prophecy. In this case there could be no absolute certainty, because the ordinance had[1] never been put in operation. * * * Suppose, by way of illustration, that before bringing suit the Company had put the ordinance into effect and had observed it for a number of years, and the result showed that a sufficient net income had been realized, it is possible that a suit then could be brought and the evidence confined to a period prior to the ordinance, and by a process of speculation the conclusion reached that the ordinance would be confiscatory? * * * Where the case rests, as it does here, not upon observation of the actual operation under the ordinance, but upon speculation as to its effect, * * * we will not guess whether the substantial return certain to be earned would lack something of the return which would save the effect of the ordinance from confiscation. It is enough that the whole case leaves us in grave doubt." And the Court thus concludes its opinion with the following enlightening statement:[2] "Regulation of public service corporations, which perform their duties under conditions of necessary monopoly, will occur with greater and greater frequency as time goes on. It is a delicate and dangerous function. * * * The Courts ought not to bear the whole burden of saving property from confiscation, though they will not be found wanting where the proof is clear. The Legislatures and subordinate bodies, to whom the legislative power has been delegated, ought to do their part. Our social system rests largely upon the sanctity of private property, and that State or community
- ↑ The ordinance in question was enacted by the City of Knoxville fixing in detail the maximum rates to be charged by the company in its business of supplying the city and its inhabitants with water for domestic and other uses, etc.
- ↑ City of Knoxville vs. The Knoxville Water Co., 212 U. S. 1 (see page 18). 1909.
