two hundred per cent. of the normal price, to stimulate increased production, showing a complete realization of the truth enforced by the Common Law that such is the proper and most effective way of securing "adequate supplies in times of scarcity." To say that such a statute, in pari materia with similar statutes, without a word of repeal, demonstrates an implied determination to wreck our whole system of statutory and judicial determination of this matter, goes beyond the bounds of reason. As has already been said, nothing could be more astonishing than that it should have been even discussed as a possibility, much less assumed without any argument. So far as this question is concerned, the statute, properly construed "in the light of well-settled principles," is plainly constitutional.
Two considerations pointed out by Judge Connor in the Myatt case,[1] are of value. The first that "a fair and reasonable construction of the entire section would make the purpose or intent an essential element in the unlawful character of each of them"; and second, as he thus states it:[2] "It is significant that neither of the words 'price' or 'profit' is found in either of the prohibited acts which may be committed by a single person."
This leads to a fact constantly overlooked. At Common Law men were not only permitted to obtain bargains, but profit by them. Indeed, with free competition, the more bargains that were obtained, the better for the consumer, as those having obtained them would in their competition be naturally able and tempted to give the public at least a portion of the benefit. If the incentive were to be taken away, it would inevitably tend to higher prices. Now, the Act scrupu-
