual assurances of unbounded confidence, admiration and sympathy, if there was any genuine sincerity in them, represented merely a transient state of feeling. Napoleon, who could brook no equal, was nourishing the secret hope that his confederate might be used as a docile subordinate in the realization of his own plans, and the confederate soon came to suspect that he was being duped. His suspicions were intensified by the hostile criticisms of the Tilsit arrangement among his own subjects and by the arbitrary conduct of his ally, who continued his aggressions in reckless fashion as if he were sole master of Europe. The sovereigns of Sardinia, Naples, Portugal and Spain were dethroned, the pope was driven from Rome, the Rhine Confederation was extended till France obtained a footing on the Baltic, the grand-duchy of Warsaw was reorganized and strengthened, the promised evacuation of Prussia was indefinitely postponed, an armistice between Russia and Turkey was negotiated by French diplomacy in such a way that the Russian troops should evacuate the Danubian principalities, which Alexander intended to annex to his empire, and the scheme for breaking up the Ottoman empire and ruining England by the conquest of India, which had been one of the most attractive baits in the Tilsit negotiations, but which had not been formulated in the treaty, was no longer spoken of. At the same time Napoleon threatened openly to crush Austria, and in 1809 he carried out his threat by defeating the Austrian armies at Wagram and elsewhere, and dictating the treaty of Schönbrunn (October 14).
Russia now remained the only unconquered power on the continent, and it was evident that the final struggle with her could not be long delayed. It began in 1812 by the advance Of the Grande Armée on Moscow, and it ended in 1815 at Waterloo. During those three years Alexander was the chief antagonist of Napoleon, and it was largely due to his skill and persistency that the allies held together and freed Europe permanently from the Napoleonic domination. When peace was finally concluded, he had obtained that predominant position in European politics which had been the object of his ambition since the commencement of his reign, and he now believed firmly that he had been chosen by Providence to secure the happiness of the world in general and of the European nations in particular. In the fulfilment of this supposed mission he was not very successful, Alexander and the reaction in Europe. because his conception of national happiness and the means of obtaining it differed widely from that of the peoples whom he wished to benefit. They had fought for freedom in order to liberate themselves not only from the yoke of Napoleon but also from the tyranny of their own governments, whereas he expected them to remain submissively under the patriarchal institutions which their native rulers imposed on them. Thus, in spite of his academic sympathy with liberal ideas, he became, together with Metternich, a champion of political stagnation, and co-operated willingly in the reactionary measures against the revolutionary movements in Germany, Italy and Spain. In the affairs, of his own country he refrained from developing and extending the liberal institutions which he had created immediately after his accession, and he finally adopted in all departments of administration a strongly reactionary policy. This naturally caused profound disappointment and dissatisfaction in the liberal section of the educated classes and especially among the young officers of the regiments which had spent some years in western Europe. Some of these officers had been in touch with the revolutionary movements, and had adopted the idea then prevalent in France, Germany and Italy that the best instrument for assuring political progress was to be found in secret societies. In Russia such societies began to be formed about 1816. The tsar, though he came to know of their existence, refrained from taking repressive measures against them, and when he died suddenly at Taganrog on the 1st of December 1825, two of them made an attempt to realize their political aspirations. The heir to the throne was the late tsar's eldest brother, Constantine, but he Nicholas I., 1825-55. declined, for private reasons, to accept the succession, and a few days elapsed before the second brother, Nicholas, was proclaimed emperor. Taking advantage of this short interregnum, some members of the secret societies, mostly officers of the Guards, organized a mutiny among the troops quartered in St Petersburg and in Podolia, with a view to effecting a political revolution, but the movement was easily suppressed, and the ringleaders, known subsequently as the Decembrists, were severely punished (see Nicholas I.).
Nicholas was a blunt soldier incapable of comprehending his brother's sentimental sympathy with liberalism. The Decembrists' abortive attempt at revolution and the Polish insurrection of 1831, which he crushed with great severity, confirmed him in his conviction that Russia must be ruled with a strong hand. That conviction he put into practice with extreme rigour during the thirty years, of his reign (1825-55), endeavouring by every means at his disposal to prevent revolutionary ideas from germinating spontaneously among his subjects and from being imported from abroad. For this purpose he created a very severe press-censorship and an expensive system of passports, which made it more difficult for Russians to visit foreign countries. It would be unjust, however, to say that he was the determined enemy of all progress. Progress was to be made in certain directions and in a certain way. Not only was the army to be well drilled and the fleet to be carefully equipped, but railways were to be constructed, river-navigation was to be facilitated, manufacturing industry was to be developed, commerce was to be encouraged, the administration was to be improved, the laws were to be codified and the tribunals were to be reorganized. All this was to be done, however, under the strict supervision and guidance of the autocratic power, with as little aid as possible from private initiative and with no control whatever of public opinion, because influential public opinion is apt to produce insubordination. When the results proved unsatisfactory, remedies were sought in increased administrative supervision, draconian legislation and severe punishment, and no attempt was made to get out of the vicious circle. In the last months of his life, under the influence of a great national disaster, the conscientious, persistent autocrat began to suspect that his system was a mistake, but he still clung to it obstinately. “My successor,” he is reported to have said on his death-bed, “may do as he pleases, but I cannot change!”
This steadfast faith in autocratic methods and the exaggerated fear of revolutionary principles were shown in foreign as well as in home affairs. Like Alexander in the last period of his reign, Nicholas considered himself the supreme guardian of European order, and was ever on the watch to oppose revolution in all its forms. Hence he was generally in strained relations with France, especially in the time of Louis Philippe, who became king not by the grace of God but by the will of the people. During the revolutionary ferment of 1848-49 he urged the Prussian king to refuse the imperial crown, co-operated with the Austrian emperor in suppressing the Hungarian insurrection, and compelled the Prussians to withdraw their support from the insurgents
