it again, other trenches with a cross fire being behind. At Pan-Lung
the machine guns on the Wall prevented them from leaving the
parallel. At Chi-Kuan Fort the terreplein of the fort had been
covered with entanglements defended by machine guns on the gorge
parapets, and the Japanese could make no way. Briefly, there was
a furious fight all along the line, and nothing gained. On the 27th
of November, after losing 12,000 men, the assault was abandoned.
On the north front the Japanese returned to mining.
But so urgent was the necessity of speedy victory that the fighting had to continue elsewhere. And at last, after every other point 203-Metre Hill. had been attempted, the weight of the attack was directed on 203-Metre Hill. A battery of 11-inch howitzers was established only one mile away. On the 28th of November assaults were made and failed. On the 30th of November an attack with fresh troops failed again. On the 1st of December there was a heavy bombardment by the big howitzers, which obliged the Russians to take shelter in rear of the ruined works. On the 2nd of December the Russians tried a counter-attack. During the next two days the artillery were busy. The engineers sapped up to the ruins of the western work, saw the shelters on the reverse slope and directed artillery fire by telephone. Thirty-six guns swept the ground with shrapnel. Finally on the 5th of December the Japanese attacked successfully. Their losses in the last ten days at 203-Metre Hill had been probably over 10,000. Those of the Russians were about 5000, chiefly from artillery fire.
This was the turning-point of the siege. At once the 11-inch howitzers, assisted by telephone from 203-Metre, opened upon the Russian ships; a few days later these were wholly hors de combat, and at the capitulation only a few destroyers were in a condition to escape. The siege was now pressed with vigour by the construction of batteries at and around 203 Metre, by an infantry advance against the main western defences, and by renewed operations against the eastern forts. The escarp of Chi-Kuan was blown up, and at the cost of 800 men, General Sameyeda (11th division), personally leading his stormers, captured the great fort on the 19th of December. The escarp of Ehr-Lung was also blown up, and the ruins of the fort were stormed by the 9th division on the 28th of December, though a mere handful of the defenders prolonged the fighting for eight hours and the assailants lost 1000 men. Sung-Shu suffered a worse fate on the 31st, the greater part of the fort and its defenders being blown up, and on this day the whole defence of the eastern front Fall of Port Arthur. collapsed. The Japanese 7th and 1st divisions were now advancing on the western main line; the soul of the Arthur defence, the brave and capable General Kondratenko, had been killed on the 15th of December, and though the Japanese seem to have anticipated a further stand,[1] Stessel surrendered on the 2nd of January 1905, with 24,000 effective and slightly wounded and 15,000 wounded and sick men, the remnant of his original 47,000. The total losses of the 3rd Japanese Army during the siege were about 92,000 men (58,000 casualties and 34,000 sick).
Meanwhile the Japanese navy had scored two important successes. After months of blockade and minor fighting, the Russian Port Naval battle of August 10. Arthur squadron had been brought to action on the 10th of August. Admiral Vitheft, Makárov's successor, had put to sea shortly after the appearance of the 3rd Army on the land front of Port Arthur. The battle opened about noon, 20 m. south of the harbour; the forces engaged on each side varied somewhat, but Togo finally had a superiority. Admiral Vitheft was killed. As the Russians became gradually weaker, the Japanese closed in to within 3 m. range, and Prince Ukhtomsky (who succeeded to the command on Vitheft's fall) gave up the struggle at nightfall. The Russians scattered, some vessels heading southward, the majority with the admiral making for Port Arthur, whence they did not again emerge. All the rest were either forced into neutral ports (where they were interned) or destroyed, among the latter being the third-class cruiser “Novik,” which had already earned a brilliant reputation for daring, and now steamed half round Japan before she was brought to action and run ashore. The victors blockaded Port Arthur, until near the close of the siege, when, after going ashore and examining the remnant of the Russian fleet from 203-Metre Hill, Togo concluded that it would be safe to return to Japan and give his ships a complete refit. Kaimura's squadron, after various adventures, at last succeeded on the 14th of August in engaging and defeating the Russian Vladivostok squadron (Admiral Jessen). Thus the Russian flag disappeared from the Pacific, and thenceforward only the Baltic fleet could hope seriously to challenge the supremacy of the Japanese navy.
The remainder of the war on land, although it included two battles on a large scale and numerous minor operations, was principally a test of endurance. After Liao-Yang there were no extended operations, the area of conflict being confined to the plain of the coast side of the Hun-ho and the fringe of the mountains. Japan had partially accomplished, her task, but had employed all her trained men in this partial accomplishment. It was questionable, even in October 1904, whether she could endure the drain of men and money, if it were prolonged much further. On the other hand, in Russia opposition to the war, which had never been popular, gradually became the central feature of a widespread movement against irresponsible government. Thus, while the armies in Manchuria faced one another with every appearance of confidence, behind them the situation was exceedingly grave for both parties. A state of equilibrium was established, only momentarily disturbed by Kuropatkin's offensive on the Sha-ho in October, and by the Sandepu incident in the winter, until at last Oyama fought a battle on a grand scale and won it. Even then, however, the results fell far short of anticipation, and the armies settled down into equilibrium again.
After the battle of Liao-Yang Kuropatkin reverted for a moment to the plan of a concentration to the rear at Tieling. Politically, however, it was important to hold Mukden, the Manchurian capital, and since the Japanese, as on previous occasions, reorganized instead of pursuing, he decided to stand his ground, a resolution which had an excellent effect on his army. Moreover, growing in strength day by day, and aware that the Japanese had outrun their powers, he resolved, in spite of the despondency of many of his senior officers, to take the offensive. He disposed of about 200,000 men, the Japanese had about 170,000. The latter lay entrenched north of Liao-Yang, from a point 9 m. west of the railway, through Yentai Station and Yentai Mines, to the hills farther east. There had been a good deal of rain, and the ground was heavy. Kuropatkin's intention was to work round the Japanese right on the hills with his eastern wing (Stakelberg), to move his western wing (Bilderling) slowly southwards, entrenching each strip of ground gained, and finally with the centre—i.e. Bilderling's left—and Stakelberg, to envelop and crush the 1st Army, which formed the Japanese right, keeping the 4th Army (Nozu) and the 2nd Army (Oku) in countenance by means of Bilderling's main body. The manœuvre began on the 5th of October, and by the evening of the 10th, after four days of fairly heavy advanced-guard fighting, chiefly between Bilderling and Nozu, Stakelberg was in his assigned position in the mountainous country, facing west towards Liao-Yang, with his left on the Taitseho. The advance of Bilderling, however, necessarily methodical and slow in any case, had taken more time than was anticipated. Still, Bilderling crossed the Sha-ho. Sha-ho and made some progress towards Yentai, and the demonstration was so far effectual that Kuroki's warnings were almost disregarded by the Japanese headquarters. The commander of the 1st Army, however, took his measures well, and Stakelberg found the greatest trouble in deploying his forces for action in this difficult country. Oyama became convinced of the truth on the 9th and 10th, and prepared a great counter-attack. Kuroki with only a portion of the 1st Army was left to defend at least 15 m. of front, and the entire 2nd and 4th Armies and the general reserves were to be thrown upon Bilderling. On the 11th the real battle opened. Kuroki displayed the greatest skill, but he was of course pressed back by the four-to-one superiority of the Russians. Still the result of Stakelberg's attack, for which he was unable to deploy his whole force, was disappointing, but the main Japanese attack on Bilderling was not much more satisfactory, for the Russians had entrenched every step of their previous advance, and fought splendidly. The Russian commander-in-chief states in his work on the war that Bilderling became engaged à fond instead of gradually withdrawing as Kuropatkin intended, and at any rate it is unquestioned that in consequence of the serious position of affairs on the western wing, not only did Stakelberg use his reserves to support Bilderling, when the 12th division of Kuroki's army was almost at its last gasp and must have yielded to fresh pressure, but Kuropatkin himself suspended the general offensive on the 13th of October. In the fighting of the 13th-16th of October the Russians gradually gave back, as far as the line of the Sha-ho, the Japanese following until the armies faced roughly north and south on parallel fronts. The fighting, irregular but severe, continued. Kuropatkin was so far averse to retreat that he ordered a new offensive, which was carried out on the 16-17th. Putilov and Novgorod hills, south of the Sha-ho, were stormed by the Russians, and the Japanese made several efforts to retake these positions without success. Kuropatkin wished to continue the offensive, but his corps commanders offered so much opposition to a further offensive that he at last gave up the idea. The positions of the rival armies from the 18th of October, the close of the battle of the Sha-ho, to the 26th of January 1905, the opening of the battle of Sandepu (Heikoutai)—a period almost entirely devoid of incident—may be described by the old-fashioned term “winter quarters.” The total losses of the Russians are stated as 42,000 men, but this is very considerably exaggerated; the Japanese acknowledged 20,000 casualties.
In January 1905, apart from Mishchenko's cavalry raid in rear
- ↑ As regards food and ammunition, the resources of the defence were not by any means exhausted, and General Stessel and other senior officers of the defence were tried by courts-martial, and some of them convicted, on the charge of premature surrender.
