for proof of the self-evident, on which all proof must ultimately depend. It is of course always possible that in any particular case we may be deceived; we may be assuming as self-evidently true what is in reality not so. But such incidental lapses are found to correct themselves by the consequences in which they involve us, and they have no power to shake our trust in the general validity of reason. It may, however, be granted that the possibility of lapse throws us open to the objections, ingenuous or disingenuous, of the sceptic; and we must remain exposed to them so long as we deal with our first principles as so many isolated axioms or intuitions. But the process of self correction referred to points to another proof—the only ultimately satisfactory proof of which first principles admit. Their evidence lies in their mutual interdependence and in the coherence of the system which they jointly constitute.
Of a scepticism which professes to doubt the validity of every reasoning process and every operation of all our faculties it is of course, as impossible as it would be absurd to offer any refutation. This absolute scepticism, indeed, can hardly be regarded as more than empty words; the position which they would indicate is not one which Function of scepticism. has ever existed. In any case, such scepticism is at all times sufficiently refuted by the imperishable and justifiable trust of reason in itself. The real function of scepticism in the history of philosophy is relative to the dogmatism which it criticizes. And, as a matter of fact, it has been seen that many so-called sceptics were rather critics of the effete systems which they found cumbering the ground than actual doubters of the possibility of knowledge in general. And even when a thinker puts forward his doubt as absolute it does not follow that his successors are bound to regard it in the same light. The progress of thought may show it to be, in truth, relative, as when the nerve of Hume’s scepticism is shown to be his thoroughgoing empiricism, or when the scepticism of the Critique of Pure Reason is traced to the unwarrantable assumption of things-in-themselves. When the assumptions on which it rests are proved to be baseless, the particular scepticism is also overcome. In like manner, the apparent antinomies on which such a scepticism builds will be found to resolve themselves for a system based on a deeper insight into the nature of things. The serious thinker will always repeat the words of Kant that, in itself, scepticism is “not a permanent resting-place for human reason.” Its justification is relative, and its function transitional.
Authorities.—Ancient scepticism is fully treated in the relative parts of Zeller’s Philosophie der Griechen. See also works quoted in the biographical articles; Brochard, Les Sceptiques grecs (1887); Ed. Caird, Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers (1904); Norman MacColl, Greek Sceptics from Pyrrho to Sextus (1869): Haas, De philosophorum scepticorum successionibus (1875). Among other works may be mentioned Stäudlin, Geschichte und Geist d. Scepticismus, vorzüglich in Rücksicht auf Moral u. Religion (1794); Tafel, Geschichte d. Scepticismus (1834); E. Saisset, Le Scepticisme: Ænésidème, Pascal, Kant (1875). For a modern view see A. J. Balfour, Defence of Philosophic Doubt (1879). All histories of philosophy deal with scepticism, and general accounts will be found in J. M. Robertson’s Short History of Free Thought and A. W Benn’s History of Modern Rationalism. See also Agnosticism, Rationalism. (A. S. P.-P.; X.)
SCEPTRE. A rod or staff has always been regarded as a token
of authority. Among the early Greeks the sceptre (σκῆπτρον) was
a long staff used by aged men (Il. xviii. 416, Herod. 1. 196), and
came to be used by judges, military leaders, priests and others.
It is represented on painted vases as a long staff tipped with a
metal ornament, and is borne by some of the gods. Among the
Etruscans sceptres of great magnificence were used by kings and
upper orders of the priesthood, and many representations of
such sceptres occur on the walls of the painted tombs of Etruria.
The British Museum, the Vatican and the Louvre possess
Etruscan sceptres of gold, most elaborately and minutely
ornamented. The Roman sceptre was probably derived from
the Etruscan. Under the Republic an ivory sceptre (sceptrum
eburneum) was a mark of consular rank. It was also used by
victorious generals who received the title of imperator, and it
may be said to survive in the marshal’s baton. Under the empire
the sceptrum Augusti was specially used by the emperors, and
was often of ivory tipped with a golden eagle. It is frequently
shown on medallions of the later empire, which have on the
obverse a half-length figure of the emperor, holding in one hand
the sceptrum Augusti, and in the other the orb surmounted
by a small figure of Victory.
With the advent of Christianity the sceptre was often tipped with a cross instead of the eagle, but during the middle ages the finials on the top of the sceptre varied considerably. In England from a very early period two sceptres have been concurrently used, and from the time of Richard I. they have been distinguished as being tipped with a cross and a dove respectively. In France the royal sceptre was tipped with a fleur de lys, and the other, known as the main de justice, had an open hand of benediction on the top. Sceptres with small shrines on the top are sometimes represented on royal seals, as on the great seal of Edward III., where the king, enthroned, bears such a sceptre, but it was an unusual form; and it is of interest to note that one of the sceptres of Scotland, preserved at Edinburgh, has such a shrine at the top, with little images of Our Lady, St Andrew and St James in it. This sceptre was, it is believed, made in France about 1536, for James V. Great seals usually represent the sovereign enthroned, holding a sceptre (often the second in dignity) in the right hand, and the orb and cross in the left. Harold is so depicted on the Bayeux tapestry.
The earliest coronation form of the 9th century mentions a sceptre (sceptrum), and a staff (baculum). In the so-called coronation form of Ethelred II. a sceptre (sceptrum), and a rod (virga) are named, and this is also the case with a coronation order of the 12th century. In a contemporary account of Richard I.’s coronation the royal sceptre of gold with a gold cross, and the gold rod (virga) with a gold dove on the top, are mentioned for the first time. About 1450 Sporley, a monk of Westminster, compiled a list of the relics there. These included the articles used at the coronation of St Edward the Confessor, and left by him for the coronations of his successors. A golden sceptre, a wooden rod gilt and an iron rod are named. These survived till the Commonwealth, and are minutely described in an inventory of the whole of the regalia drawn up in 1649, when everything was destroyed.
For the coronation of Charles II. new sceptres were made, and though slightly altered, are still in use. They are a sceptre with a cross called St Edward’s sceptre, a sceptre with a dove, and a long sceptre or staff with a cross of gold on the top called St Edward’s staff. To these, two sceptres for the queen, one with a cross, and the other with a dove, have been subsequently added.
See Cyril Davenport, The English Regalia; Leopold Wickham-Legg, English Coronation Records; The Ancestor, Nos. 1 and 2 (1903); Menin, The Form, &c., of Coronations (English translation, 1727).
SCÈVE, MAURICE (c. 1500–1564), French poet, was born at
Lyons, where his father practised law. Besides following his
father’s profession he was a painter, architect, musician and
poet. He was the centre of the Lyonnese coterie that elaborated
the theory of spiritual love, derived partly from Plato and partly
from Petrarch, which was enunciated in Antoine Heroet’s
Parfaicte Amye.
Scève’s chief works are Délie, objet de plus haulte vertu (1544); two eclogues, Arion (1536) and La Saulsaye (1547); and La Microcosme (1562), an encyclopaedic poem beginning with the fall of man. Délie consists of 450 dizaines and about 50 other poems in praise of his mistress. These poems, now little read, were even in Scève’s own day so obscure that his enthusiastic admirer Étienne Dolet confesses he could not understand them. Scève was a musician as well as a poet, and cared very much for the musical value of the words he used. In this and in his erudition he forms a link between the school of Marot and the Pléiade. Délie (an anagram for l’idée) set the fashion of a series of poems addressed to a mistress real or imaginary, followed by Ronsard in Cassandre and by Du Bellay in Olive. The Lyonnese school of which Scève was the leader included his friend Claude de Taillemont and many women writers of verse, Jeanne Gaillarde-placed by Marot on an equality with Christine de Pisan—Pernette du Guillet, Clémence de Bourges and the poet’s sisters, Claudine and Sibylle Scève. Scève died in 1564. See also Labé, Louise).
See E. Bourciez, La Littérature polie et les mœurs de cour sous Henri II (Paris, 1886); Pernetti, Recherches pour servir à l’histoire de Lyon (2 vols., Lyons, 1757), and F. Brunetière, “Un Précurseur de la Pléïade, Maurice Scève,’ in his Études critiques, vol. vi. (1899).
SCHACK, ADOLF FRIEDRICH, Graf von (1815–1894),
German poet and historian of literature, was born at Brüsewitz near Schwerin on the 2nd of August 1815. Having studied jurisprudence (1834–1838) at the universities of Bonn, Heidelberg and Berlin, he entered the Mecklenburg State service and was subsequently attached to the “Kammergericht” in Berlin. Tiring of official work, he resigned his appointment, and after travelling in Italy, Egypt and Spain, was attached to the court
