to be made, not on the Straits of Tsushima, but as far north as The Japanese 1st Army in Korea possible. Chemulpo, nearer by 50 m. to Port Arthur than to Japan, was selected. On the first day of hostilities Rear-Admiral Uriu disembarked troops at Chemulpo under the eyes of the Russian cruiser “Variag,” and next day he attacked and destroyed the “Variag” and some smaller war-vessels in the harbour, and the rest of the 1st Army (General Kuroki) was gradually brought over during February and March, in spite of an unbeaten and, under Makárov's régime, an enterprising hostile navy. But owing to the thaw and the subsequent break-up of the miserable Korean roads, six weeks passed before the columns of the army (Guard, 2nd and 12th divisions), strung out along the “Mandarin road” to a total depth of six days' march, closed upon the head at Wiju, the frontier town on the Yalu. Opposite to them they found a large Russian force of all arms.
The Russian commanders, at this stage at least, had not and could not have any definite objective. Both by sea and by land their policy was to mass their resources, repulsing meantime the attacks of the Japanese with as much damage to the enemy and as little to themselves as possible. Their strategy was to gain time without immobilizing themselves so far that the Japanese could impose a decisive action at the moment that suited them best. Both by sea and by land, such strategy was an exceedingly difficult game to play. But afloat, had Makárov survived, it would have been played to the end, and Togo's fleet would have been steadily used up. One day, indeed (May 15th), two of Japan's largest battleships, the “Hatsume” and the “Yashima,” came in contact with free mines and were sunk. One of them went to the bottom with five hundred souls. But the admiral was not on board. The Russian sailors said, when Makárov's fate was made known, “It is not the loss of a battleship. The Japanese are welcome to two of them. It is he.” Not only the skill, but the force of character required for playing with fire, was wanting to Makárov's successors.
It was much the same on land. Kuropatkin, who had taken of the army, saw from the first that he would have Kuropatkin's plan. to gain three months, and disposed his forces as they came on the scene, unit by unit, in perfect accord with the necessities of the case. His expressed intention was to fight no battle until superiority in numbers was on his side. He could have gained his respite by concentrating at Harbin or even at Mukden or at Liao-Yang. But he had to reckon with the fleet[1] at Port Arthur. He knew that the defences of that place were defective, and that if the fleet were destroyed whilst that of Togo kept the sea, there would be no Russian offensive. He therefore chose Liao-Yang as the point of concentration, and having thus to gain time by force instead of by distance, he pushed out a strong covering detachment towards the Yalu.
But little by little he succumbed to his milieu, the atmosphere of false confidence and passivity created around him by Alexeiev. After he had minutely arranged the Eastern Detachment in a series of rearguard positions, so that each fraction of it could contribute a little to the game of delaying the enemy before retiring on the positions next in rear, the commander of the detachment, Zasulich, told him that “it was not the custom of a knight of the order of St George to retreat,” and Kuropatkin did not use his authority to recall the general, who, whether competent or not, obviously misunderstood his mission. Thus, whilst the detachment was still disposed as a series of rearguards, the foremost fractions of it stood to fight on the Yalu, against odds of four to one.
The Japanese 1st Army was carefully concealed about Wiju until it was ready to strike. Determined that in this first battle against a white nation they would show their mettle, the Japanese lavished both time and forethought on the minutest preparations. Forethought was still busy when, in accordance with instructions from Tokio, Kuroki on the 30th of April ordered the attack to begin at daybreak on the 1st of May. For several miles above Antung the rivers Yalu and Aiho are parallel and connected by numerous channels. The majority of the islands thus formed were held and had been bridged by the Japanese. The points of passage were commanded by high ground a little farther up where the valleys definitely diverge, and beyond the flank of the ill-concealed positions of the defence. The first task of the right division (12th) was to cross the upper Yalu and seize this. To the Guard and 2nd divisions was Battle of the Yalu. assigned the frontal attack on the Chiuliencheng position, where the Russians had about one-half of their forces under Major-General Kashtalinski. On the 30th of April, Inouye's 12th division accomplished its task of clearing the high ground up to the Aiho. The Russians, though well aware that the force in their front was an army, neither retired nor concentrated. Zasulich's medieval generalship had been modified so far that he intended to retreat when he had taught the Japanese a lesson, and therefore Kuropatkin's original arrangements were not sensibly modified. So it came about that the combined attack of the 2nd and Guard divisions against the front, and Inouye on the left flank and rear, found Kashtalinski without support. After a rather ineffective artillery bombardment the Japanese advanced in full force, without hesitation or finesse, and plunging into the river, stormed forward under a heavy fire. A few moments afterwards Zasulich ordered the retreat. But the pressure was far too close now. Broken up by superior numbers the Russian line parted into groups, each of which, after resisting bravely for a time, was driven back. Then the frontal attack stopped and both divisions abandoned themselves to the intoxication of victory. Meanwhile, the right attack (12th division) encountering no very serious resistance, crossed the Aiho and began to move on the left rear of the Russians. On the side of the defence, each colonel had been left to retire as best he could, and thus certain fractions of the retreating Russians encountered Inouye's advancing troops and were destroyed after a most gallant resistance. The rearguard itself, at Hamatan, was almost entirely sacrificed, owing to the wrong direction taken in retreating by its left flankguard. Fresh attempts were made by subordinates to form rearguards, but Zasulich made no stand even at Feng-hwang-cheng, and the Japanese occupied that town unopposed on the 5th of May. The Japanese losses were 1100 out of over 40,000 present, the Russian (chiefly in the retreat) at least 2500 out of some 7000 engaged.
The Yalu, like Valmy, was a moment in the world's history. It mattered little that the Russians had escaped or that they had been in inferior numbers. The serious fact was that they had been beaten.
The general distribution of the Russian forces was now as follows: The main army under Kuropatkin was forming, by successive brigades, in two groups—I. Siberian Corps (Stakelberg), Niu-chwang and Kaiping; II. Siberian Corps, Liao-Yang. Zasulich (III. Corps and various other units) had still 21,000. In the Port Arthur “fortified rayon,” under Lieut.-General Stoessel (IV. Corps), were 27,060 men, and General Linievich around Vladivostok had 23,000. These are, however, paper strengths only, and the actual number for duty cannot have been higher than 110,000 in all. The Trans-Siberian railway was the only line of communication with Europe and western Siberia, and its calculated output of men was 40,000 a month in the summer. In October 1904, therefore, supposing the Japanese to have used part of their forces against Port Arthur, and setting this off against the absence of Linievich and Stoessel, Kuropatkin could expect to have a sufficient superiority in numbers to take the offensive. His policy was still, “No battle before we are in superior force.”
For the moment it was equally Japan's interest to mark time in Manchuria. Still intent upon the Russian Port Arthur squadron, Landing of the Japanese 2nd Army. she had embarked her 2nd Army (General Oku, 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th divisions) during April, and sent it to Chinampo whence, as soon as the ice melted and Kuroki's victory cleared the air, it sailed to the selected landing-place near Pitszewo. Here, under the protection of a continuous chain of war-vessels between the Elliot
- ↑ Not, as is often assumed, the fortress itself.
